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COMMUNITY IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN
JASON ROBISON,* MATTHEW MCKINNEY** DARYL VIGIL*** & ASADULAH MEELAD****
ABSTRACT
Something historic is happening right now in the Colorado River Basin.
Domestic and international negotiations over the next several years
will yield a new management framework for the Colorado River system
from which more than forty-million people draw the essence of life.
Climate change looms over these negotiations—an ongoing twentyone-year megadrought unprecedented in the historical record.
Although the basin is a place of incredible diversity—a “community of
communities”—you might not know it from institutions devised thus
far for Colorado River governance. Some progress has been made with
these institutions in recent decades, and collaboration has been
instrumental, including with tribal sovereigns whose ancestral
homelands and modern reservations span across the basin. But more
needs to be done. This Article advocates for an elevated commitment
to collaboration in the new management framework’s negotiation and
beyond. Next-generation Colorado River governance institutions
should be created that align with the whole community of
communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The waters of to-day have values and must be divided; the waters of the
morrow have values, and the waters of all coming time, and these values must be
distributed among the people. How shall it be done?” 1 We’re still grappling with
this question posed by John Wesley Powell in 1890. His answer to it was all about
connections—at least as far as his eyes could see. One aspect of these connections
had to do with the contours of the Western landscape and its arterial river systems.
These bloodlines combine to “form the drainage system of a hydrographic basin, a

1. John Wesley Powell, Institutions for the Arid Lands, 40 CENTURY MAG. 111, 113 (1890).
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unit of country well defined in nature, . . . bounded above and on each side by
heights of land that rise as crests to part the waters.” 2 A corollary aspect had to do
with the landscape’s human inhabitants. “Such a district of country is a
commonwealth by itself,” professed Powell, “[t]he people who live therein are
interdependent.”3 Out of this proverbial soil of connectivity grew Powell’s grand yet
ultimately unrealized vision: “that the entire arid region be organized into natural
hydrographic districts, each one to be a commonwealth within itself.”4 Nested in
this fashion, it would fall to the people of each commonwealth to “make their own
laws for the division of the waters, for the protection and use of the forests, for the
protection of the pasturage on the hills, and for the use of the [water] powers.”5
It almost sounds like community. But that would be a stretch. Or, put
differently, the connections didn’t stretch that far in Powell’s time. Not all
Westerners belonged in his watershed commonwealths. Only some were top of
mind. “It should be remembered that the far West is no longer an uninhabited
region,” Powell admonished, revealing thick cultural blinders. 6 When had the “far
West” been “uninhabited”? Not for millennia when accounting for Native peoples,
and not for centuries when considering Spanish and Mexican communities. 7 Yet
they were practically invisible in Powell’s vision.8 It was focused elsewhere—toward
“intelligent, industrious, enterprising” Euro-American immigrants colonizing the
western United States, a people “wide awake to their interests,” whose “hearts
beat high with hope,” and whose “aspirations are for industrial empire.” 9 “On this
round globe and in all the centuries of human history,” gushed Powell, “there has
never before been such a people.”10 It was this “people,” not others, who would be
included. They would create the commonwealths, participate in self-governance,
and make lives and livelihoods involving familiar relationships with other parts of
nature: planting towns and cities “on the mountainsides,” operating “stupendous
mining enterprises,” erecting saw mills on the streams supplied by the
“woodsman’s ax” in the forest, covering the hills with “flocks and herds,” and

2. Id.
3. Id. at 113–14.
4. Id. at 114.
5. Id. To be clear, Powell’s watershed-commonwealths proposal involved nuanced, tiered roles
for the local, state, and federal (“general” in his jargon) governments. Id. at 114–15.
6. Id. at 115.
7. See infra Part II.A–B.
8. Powell did briefly mention the communitarian, centuries-old irrigation communities
transplanted to what had become the U.S. Southwest during the Spanish and Mexican periods. Id. at
112.
9. Id. at 115.
10. Id.

4

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

cultivating the valleys with vineyards, fields, orchards, and gardens. 11 Of course,
Powell’s commonwealths reflected just one conception of “community.” 12
It’s time to say a few things about that word as it applies in the Colorado River
Basin.
One thing is that the singular form seems dead wrong. How can “community”
be used in reference to a 244,000-square-mile watershed encompassing a river
system whose flows supply water to over forty-million people?13 Pluralization
appears necessary. There are layers upon layers of communities in this space.14 For
starters, the Colorado River Basin is replete with ecosystems—aquatic, riparian,
desert, forest, tundra—teeming with biotic life and non-living things.15 Human
beings are one species of these ecosystems, but they are far more extensive,
complex communities.16 Even focusing solely on people, however, the singular form
falls short. Consider the vast metropolises and megapolises hooked up to Colorado
River system water—Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, Denver, Las Vegas, Salt Lake
City, Tucson, and Albuquerque, among others. 17 Contrast these urban oases with
the numerous agricultural communities collectively irrigating nearly 4.5 million
acres in and around the basin.18 And lest we overlook the thirty tribal sovereigns
whose ancestral homelands and modern reservations lie within this magical place,19

11. Id.
12. For a rich examination of how certain aspects of Powell’s watershed commonwealths might
be translated into contemporary Colorado River governance, see Robert W. Adler, Communitarianism in
Western Water Law and Policy: Was Powell’s Vision Lost?, in VISION & PLACE: JOHN WESLEY POWELL &
REIMAGINING THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN 28 (Jason Robison, Daniel McCool & Thomas Minckley eds., 2020).
13. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Colorado River Basin, in 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 6 (Amy K. Kelley
ed., 2011); Press Release, The Bureau of Reclamation, Interior and States Sign Historic Drought
Agreements
to
Protect
Colorado
River
(Feb.
20,
2019),
https://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=66103.
14. For an overview of these communities, see Manuel Chaz Baculi et al., The Hardest Working
River
in
the
West,
BABBITT
CTR
FOR
LAND
&
WATER
POL’Y,
https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/2efeafc8613440dba5b56cb83cd790ba (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
15. See generally ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF
IMMENSITY (2007).
16. The definition of “ecosystem” speaks to this point: “the complex of a community of organisms
and its environment functioning as an ecological unit.” Ecosystem, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ecosystem (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) (emphasis added).
17. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN STAKEHOLDERS MOVING FORWARD TO ADDRESS
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY: PHASE I REPORT: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
2
fig.
1
(2015),
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/MovingForward/Phase1Report/ExecSumm.pdf
[hereinafter MOVING FORWARD REPORT].
18. Id. at 1.
19. See TEN TRIBES PARTNERSHIP & BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN TEN TRIBES
PARTNERSHIP TRIBAL WATER STUDY: STUDY REPORT appx. 1B-1 (2018) (providing map of twenty-nine tribes’
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or the pervasive federal lands where millions of visitors interact with the river
system, including the Grand Canyon.20 The system’s flows are used and valued
distinctly by these diverse communities. 21 But used and valued they are. Which
water users get to access the resource and which do not? This question throws into
relief a final, critical human layer: the network of federal, state, local, and
sometimes tribal officials vested with decision-making authority over the Colorado
River system.22
That’s a lot of layers—though a gross simplification of the real fabric—but it
tees up a contrary and paradoxical thing that needs to be said about “community.”
Its singular form is actually dead on when used in reference to the Colorado River
Basin. From a twenty-first-century perspective, Powell got something profoundly
right in his watershed-commonwealths proposal—the part about connections,
despite how they were conceived in ethnocentric, now antiquated ways. The river’s
mainstem and tributaries do combine to form “the drainage system of a
hydrographic basin, a unit well defined in nature,”23 even with its human bifurcation
via the Colorado River Compact.24 And as for the wide-ranging human
communities—those using the basin’s flows, consumptively and nonconsumptively, as well as those engaged in governance—their distinct, sometimes
conflicting natures are clear as day. Equally so, however, is their common,
unmistakable connection. It is the river system—the lifeblood of all the human
communities and ecosystems of which they are a part.
So the Colorado River Basin is a community of communities. That’s the bottom
line. Why tease it out now? To influence the course of history—nothing less—as
that’s exactly what’s being made at the time of this writing. Between now and 2026,
a new management framework for the Colorado River system will be negotiated—
with domestic and international pieces—ushering in the next chapter in the history

reservations in basin) [hereinafter TRIBAL WATER STUDY]. The Tribal Water Study did not note the San Juan
Southern Paiute Tribe, which is a federally recognized tribe living on traditional territory within the
Navajo Reservation. About the Tribe, SAN JUAN SOUTHERN PAIUTE TRIBE, https://www.sanjuanpaiutensn.gov/about (last visited April 23, 2021). All of the Tribal Water Study documents can be found at
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN TEN TRIBES PARTNERSHIP: TRIBAL WATER STUDY REPORT, LOWER
COLORADO REGION, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/tws/finalreport.html.
20. For a map of federal lands in the Colorado River Basin, see VISION & PLACE, supra note 12, at
98. As just one illustration, annual visitation to Grand Canyon National Park has hovered around sixmillion people over the past several years. Grand Canyon, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
https://www.nps.gov/grca/learn/management/statistics.htm#onthisPage-6 (last visited April 24, 2021).
21. See, e.g., Jason Robison et al., Challenge & Response in the Colorado River Basin 16 WATER
POL’Y 12, 18–19 (2014) (discussing value pluralism in the era of limits).
22. JOHN FLECK, WATER IS FOR FIGHTING OVER AND OTHER MYTHS ABOUT WATER IN THE WEST 9–11 (2016).
23. Powell, supra note 1, at 113.
24. Article I divides the basin into an “Upper Basin” and a “Lower Basin” at Lee Ferry, Arizona.
Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-61-101 to -104 (2019)
[hereinafter Compact]. See also Id. at Arts. II(e)-(g) (defining “Lee Ferry,” “Upper Basin,” and “Lower
Basin”).
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of Colorado River governance.25 In whatever form it ultimately appears, this
framework will implement the cornerstone of the complex, nearly century-old body
of laws and policies governing the system—colloquially, the “Law of the River.” That
cornerstone is the Colorado River Compact. 26 So, too, will the new framework
inevitably touch on a venerable institution at the international border, a treaty over
the Colorado River forged by the United States and Mexico in the mid-twentieth
century.27 Flow obligations connect these two components of the Law of the River
and set water budgets in both countries.28 It is these flow obligations, among other
pressing matters, that the framework must navigate—and in unprecedented
circumstances to boot: amidst a twenty-one-year megadrought that is more severe
than any in recorded history and portends regional aridification. 29 That will be the
negotiating climate (pun intended). It is one requiring earnest, transparent
thoughts and deeds in relation to the concept introduced above: “community.”
How has it historically been understood and approached? What should it mean as
the basin’s community of communities looks ahead?
Short answer for the future: collaboration. Colorado River governance has
increasingly taken this tack. It reflects the reality of the basin as a community of
communities. And it’s how the new management framework should be negotiated
and implemented. That’s this Article’s thesis. It applies with special force to the
engagement of tribal sovereigns, but extends further to the full scope of
communities connected to the river system—those whose voices historically have
been marginalized, alongside those whose voices have been power.
Rolling out this thesis, Part II starts with a sense of place, briefly outlining the
Colorado River Basin’s physical geography, but spending considerable time with its
human history, particularly across the four centuries preceding the Law of the
River’s genesis in 1922. While the dynamic layers of community over this period are
critical to understand from a relationship standpoint, they are often poorly
understood or ignored in contemporary dialogue about the Colorado River system.
Real relationships cannot be built until that changes. Against this backdrop, Part III
turns to governance institutions, partly as revealed by the Law of the River’s core

25. These negotiations are taking place due to the general expiration of three key instruments in
2025 and 2026—the 2007 Interim Guidelines, Minute 323 to the U.S.-Mexico Treaty, and the 2019
Drought Contingency Plans—all of which are discussed infra Part III.B.3.
26. Compact, supra note 24.
27. Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Treaty
Between the United States of America and Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, T.S. 994 [hereinafter Treaty].
28. Compact, supra note 24, at Arts. III(c)–(d); Treaty, supra note 27, at Art. 10.
29. See, e.g., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REVIEW OF THE COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER
BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD 15 (2020) (“The period of
2000 through 2019 was the lowest 20-year period in the historical natural flow record that dates back
to 1906.”), https://www.usbr.gov/ColoradoRiverBasin/documents/7.D.Review_FinalReport_12-182020.pdf [hereinafter 7D REVIEW]; COLORADO RIVER RESEARCH GROUP, WHEN IS A DROUGHT NOT A DROUGHT?
DROUGHT,
ARIDIFICATION,
AND
THE
“NEW
NORMAL”
1
(2018),
https://www.coloradoriverresearchgroup.org/uploads/4/2/3/6/42362959/crrg_aridity_report.pdf.
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instruments—e.g., the Colorado River Compact and U.S.-Mexico Treaty—and partly
as shown by more recent collaborative efforts. The layers of institutions in the latter
camp address adaptation vis-à-vis such timely subjects as biodiversity loss,
ecosystem protection and restoration, tribal water rights, and transboundary water
allocation in light of climate change. Collaboration appears recurringly as an
essential tool for adaptation in these contexts. It should be elevated in negotiations
over the new management framework and beyond. Such advocacy animates Part
IV. Its focus is on institutional design—specifically, how to structure the
negotiations in a collaborative fashion that not only adheres in the short term, but
also sets a precedent for the long term. No progress of this sort can be made
without a sense of the basin’s character—its layers of community—so that topic
marks our put in.
II. LAYERS OF COMMUNITY
Western painter Patrick Kikut’s piece Reservoir Powell: Crossing of the
Cultures kind of says it all. Created as part of the Sesquicentennial Colorado River
Exploring Expedition—which retraced the historic 1869 Powell Expedition’s voyage
down the Green and Colorado rivers during summer 2019—the piece depicts in
sunlit orange, tan, brown, and salmon hues a spot of remarkable cultural
intersection.30 When the Dominguez-Escalante Expedition forded the Colorado
River at this spot in 1776—later named the “Crossing of the Fathers”31—they were
as exhausted as they were elated, “praising God our Lord and firing off some
muskets in demonstration of the great joy we all felt in having overcome so great a
problem.”32 The “main cause” of their suffering through “so much difficult terrain”
was the absence of a Native guide from among the “great number of peoples” with
whom they had interacted—“all of pleasing appearance, very engaging, and
extremely timid,” and all speaking the “Yuta” language. 33 Two centuries later, as
depicted in the foreground of Kikut’s painting, a reservoir submerged this crossing,
bearing Powell’s name as a famed American explorer. 34 Prominent Native elements
hover behind this “lake” in Kikut’s piece, one in the ancient form of Naatsisʼáán
(Navajo Mountain), the other in the industrial form of the now-shuttered Navajo
Generating Station.

30. The Expedition, SCREE, https://www.powell150.org/expedition (last visited April 24, 2021).
31. Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, Crossing of the Fathers (lost site), Utah, NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE, https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/explorers/sitea28.htm (last visited April 24,
2021).
32. THE DOMÍNGUEZ-ESCALANTE JOURNAL: THEIR EXPEDITION THROUGH COLORADO, UTAH, ARIZONA, AND NEW
MEXICO IN 1776 120 (Ted J. Warner ed., 1995).
33. Id. at 120, 122.
34. See generally VISION & PLACE, supra note 12 (examining from retrospective and prospective
angles Powell’s historical ideas about water, public lands, and Native Americans in the Colorado River
Basin and broader “Arid Region”).
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That is our complex world in the twenty-first century—layers atop layers of
culture, identity, and meaning fused together in a place called the Colorado River
Basin. It is a place eluding description in so many ways, though “extreme” is
certainly a fit—extremity of climate, hydrology, and topography, bundled with
something wonderfully incapable of measurement: stunning beauty. Witness on
the one hand the alpine peaks of Wyoming’s Wind River Range, the Green River’s
headwaters, or those within and adjacent to Rocky Mountain National Park, the
Colorado River’s origin. The snowfields of these majestic water towers—as well as
those of the San Juans, Wasatch, and Uintas—are the Colorado River system.35
Consider on the other hand their downstream incising of the Grand Canyon as
snowmelt and the canyon’s desert heart stretching along the river channel in
scorching form several months each year, counterpoised by high, pine-filled rims.
And the river runs further still through low-desert country, flowing slowly, starkly
across the Mojave and the Sonora, and eventually reaching the Gila’s mouth. Below
that confluence once lied one of North America’s most extensive, lush wetlands,
the Colorado River Delta, though only remnants of Aldo Leopold’s “green lagoons”
still remain.36
Imagine what stories these mountains, rivers, and deserts could tell if they
could only speak. Or perhaps if we would only listen. Not just stories about the
Colorado River Basin’s natural history writ large, but inevitably dramas involving
one inordinately influential species within that history in recent millennia,
particularly the past 175 years. Homo sapiens. The Law of the River was not written
on a blank page when it originated in the early twentieth century. Colorado River
governance may have been institutionalized in 1922 with the Colorado River
Compact’s negotiation.37 But the real, messy, often appalling, sometimes inspiring
human relationships surrounding Colorado River governance trace back much
further, in some cases to time immemorial. In short, Colorado River governance has
a backstory. It seems to be seldom told, at least outside a narrow window of time—
perhaps due to shame, perhaps because of ignorance, or perhaps stemming from
the paramount premium placed on condensed information in our busy age.
Regardless of cause, the backstory is worth the trip, even if brevity only allows a
broad narrative. For only when the layers of community embedded within Reservoir
Powell are peeled back can a holistic picture of Colorado River governance be
painted.

35. MOVING FORWARD REPORT, supra note 17, at 2 fig. 1.
36. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 150 (1949).
37. Compact, supra note 24.
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Figure 1. Colorado River Basin38

38. MOVING FORWARD REPORT, supra note 17, at 2 fig. 1.
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Figure 2. Federally Recognized Tribes in Colorado River Basin39

39. TRIBAL WATER STUDY, supra note 19, at app. 1B-1.
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A. Natives
It only makes sense to start with the “first westerners” 40—a fitting term within
and beyond the Colorado River Basin. The basin is rich in Native communities and
has been so for further back than anyone can remember. No fewer than thirty
federally recognized tribes reside on reservations inside the basin at this time,
although these reservations generally pale in size compared to the tribes’ ancestral
homelands—a pattern discussed further below.41
Precisely how long Native communities have been part of the basin depends
upon whom you ask. Tribal members may answer forever or since time
immemorial,42 both of which complement western science as a practical matter—
for example, the more than 13,000 years during which humans are estimated to
have inhabited the Grand Canyon region.43 In light of this time span, Native
communities in and around the basin predate human habitation of what is now
England (encased in ice until 12,000 years ago), as well as ancient Chinese, Egyptian,
and Phoenician civilizations.44 Further indicia of this longstanding occupancy come
from the Hopi village of Oraibi in what is now northeastern Arizona, as well as
Acoma Pueblo in what is now west central New Mexico, both originating nearly a
millennium ago and constituting some of the oldest continuously inhabited
communities in North America.45 These figures put into perspective the relative
recency of the United States’ presence in the basin since the mid-nineteenth

40. CLYDE A. MILNER II, et al., THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 10 (1994) [hereinafter
OXFORD HISTORY].
41. For maps of Colorado River Basin tribes’ traditional homelands, see ANTON TREUER, ATLAS OF
INDIAN NATIONS 170, 204 (2014). These maps should be cross-referenced with the “shrinking Indian
territories” map sequence in id. at 18–19 and the reservations map in TRIBAL WATER STUDY, supra note 19,
at app. 1B-1.
42. As described by Diné (Navajo) tribal member Sarana Riggs, who is the Grand Canyon Program
manager at the Grand Canyon Trust: “It’s not the Grand Canyon to us, it is home. Our stories place us in
the canyon since time immemorial . . . .” Native Voices Lead into Second Century of Grand Canyon
National Park, GRAND CANYON TRUST, (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.grandcanyontrust.org/native-voiceslead-second-century-grand-canyon-national-park.
43. Associated
Tribes,
NAT’L
PARK
SERVICE,
https://www.nps.gov/grca/learn/historyculture/associated-tribes.htm (last visited April 24, 2021).
44. TREUER, supra note 41, at 9.
45. Indigenous Voices of the Colorado Plateau, N. ARIZ. UNIV. LIBRARY: HOPI PLACES,
https://library.nau.edu/speccoll/exhibits/indigenous_voices/hopi/places.html#place2 (“The village of
Old Oraibi, established in 1100 A.D., is considered the oldest continuously inhabited settlement in North
America.”) (last visited April 24, 2021); The Story of Acoma, SKY CITY CULTURAL CENTER & HAAK’U MUSEUM,
https://www.acomaskycity.org/page/our_story (“Since 1150 A.D., Acoma Pueblo has earned the
reputation as the oldest continuously inhabited community in North America.”) (last visited April 24,
2021).
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century, as well as the Spanish/Mexican presence beginning in the mid-sixteenth
century.46
Although just referred to by the general term “Native communities,” that
phrasing is poor insofar as it conveys the idea of a “single, monolithic population.” 47
Nothing could be further off the mark, both in the past and the present. In relation
to the Colorado River Basin and more broadly, “many different cultures—varying in
size, ambition, and economy—inhabited North America.”48 “The cultural and
linguistic diversity of the indigenous peoples of North America dwarfs that of
Europe and many other places.”49 As just one example, when Spaniards initially
ventured into present-day New Mexico and Arizona, they identified fourteen
different Native languages, pinning names that have since persisted: “Piro, Tiwa,
Tewa, Keres, Jemez, Zuni, Moqui, Navajo, Apache, Maricopa, Yuma, Mohave,
Yavapai, and Walapai.”50
Yet these diverse communities did and do share one piece of unmistakable
common ground. “The land made the first people of North America.” 51 Words
cannot do justice to Native connections to the land, but some effort must be made
nonetheless. Several beautiful expressions come from the Hualapai people in the
Grand Canyon region, who explain their origin as follows: “We were created from
the reeds, sediment, and clay of the Colorado River at Wi’Kahme (‘sacred mountain
of creation’),” which lies along the Lower Colorado River.52 The Hualapai thus revere
Ha ’yidada (the Colorado River) as a “life-giving source”53 and “healing body of
water.”54 In their culture, “[t]he long expanse of the River through the [Grand

46. The United States assumed sovereignty over most of the land encompassed within the basin
via the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, while the Coronado Expedition from 1540-1542 marks the
onset of the Spanish/Mexican period. See infra Part II.B-C.
47. PETER IVERSON, Native Peoples and Native Histories, in OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 40, at 15.
48. Id.
49. TREUER, supra note 41, at 9. “[T]he land shaped the people.” Id.
50. EDWARD H. SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST: THE IMPACT OF SPAIN, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE
INDIANS OF THE SOUTHWEST, 1533-1960 12 (1962). More broadly, “North America was home to more than
500 distinct tribes, speaking more than 300 distinct languages from 29 different primary language
families . . . . The linguistic diversity of North American tribes is astounding. By contrast, European
languages have three major classifications, broken into several families.” TREUER, supra note 41, at 7.
Maps of Native language families within and adjacent to the Colorado River Basin can be found in id. at
14.
51. TREUER, supra note 41, at 9.
52. This quote is drawn from the Museum of Northern Arizona’s exceptional permanent
exhibition “Native Peoples of the Colorado Plateau.” It displays the stories of ten tribes of the Colorado
Plateau and contains 350 objects selected by 42 tribal consultants. Portions of the exhibition can be
accessed at Native Peoples of the Colorado Plateau, MUSEUM OF NORTHERN ARIZONA,
https://musnaz.org/native-peoples-gallery/ (last visited April 24, 2021) [Hereinafter materials from the
exhibition, which one of the authors viewed in person, will be cited as “Native Peoples.”].
53. HUALAPAI DEPT. OF CULTURAL RESOURCES, ABOUT THE HUALAPAI NATION 6 (2010), http://hualapainsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/AboutHualapaiBooklet.pdf [hereinafter HUALAPAI NATION].
54. The Voices of Grand Canyon, GRAND CANYON TRUST (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.grandcanyontrust.org/native-american-stories-grand-canyon.
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Canyon] and the riparian eco-systems makes a life-way connection that flows
through the hearts of the Hualapai people.” 55 This connection, in turn, factors into
their animistic view of other relations within nature.
The Hualapai people regard the canyon and the Colorado River as a
living entity infused with conscious spirit. All of the physical elements
here have powers of observation and awareness, including the air, land,
water, plants, animals, and stars. Everything in the landscape has a
spirit deserving of respect.56
So many similar examples of Native connections to the land exist. The Grand
Canyon region is especially rich and powerful in this way.57 Around that epic chasm
and elsewhere, Native peoples have created names for the Colorado River and
other landscape features, ascribing meaning (including sacredness) and deriving
identity through the inherently connective enterprise of human language. 58
Perhaps even more to the point, the Colorado River system is the very place of
origin for several Native communities. It is the spot from which they emerged into
this world and from which they migrated for long periods to eventually arrive at
their homelands. Witness the Hopi and Zuni in both respects. 59 Further, not only
are the river system’s corridors places of emergence and migration for Native
peoples, they are also places to which tribal members will return when they pass
on.60 Thus, the prevailing sense of stewardship for the land accompanying these
connections is as powerful as it is unsurprising. As expressed by one Hopi tribal
member: “We’re still here. We’re still in active communities. We still care deeply
for the lands and this landscape. We still use it and are stewards.” 61
Additional commonalities tied and tie Native communities together. One
concerns the land, but in a different way than above—in regards to “ownership.”
Although territoriality did exist among Native communities, the idea of individual
land ownership did not.62 “Individuals did not own parcels of real estate, so status
and power had nothing to do with the acquisition of acreage, as it did in Europe.” 63

55. HUALAPAI NATION, supra note 53, at 6.
56. This description of the canyon and river appears in an exhibit at the Eagle Point area of Grand
Canyon West on the Hualapai Reservation [hereinafter Eagle Point].
57. For a survey of tribal connections to the Grand Canyon, see Jason Anthony Robison,
Indigenizing Grand Canyon, 2021 UTAH L. REV. 101, 105–20 (2021).
58. Examples of Native terms for the “Colorado River” include Hagtaya (Havasupai), Ha ’yidada
(Hualapai), Pisisvayu (Hopi), and Paxa’ (Southern Paiute). Native Peoples, supra note 52.
59. See, e.g., Robison, supra note 57, at 114–19.
60. See, e.g., id. at 115–16 and 118.
61. This statement comes from Hopi tribal member Georgie Pongyesva. Sarana Riggs, We’re Still
Here: Native Voices on the Grand Canyon National Park Centennial, ADVOCATE, 2018,
https://www.grandcanyontrust.org/advocatemag/fall-winter-2018/native-voices-grand-canyon.
62. IVERSON, supra note 47, at 15.
63. Id.
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Nor was collective land ownership a thing.64 This relationship to the land—
particularly the absence of individual ownership—overlaps with an intertwined
commonality: “dedication to community.”65 Permanency was an aspect of this
dedication. “In general, each person stayed in his or her community of origin from
birth to death, never leaving it for the next village, the next tribe, or the next
hemisphere.”66 So, too, did cooperation play a role, given its necessity for
sustenance and survival.67 In a similar vein, Native communities’ autonomy and
localism are notable. Nothing akin to an all-encompassing state organization
existed in and around the basin prior to contact by European peoples. “Widely
extended political organization and conquest were unknown institutions. It was a
region of small, autonomous, local communities, economically and politically
independent of one another.”68 These communities likewise possessed and
continue to possess a final common trait. And it may be most important:
“[D]ifferent peoples learned from each other.”69 As they moved about, Native
communities “transported old ways of doing things to new places and at the same
time picked up improved methods of building houses, growing crops, hunting
animals, or weaving rugs.”70 Such exchange and adaptability would prove vital.
B. Spaniards & Mexicans
Arrival of the Spaniards in what is now the U.S. Southwest “inaugurated a new
era” in the region’s history, including within and adjacent to the Colorado River
Basin.71 Put in more loaded terms, “[t]he transformation of the continent’s SpanishMexican rim began in the first half of the 1500s, when Iberians introduced Native
Americans to the predatory ways of Europeans.”72 Those ways included the
Spaniards’ faith that “god had given them ‘dominion’ over all creatures of the earth,
including the newly discovered infidels,” state institutions for enforcing social order
(armies, police, and bureaucracies), and other conventions. 73 Hispanics expanded
their presence across the region over the next three centuries, transforming “the
indigenous landscapes and peoples.”74 This process initially occurred under Spanish

64. See, e.g., id. (“Nor did groups as a whole own land.”).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. IVERSON, supra note 47, at 15.
68. SPICER, supra note 50, at 9.
69. IVERSON, supra note 47, at 16 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. IVERSON, supra note 47, at 17.
72. DAVID J. WEBER, The Spanish-Mexican Rim, in OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 40, at 47.
73. Id. at 47–48.
74. Id. at 47.
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rule from 1540 to 1821, and briefly continued under Mexican rule between 1821
and 1848.75
February 23, 1540 marks the era’s onset. A formidable army marched
northward from Compostela in New Spain on that date to conquer the fabled Seven
Cities of Cibola.76 Imagine the impression made by the Coronado Expedition as it
ventured into the heart of today’s Southwest—a party of “three hundred Spanish
adventurers (at least three of them women), six Franciscans, more than one
thousand Indian ‘allies,’ and some fifteen hundred horses and pack animals.” 77 As
conveyed by this image, “Coronado not only explored the Southwest,” he “sought
to conquer the people who lived there.” 78 His expedition was one of several
undertaken by Spaniards in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries aimed at
these goals.79
Yet a number of “firsts” distinguish the Coronado Expedition. Its maritime
arm, led by Hernando de Alarcón, was the first group of Europeans to see the
Colorado River, embarking from the delta on August 26, 1540, and persuading with
“European trifles” Native peoples to drag the boats upstream from the banks. 80
Melchior Diaz likewise ascribed a European name to the river around this time, in
September 1540, calling it the Rio del Tizon (Firebrand River) based upon a practice
of Native peoples in the delta burning sticks for warmth. 81 Diaz relied on these
people to complete the first crossing of the river by Europeans.82 García López de
Cárdenas also warrants attention in this vein. Accompanied by Hopi guides on an
eighty-day journey beginning in August 1540, he was the first European to visit the
Grand Canyon, viewing the Colorado River from its rim.83 The canyon “baffled
[Cárdenas’s] most agile companions in their efforts to descend to the water or to
discover some means of crossing to the opposite side. He returned with only the
story of this hopeless barrier to exploration westward.”84 Finally, and most
importantly, there’s what transpired when Coronado ultimately reached the first

75. The period of Spanish rule is discussed infra notes 75–133 and accompanying text, while the
period of Mexican rule is discussed infra notes 134–147 and accompanying text.
76. GEORGE PARKER WINSHIP, THE CORONADO EXPEDITION, 1540-1542 382 (1896),
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50448/50448-h/50448-h.htm.
77. WEBER, supra note 72, at 49.
78. IVERSON, supra note 47, at 17.
79. For a map of these expeditions, see WEBER, supra note 72, at 46. The Coronado Expedition
was prompted by the wanderings of Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca from 1528 to 1536 and a
reconnaissance of the lands north of Mexico by Marcos de Niza from 1538 to 1539. Id. at 46, 48–49. See
also WINSHIP, supra note 76, at 345 (“[T]he information which led to the expedition of Friar Marcos de
Niza and to that of Francisco Vazquez Coronado was brought to New Spain late in the spring of 1536 by
Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca.”).
80. WINSHIP, supra note 76, at 404.
81. Id. at 406–407.
82. Id. at 407.
83. Id. at 390, 489.
84. Id. at 390.
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purported “city of Cibola”—in actuality, the Zuni Pueblo of Hawikuh.85 He staged a
military assault and conquered the community.86 In this way, “the mystery of the
Seven Cities was revealed at last. The Spanish conquerors had reached their goal.
July 7, 1540, white men for the first time entered one of the communal villages of
stone and mud, inhabited by the Zuñi Indians of New Mexico.”87 Coronado
proceeded to exhort Zuni inhabitants of Hawikuh who returned after the assault—
bringing gifts during Coronado’s recovery—“to become Christians and to submit
themselves to the sovereign over-lordship of His Majesty the Spanish King.”88
What happened at Hawikuh is, of course, a lone chapter in weighty tomes of
Spanish exploration and colonization. The former—Coronado’s Expedition and
otherwise—laid the groundwork for the latter. “The earliest Spanish expeditions set
powerful forces into motion, altering native populations and institutions.” 89 That
holds true with respect to lethal European infectious diseases, particularly smallpox
and measles, accompanying the expeditions. It also speaks to a “legacy of ill-will”
bestowed by them: “[t]he violent aggression of the earliest Spanish explorers
affected Spanish-Indian relations for generations thereafter.”90
In the domain of colonization, Coronado’s counterpart was Juan de Oñate. In
1598, he travelled north from Santa Barbara in New Spain to establish the first
permanent European colony in what is now the American West: New Mexico. 91
Oñate selected as his headquarters the Tewa-speaking Pueblo of Ohke, just north
of present-day Santa Fe, declaring it a Spanish town, renaming it for San Juan,
forcing the king’s new vassals out of their dwellings, yet still keeping them close at
hand to extract labor, food, and clothing.92 Why did Ohke’s inhabitants accede to
Oñate’s oppression? Probably “to avoid the deaths and damage” inflicted by
Coronado and later explorers when prior Native communities had “failed to offer
hospitality to Spaniards.”93 Oñate perpetuated this cycle of violence at Acoma
Pueblo less than a year later.94 From 1604 to 1605, in turn, Oñate travelled across
the Colorado River Basin, entering it in present-day northwestern New Mexico and
trekking to the Gulf of California.95 Yet nothing yielded from this exploration or
other exploits persuaded Oñate to stay the course as it were. Having “found no
wealthy Indians or mines, much less a transcontinental strait,” Oñate and the
colonists prepared to abandon New Mexico.96 Because of the wide range of Pueblo

85. WINSHIP, supra note 76, at 390.
86. Id. at 389.
87. Id. at 389.
88. Id. at 389–90.
89. WEBER, supra note 72, at 50.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 46, 51.
92. Id. at 51.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 51–52.
95. Id. at 46, 52.
96. Id. at 52.
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Indians who had been baptized, however, the Spanish king granted the project a
royal reprieve and permitted Franciscans to stay.97 New Mexico thus “endured
largely as a missionary outpost” throughout the seventeenth century, with a
modest population of no more than 3,000 Spaniards supporting a single
municipality, Santa Fe, founded between 1607 and 1610. 98
These snapshots of the Coronado Expedition and Oñate’s colonization of New
Mexico are just that—granular stories within a massive Spanish metanarrative. The
whole enterprise revolved around a paramount, time-tested rationalization:
“civilization.”
[B]eginning in the late 1500’s, the Spaniards identified their attempts
to change the Indians of this region as a mission for civilizing a savage
people. The missionaries, the military captains, and the colonial
administrators were very conscious of this mission and of themselves
as bearers of civilization. Again and again they used the word
“civilization” and instituted changes in everything from clothing
to
religious practice in its name.99
The roots of this civilizing program trace to medieval Europe and the
constructed hierarchy between “civilized” versus “barbarian” peoples. 100 This
intellectual and moral convenience was a proverbial seed transplanted into New
Spain’s soil. From it grew the civilizing program, “rest[ing] on the idea that the
Spaniards enjoyed a way of life which was of a completely different quality from,
and of course immeasurably superior to, that of the barbarians,” including Native
communities in and around the Colorado River Basin.101 Spaniards bore a perceived
obligation to “civilize” these “barbarians,” and fulfillment of this obligation was
spun into a form of gift giving.102 “Lacking government, religion, and civilized
decencies, the Indians were being given the opportunity to know these things and
should be grateful for them.”103
Native communities were culturally inferior, Spanish communities were
culturally superior. That was the dogma of “civilization” in the context of Spanish
missions and towns.104 Cultural relativism had no place. Rather, “[t]he Spanish
program was an a priori, unilaterally conceived plan for improving, that is, civilizing,
the barbarian Indians” of the Colorado River Basin and overall region. 105 And the
perceived “improvements” spanned many facets of life:

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. SPICER, supra note 50, at 5.
100. Id. at 281.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 281–82.
103. Id. at 282.
104. Id. at 285.
105. Id.
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The Spaniards identified civilization with specific elements of the
Spanish culture of the period. They identified it by and large with the
Castilian variety of the Spanish language, with adobe and stone houses,
with men’s trousers, with political organization focused through loyalty
and obedience to the King of Spain, and with the Roman Catholic form
of Christianity. For more than two hundred years after 1540 the
Spaniards in northwestern New Spain sought by various means to
replace corresponding features of Indian cultures with these and other
elements . . . .106
These collective elements have been dubbed a “Culture of the Conquest”
because of their unified focus on conquest via the civilizing program. 107 No doubt
this terminology carries heavy connotations. They were borne out in many ways,
however, including a tried and true Spanish technique for conforming Native
communities to the elements: “forcible imposition.” 108 Military coercion and
corporeal punishment were widely harnessed:
We may say that the Spaniards employed force to get the Indians to
live according to their legal and political system, to make them work
regularly in their economic enterprises, to persuade them to follow
the weekly plan of worship in the churches, and to give up aspects of
their religion classed by the missionaries as idolatry or worship of the
Devil.109
As outlined in these broad strokes, the Spanish civilizing program remained
consistent in form throughout the colonization era, from the early 1600s to the
early 1800s.110
A relationship cycle commonly followed Spanish attempts to impose the
civilizing program on Native communities within and adjacent to the Colorado River
Basin. The cycle played out in various ways across the region but generally entailed
four stages: (1) initial acceptance of the civilizing program by the Native community;
(2) growing tension between the Natives and Spaniards; (3) rebellion or attempted
rebellion by the Native community; and (4) mutual accommodation between the

106. Id. at 5. These elements are reiterated and supplemented slightly in id. at 282. See also
WEBER, supra note 72, at 53–54 (“Many Spanish priests . . . could not imagine that a people could become
Christians unless they lived like Europeans. Thus, in the ideal mission, Franciscans sought to reshape the
natives’ temporal lives by teaching them to dress, eat, and live like town-dwelling Spaniards.”).
107. SPICER, supra note 50, at 284.
108. Id. at 324.
109. Id. at 326. See also WEBER, supra note 72, at 54 (“[O]nce natives consented to receive
baptism, Franciscans commonly relied on military force to prevent converts from slipping back into
apostacy . . . .”).
110. SPICER, supra note 50, at 331.
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Natives and Spaniards.111 These stages can be seen in seventeenth-century New
Mexico, as well as throughout the “eighteenth century as Spanish missionaries
attempted conversions among other sedentary peoples in far northern New Spain,”
including the Pimas of present-day southern Arizona and coastal tribes of Alta
California.112
Native communities weren’t passive subjects of the civilizing program. Far
from it. There are numerous examples of the rebellion stage of the relationship
cycle. Most well-known is the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. The Pueblos’ population in
New Mexico had fallen by at least half—to roughly 17,000—between Oñate’s initial
colonization in 1598 and the revolt.113 Rejecting the forcible imposition of
Catholicism and Spanish rule, it was a coordinated resistance by an alliance of New
Mexico’s forty-six Pueblos, plus Hopi and Zuni peoples.114 Within a three-day
period, the Native alliance “put Santa Fe under siege and destroyed every other
Spanish settlement in the region,” killing 500 Spaniards and chasing the remaining
2,000 to Mexico.115 Spanish reconquest of New Mexico began twelve years later,
but it precipitated further Native resistance, spurring another revolt in 1696
involving all but five of the Pueblos.116 The Hopi subsequently destroyed Awatovi,
the one Hopi village that had tried to adopt Christianity, in 1700, and followed suit
in 1706 with an attack on “the nearest Pueblo village of Zuni to protest the return
of Christian influence there.”117 All told, the Hopi “expelled the Franciscans in the
1680 revolt and maintained their independence until the end of the Spanish era.” 118
Further examples of Native resistance included the Pima Revolt of 1751—“a
widespread nativistic reaction to Spanish intrusion” into Pimeria Alta (now
southern Arizona)—as well as the Yuma Revolt of 1781 wherein the Quechans
closed the Spaniards’ only land connection between Pimeria Alta and Alta
California, the critical Colorado River crossing at Yuma.119 While Spaniards
characterized these acts of resistance as “rebellions,” Native communities
assuredly same them through different eyes—“as armed struggles for freedom.” 120
Yet Native communities also weren’t passive subjects of Spanish influence in
a different sense. Not only did these communities learn from one another before
the Spanish invasion—as noted above—“their flexibility carried over into the

111. WEBER, supra note 72, at 57.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 55.
114. TREUER, supra note 41, at 176; see also RICHARD WHITE, “IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY
OWN”: A NEW HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 12 (1991). White also notes the Pueblos’ “cooperation with
some of the surrounding ‘Apaches’ (either Navajos or actual Apaches) . . . .” Id. at 12.
115. TREUER, supra note 41, at 176.
116. WHITE, supra note 114, at 12.
117. IVERSON, supra note 47, at 18. The Hopi repelled Spanish military emissaries sent to chastise
them for this “obstinacy” in 1701, 1707, and 1717. Id.
118. WEBER, supra note 72, at 57.
119. Id. at 67.
120. Id. at 55.
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postcontact period.”121 The Navajo offer one illustration. During the 140 years
between the Coronado Expedition and the Pueblo Revolt, they “learned about the
Spaniards’ religion, language, and culture and gradually determined the usefulness
of these things. Few Navajos saw any point in converting to Catholicism. . . . Nor did
Spanish replace the Navajo language.”122 At the same time, the Spaniards’ horses,
sheep, cattle, and goats melded into Navajo culture.123 The Navajo were not outliers
in this way. “Even the sedentary farmers at Zuni eventually took up ranching.” 124
So, too, did the Apache—who were never conquered by the Spanish—adopt horses
and metal weapons, utilizing them for raiding and keeping large herds.125 The
Spanish likewise presented “certain opportunities” to the Pueblos of New Mexico,
from livestock to the technical skills of new craftsmen to new crops such as peaches,
wheat, oats, plums, and apricots.126 Catholicism also seeped in. Although the
Pueblos “did not abandon their own religious rituals,” the new religion came to
supplement and to partially merge with pre-existing rites.127
Native communities’ selective incorporation of Spanish culture dovetailed
with another practical consideration: protection. Arguably even more so than
cultural incorporation, protective alliances between Native communities and the
Spanish make sense of the mutual-accommodation stage of the relationship cycle.
In New Mexico, Spanish power was not only relevant to interpueblo relations, “a
potentially valuable addition to an individual pueblo” in its relations with rival
Pueblos.128 The Spanish also “offered the Pueblos protection against all the less
settled peoples . . . who lived in the surrounding lands”—and vice versa as far as
what the Pueblos could muster against common enemies. 129 Thus, moving forward
from the Spaniards’ quelling of the 1696 revolt, “came stability of a sort.”130 Mutual
protection was a key factor in forging this accommodation. “The Spanish and the
Pueblos came to need each other, for surrounding them were other Indians who
increasingly preyed upon Spaniard and Pueblo alike and were preyed upon in
turn.”131 The Spanish called these tribes bárbaros, and they included the
Comanches, Faraone Apaches, and initially the Navajos.132 “Against these bárbaros
the Spaniards, the Pueblos, and usually the Utes stood together,” constituting “the

121. IVERSON, supra note 47, at 16.
122. Id. at 38.
123. Id.
124. TREUER, supra note 41, at 167.
125. Id.; see also WHITE, supra note 114, at 10 (“[M]ounted and armed with metal weapons, the
Apache, Navajo, and Ute raiders became far more dangerous opponents than they had ever been before
the Spanish arrived.”).
126. TREUER, supra note 41; see also WHITE, supra note 114.
127. WHITE, supra note 114, at 11.
128. Id. at 10.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id.
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most successful Indian alliance the Spanish would forge in their northern
provinces.”133
When Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, human relationships
in and around the Colorado River Basin changed yet also stayed the same. 134 During
their quarter century of rule, Mexicans followed in their predecessors’ footsteps by
self-identifying as “bearers of civilization.”135 In this way, they perpetuated ancient
Europe’s constructed hierarchy between “barbarian” and “civilized” peoples. 136
Mexicans “were just as certain as the Spaniards that their own kind of culture was
civilization and that they had a mission to civilize the Indians.”137 The content of the
civilizing program showed some continuity as well. Mexicans “still regarded
Castillian Spanish . . . as an important element, and they still emphasized
rectangular houses of some sort and men’s trousers.” 138 Where things changed a
bit was with other elements of the civilizing program—namely, (1) granting of full
citizenship to Native peoples, (2) political incorporation of all citizens (Native
peoples included) into the nation-state, and (3) equitable distribution of land in
individual parcels adequate to support families.139 These new measures aimed to
move Mexico—with Native communities assimilated into it—away from “the
system of bad government and economic stagnation which had characterized the
final phase of Spanish rule.”140 Unintended consequences nonetheless followed.
A familiar pattern of Native resistance and Mexican forcible imposition
ensued. Native communities received the civilizing program in its Mexican mold “as
a new form of oppression and a threat to a well-established way of life.”141
Resistance varied across communities, on the one hand prompting flight from the
new measures, on the other hand armed revolt. 142 But Mexican officials doubled
down.143 Rather than modifying the civilizing program’s new measures, they strove
to force their acceptance.144 “[W]henever the Indian reaction took the form of
determined resistance, the Mexican policy became one of simple force”—that is,
“forcible ‘civilizing’ of the Indians”—including wholesale killing of Native peoples,
destruction of their crops, “nondestructive military colonization” of their

133. Id.
134. For a map depicting the Spanish presence in the region as of 1821, see WEBER, supra note
72, at 69. See also id. at 67 (discussing Spanish population figures in 1821 within California, Texas,
Arizona, and New Mexico).
135. SPICER, supra note 50, at 5.
136. Id. at 281.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 334–35.
140. Id. at 335.
141. Id. at 336.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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communities, and deportation.145 It takes little effort to surmise what
rationalization came into play here, perhaps above all else in relation to what was
considered the “cornerstone of a solution of the Indian problems”: “[t]he concept
of individual ownership of plots of land.”146 “The view developed that the Indian
tendencies toward tribal separatism and the corporate community were a species
of barbarism which had to be destroyed if Mexico was to become a functioning
nation.”147 This rationalization would reveal the cyclical nature of time as the
nineteenth century unfolded.
C. Americans
Choosing the proper entry point for U.S. colonization of the Colorado River
Basin and broader West is more difficult than may appear at first blush. Given his
role in the Louisiana Purchase and the Lewis and Clark Expedition, however,
President Thomas Jefferson is certainly high up on the shortlist, particularly a
continental vision articulated by him in 1801, roughly two years before the
“imperial fire sale” with Napoleon.148
However our present interests may restrain us within our own limits, it
is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid
multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits and cover the
whole northern, if not the southern continent, with a people speaking
the same language, governed in similar form by similar laws.149
Two decades after this statement, in 1821, Mexico’s independence from Spain
created a gap for Jefferson’s continental vision—at least the northern part of it—
with Euro-Americans streaming into the present-day U.S. Southwest “for the first
time in significant numbers as Mexico nullified Spanish restrictions against foreign
residents and foreign commerce.”150 “[T]he American era was about to begin,” and
the stream “would soon turn into a flood.”151
There was a preset channel (channels, really) through which the flood would
surge, though some of the new immigrants held themselves high above it,
displaying “little curiosity about the Hispanics who had preceded them.” 152 Rather,
“blinded by anti-Spanish and anti-Mexican biases, many of the earliest Anglo
Americans preferred to imagine the trans-Mississippi West as a virgin land and

145. Id. at 338–39.
146. Id. at 338.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. WHITE, supra note 114, at 61–62, 119–21.
149. ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2014).
150. WEBER, supra note 72, at 21.
151. IVERSON, supra note 47, at 41.
152. WEBER, supra note 72, at 47.
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readily overlooked the region’s long Hispanic past.”153 A rich, ironic sense of cultural
supremacy and cultural inferiority thus accompanied the new era.
Initially, Anglo Americans dismissed the long Spanish-Mexican tenure in
the region as a time of despotism, religious intolerance, and economic
stagnation and Hispanics themselves as indolent, vicious and
superstitious (characteristics that Spaniards had often applied to
Indians). Painting the Hispanic past in dark hues enabled Anglo
Americans to draw a sharp contrast with the enlightened institutions
that they imagined they had imposed on the region.154
Central to the preset channel—despite the new immigrants’ ethnocentrism—
was a continued, albeit reoriented focus on “civilization” and ultimately conquest.
Conceptions of “civilization” differed partly, though not fully, as between the new
immigrants and the Spanish and Mexican colonists.155 Yet the “civilizing” program’s
end goal for Native communities in and around the Colorado River Basin
reverberated.156 As the program played out between 1848 and 1922—the former
reflecting the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo’s formation, the latter marking the
Colorado River Compact’s drafting—the new immigrants crafted novel laws and
policies governing their relationships with the region’s lands and waters.157 These
developments reflected the same heavy truth as the “civilizing” program. “The
Anglo American migrants had come as conquerors.”158 “They had envisioned a West
with little or no room for the life that had been previously lived there,” and they
“felt free to impose their own language, government, economic organization, law,
and customs to their adopted land.”159
To be clear, although the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formally heralds
the United States’ assumption of sovereignty over most of the Colorado River
Basin’s land mass, a good deal of groundwork had been undertaken prior to the
treaty.
Some groundwork had taken place on the physical landscape. Consider the
expeditions adjacent to and across the basin by Zebulon Pike (1806-1807), Stephen
Long (1819-1820), and Benjamin Bonneville (1832-1836), as well as wide-ranging

153. Id.
154. Id. at 73.
155. The distinct features yet familiar end goal of the American “civilizing” program between 1848
and 1922 are discussed infra notes 177–222 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. The doctrinal features and underlying environmental ethics of these novel laws and policies
are surveyed infra notes 222–241 and accompanying text.
158. WHITE, supra note 114, at 181.
159. Id.
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travels of mountain men such as Jim Bridger, William Ashley, and Jedediah Smith. 160
The U.S. Army Corps of Topographical Engineers likewise came into existence
during this period, in 1838, encompassing within its work John C. Fremont’s
extensive explorations in and around the basin during the 1840s. 161 A clear goal
drove government explorers and scientists in the field at this time:
They sought to establish American hegemony and dominance in the
West, to give reliable descriptions of Indian cultures, to assess
resources with scientific exactness, and generally to record an account
of the West that would enable Anglo American settlers to make it the
site of a complex industrial civilization.162
Other groundwork had fallen in the domain of politics and public
consciousness. It involved the creation and dissemination of a durable construct—
one harkening back to Thomas Jefferson’s continental vision and similar
expansionist sentiments by Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and James Monroe. 163
The construct was “manifest destiny.”164 Coined by newspaper editor John L.
O’Sullivan in 1845, the phrase surfaced during debates over Texas’s annexation into
the United States.165 In O’Sullivan’s rhetoric, foreign interference in that annexation
threatened to thwart “the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the
continent allotted [sic] by Providence for the free development of our yearly
multiplying millions.”166 Thus, “before the claims of Providence, legal claims of
other nations, let alone the unmentioned claims of Indians” were mere “cobweb
tissues” in O’Sullivan’s view.167 Although the aggressive tone and nationalistic zeal
of “manifest destiny” did not reflect a consensus across U.S. society at this time, the
construct’s expansionist nature found expression in the Mexican-American War
from 1846 to 1848—a “war of conquest” provoked by U.S. federal officials.168
Through this act of imperialism the Colorado River Basin was annexed into the
United States, and the stage was set for the nation’s western borders to coalesce.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was the main legal instrument. “For 15 million

160. Id. at 47–48, 121–22. Trading posts opened by American traders during this period
“extended as far west as the Gunnison River in Colorado and the Uintah River in Utah, where Antoine
Robidoux, a French-American who had obtained Mexican citizenship, opened posts among the Utes.”
Id. at 52. See also MILNER, supra note 40, at 159, 162–63.
161. WHITE, supra note 114, at 122–25.
162. Id. at 122.
163. MILNER, supra note 40, at 166.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. As further professed by O’Sullivan: “The American claim is by the right of our manifest
destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the
development of the great experiment of liberty and federative self-government entrusted to us.” WHITE,
supra note 114, at 73.
167. WHITE, supra note 114, at 73.
168. Id. at 79–81; MILNER, supra note 40, at 166.
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dollars and the assumption of all claims by American citizens against Mexico,” the
United States assumed sovereignty over a vast portion of the West that included
parts of present-day Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and
California.169 A few years later, in 1853, the Gadsden Purchase went through,
incorporating into the United States a 29,000 square-mile strip across what are now
southern Arizona and southwestern New Mexico. 170 “With the Gadsden Purchase
the boundaries of the modern American West were complete.” 171 These borders
did not realize manifest destiny’s full ambition. Nor did they contemplate equality
for all peoples within them:
The federal government willingly acquired new land, but it did not
willingly embrace the people inhabiting that land. . . . As for the people
within the Mexican cession to the United States, they were left on the
margins of American society. A clear sense of racial hierarchy, based on
the assumption of white cultural superiority, often led to legal, political,
and social exclusion for racial minorities.172
Dovetailing with their aggregation of land, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
and the Gadsden Purchase transplanted something foundational from the legal
realm into the Colorado River Basin and its environs: the U.S. Constitution. It put
into place a framework of legal relations that has fundamentally shaped human
habitation in and around the basin since the mid-nineteenth century. This
habitation consists not only of human relations—for example, those between the
new Euro-American immigrants’ communities, pre-existing Spanish and Mexican
communities, and longstanding Native communities—but also relations between
human beings and other parts of nature (human-nature relations)—for example,
those between human beings and the Colorado River itself. The Property Clause, 173
Treaty Clause,174 Indian Commerce Clause,175 Compact Clause,176 and other
provisions set legal parameters around which later subconstitutional laws (treaties,
statutes, executive orders, regulations, etc.) would be composed and according to
which human habitation in the region would be molded.

169. WHITE, supra note 114, at 83.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. MILNER, supra note 40, at 168. See also id. at 157 (“Acquisition was simply a claim to western
lands that were already occupied by an incredible variety of native peoples, a distinct population of
Hispanic settlers, and a diverse representation of fur trappers.”).
173. “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
174. “The President . . . shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Id. at art. II, § 2.
175. “Congress shall have Power . . . To Regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.” Id. at art.
I, § 8.
176. Phrased in an inverse manner, the Compact Clause provides: “No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” Id. at art. I, § 10.
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These constitutional provisions anchored the United States’ program for
“civilizing” Native communities within and beyond the Colorado River Basin. To
appreciate the program’s genesis and nature, however, the story must meander to
earlier chapters of U.S. history.
During the decades leading up to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, there
hadn’t been a “civilizing program” per se—at least not in the sense that emerged in
and around the Colorado River Basin later in the nineteenth century. Rather, there
had been an isolation policy whose roots traced to English colonization of North
America. “Throughout the period preceding the formation of the United States, the
British failed to conceive of an empire which should include the Indians as an
integral part of its citizenship.”177 Instead, as English settlers pushed west from the
Eastern Seaboard, “the result was the growth of a territory inhabited almost
entirely by Europeans with few persisting Indian communities.” 178 This practice of
isolating Native American communities from English settlers set a precedent for the
United States in 1776—namely, the vision of “a wholly non-Indian nation which
might grow by pushing Indians westward where they would be free to live in
whatever way they cared to, providing they remained peaceful with the Whites
settled at the borders of their territory.”179 Put differently, early U.S. policy posited
that “the solution to conflicts over land and way of life lay in isolating the Indians
as completely as possible from the Whites and letting them go their own way.” 180
By calling for removal and isolation rather than incorporation, the policy differed
sharply from the Spanish and Mexican “civilizing” programs. It embodied a cold
“truth” perceived by the new immigrants: “civilization” was “something peculiarly
their own and not for the Indians.”181
Yet O’Sullivan’s “multiplying millions,”182 in the rhetoric of manifest destiny,
forced the isolation policy to morph—though not break—following its arrival in and
around the Colorado River Basin. Euro-American immigration into and across the
basin accelerated rapidly after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 183 Pre-treaty
government expeditions and fur trading had laid groundwork as described above, 184
with Jedediah Smith’s “rediscovery” of Wyoming’s South Pass through the Rocky
Mountains being especially notable, as it spawned a proverbial settler “super-

177. SPICER, supra note 50, at 344.
178. Id.
179. Id. See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 45–54 (2005) (discussing removal policy)
[hereinafter COHEN’S].
180. SPICER, supra note 50, at 345.
181. Id. at 5. See also id. at 344 (“For the most part the Anglo approach was dominated by the
idea of pushing the Indians out of their way and keeping them apart from themselves. In general, the
settlers thought in terms of extermination or forcible isolation, rather than Christian conversion.”).
182. MILNER, supra note 40, at 166.
183. WHITE, supra note 114, at 189.
184. Id. at 47–48, 121–25.
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highway.”185 Euro-American immigrants bound for the Oregon country would rely
on South Pass, as would the Mormons in their initial journey and successive
migrations to the Salt Lake Valley.186 Upon their 1847 arrival in that valley, the
Mormons petitioned Congress to establish the massive State of Deseret—a request
that ultimately fell flat, but nonetheless marked the onset of an expansive
colonization effort throughout the basin and beyond.187 So, too, did droves of FortyNiners traverse South Pass on their way to California’s glittering gold. 188 All told,
from 1840 to 1860, approximately 300,000 immigrants traveled to the Far West on
the overland trails: 200,000 to California (120,000 during the Gold Rush years),
53,000 to Oregon in search of farms, and 43,000 to Utah as a haven from religious
persecution.189
Immigration and settlement of this sort caused unprecedented incursions into
tribal homelands in and around the Colorado River Basin 190—a pattern facilitated
by the federal government with transformative results for the isolation policy. One
example of this facilitation involved government expeditions cutting across
different parts of the basin and its environs during the 1850s to select a
transcontinental railroad route.191 That selection would not be made until after the
Civil War, but the federal government responded to the immediate “need of
western settlers for a transportation network” with wagon roads, constructing
thirty-four of them in the West between 1850 and 1860. 192 Further facilitation
occurred over the next two decades with federal surveys of the basin and broader
region by Clarence King, George Wheeler, Ferdinand Hayden, and John Wesley
Powell.193 These surveys would “reveal to settlers the conditions that they would
encounter and the resources they could develop. Any such endeavor created a
vision of the West.”194 And the surveys overlapped with yet another facilitator: the
U.S. military.195 Indian wars spanned the latter half of the nineteenth century within

185. Frontiersman Jedediah Smith is Born, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/mountain-man-jedediah-smith-is-born (last updated Jan. 4, 2021).
186. See Mormon Pioneer National Historic Trail, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
https://www.nps.gov/mopi/planyourvisit/maps.htm (last updated Jan. 28, 2021) (showing an
interactive map of the Mormon Pioneer National Historic Trail).
187. MILNER, supra note 40, at 172; WHITE, supra note 114, at 163–66.
188. MILNER , supra note 40, at 189. Miners also traveled to the California gold fields via a southern
route through the Colorado River Basin that included portions of present-day New Mexico, Arizona, and
California. Travelers on the California Leg of the Southern Route 1849-1852, CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF PARKS AND
RECREATION, https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=24680 (last visited April 24, 2021).
189. WHITE, supra note 114, at 189.
190. Id. at 90. See also COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 64 (“Indian tribes were engulfed in the stream
of western migration.”).
191. WHITE, supra note 114, at 125. See also MILNER, supra note 40, at 161.
192. WHITE, supra note 114, at 127.
193. Id. at 128–35. These surveys were consolidated into the U.S. Geological Survey in 1879. Id.
at 132. A useful map of the surveys can be found in Milner, supra note 160, at 186.
194. WHITE, supra note 114, at 135.
195. MILNER, supra note 40, at 173–83.
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the basin and across the West.196 “[N]ot all Indian tribes fought American troops”
during this period, “but all Indians came under the federal government’s policy of
cultural assimilation” detailed below.197 That was the context for the surveys. They
were inseparable from the Indian wars, providing military officials with maps and
wagon-road surveys, as well as facilitating Euro-American migration and settlement
that inherently appropriated resources on which Native communities historically
had depended.198 So much for being left alone.
These factors brought into being a “civilizing” program implemented by the
United States in and around the Colorado River Basin after the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. An outgrowth of the pre-existing isolation policy, the concept
that “dominated Anglo thought about Indians” at this time was the reservation.199
It reflected the reality that Euro-American immigrants were gradually overrunning
tribal homelands.200 “No spot in the United States could any longer be thought of
as a permanently isolated area.”201 Thus, “[t]he reservation policy became a form
of internal removal within the West.” 202 It was “an application of the peacethrough-isolation program and consisted of forcing conquered Indians into those
parts of their territory least desirable to White settlers and keeping them there
through force.”203 When considered in the context of the Indian wars, General
William T. Sherman’s harsh description of the reservation policy’s impact on Native
communities tied a bow around things. The policy entailed “a double process of
peace within their reservation and war without.”204
But not only did reservations serve an isolating function. They were conceived
as “civilizing” tools with a limited shelf life. Putting Native communities onto the
“white road”—in the Colorado River Basin and elsewhere—is ultimately what
reservations aimed for.205 Devised to foster eventual cultural assimilation into
mainstream U.S. society, reservations were constructed as places where “Indians
were to be individualized and detribalized. . . . Indians would break their communal
bonds, give up their tribal identity, and then as individuals enter white society.” 206
Temporary segregation was the prescription and prognosis, with the acculturation
process involving conversion to agriculture, Christianity, English, and private

196. Id.
197. Id. at 173.
198. Id. at 129–30.
199. SPICER, supra note 50, at 345.
200. COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 64.
201. SPICER, supra note 50, at 347.
202. MILNER, supra note 40, at 174.
203. SPICER, supra note 50, at 346.
204. MILNER, supra note 40, at 174.
205. Id.
206. WHITE, supra note 114, at 92. See also COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 65 (“The reservations were,
in effect, envisioned as schools for civilization, in which Indians under the control of the agent would be
groomed for assimilation.”).
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property.207 Boarding schools were instrumental to this end—particularly in the
U.S. Southwest—“isolating children from their tribe, forcing them to speak English,
and compelling them to follow Anglo American customs.”208 The paramount goal—
as infamously described by Indian “educator” Richard Henry Pratt—was to “kill the
Indian and save the man.”209 And the U.S. military’s role again cannot be
overlooked. It kept tribes isolated—forcibly bound to the “civilizing” process—on
reservations.210 While this policy is deeply troubling from a present-day
perspective, General Sherman’s statement above throws into relief what was an
even more dismal alternative at the time: outright extermination of Native
peoples.211
Although reservations (or portions thereof) did prove temporary for some
tribes, it wasn’t because they achieved their assimilationist goals. Quite the
opposite. Rather, “[a]n important complement to the reservation policy was the
device of allotment.”212 Recall the cornerstone of the Mexican “civilizing” program,
“[t]he concept of individual ownership of plots of land,” as well as its underlying
premise, “the basis of civilization consisted in knowing how to handle individual
property.”213 This measure came full circle. Allotment was similarly regarded as a
“fundamental feature” of the U.S. “civilizing” program. 214 Premised on the belief
that “private property and individual autonomy formed the heart of civilization,”
allotment of communally held reservation lands into individual parcels reflected a
prevailing view among federal officials: “As long as Indians held their land in
common . . . the entire ‘civilizing’ process could not take place.” 215 Although
allotment provisions had appeared in treaties and other instruments creating
reservations earlier in the nineteenth century, the General Allotment Act of 1887
(Dawes Act) was the comprehensive piece of legislation that ushered in the
allotment era.216 Eastern reformers considered the policy vital to the “civilizing”
program, while Western settlers and developers supported it to gain access to
reservation lands, as unallotted lands were deemed “surplus” and opened for Euro-

207. See, e.g., MILNER, supra note 40, at 173 (“Through education and missionization, the
government hoped to transform tribal peoples into independent Christian farmers.”).
208. WHITE, supra note 114, at 113. See also SPICER, supra note 50, at 348 (“It was believed . . .
that the Indian societies with their barbaric influences could be broken apart more quickly if all the Indian
children were required to be educated in Anglo schools, whether they and their parents wished it or
not.”). According to Spicer, the boarding-school program extended widely throughout the U.S.
Southwest, with “a fourth or more of the generation coming of school age from the 1890’s to the 1930’s
experiencing boarding-school life.” Id. at 349.
209. WHITE, supra note 114, at 113.
210. COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 65.
211. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 91 (describing “reservations as alternatives to extermination”).
212. COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 66.
213. SPICER, supra note 50, at 338, 348.
214. Id. at 348.
215. WHITE, supra note 114, at 114.
216. COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 77.
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American settlement under public land laws.217 The policy’s cumulative impact was
astounding. “Indian land holdings were reduced from 138 million [acres] in 1887 to
48 million [acres] in 1934,” and “an additional 60 million acres that were either
ceded outright or sold to non-Indian homesteaders and corporations as ‘surplus’
lands are not included in the 90 million acre loss.” 218 Colorado River Basin tribes
were not immune from this process. The Southern Ute lost 33,473 acres, and the
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation lost nearly 30,000 acres. 219
Small portions of other reservations were also allotted.220
To summarize, during the roughly seventy-five-year period between the 1848
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo’s formation and the 1922 Colorado River Compact’s
drafting, the U.S. “civilizing” program for Native communities in and around the
basin evolved as follows:
The Anglo-Americans, when they came into possession of the northern
part of New Spain, thought of civilization at first as something peculiarly
their own and not for the Indians. They began by setting up reservations
as places where Indians could be isolated from the requirements of
civilization. But speedily, as settlers encircled the reservations, the
Anglo-Americans also began to think of themselves as bearers of
civilization. They identified civilization with the American variety of the
English language, the agricultural technology of the United States at
that time, elementary schools with religious instruction, the holding of
land by individual title, and usually some one of the Protestant varieties
of Christianity.221
Many other relational developments paralleled this “civilizing” program as it
came into effect across the Colorado River Basin. During the latter half of the
nineteenth century, the basin proved to be a place where human beings held
distinct views on their relationships with other parts of nature (again, humannature relations). Such distinctions can be seen across the layers of community. In
the minds of most Euro-American immigrants, “nature existed largely as a collection
of commodities. . . . [T]hey valued plants, animals, and minerals according to their
utility” to humans.222 Christian theology laid beneath this view: “God, they believed,
had created nature for individual human beings to use, and it was their duty to
make use of it.”223 A similar perspective prevailed in the earlier Spanish and Mexican

217. Id.; WHITE, supra note 114, at 115.
218. COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 79.
219. Daniel Cordalis & Amy Cordalis, Civilizing Public Land Management in the Colorado River
Basin, in VISION & PLACE, supra note 12, at 252.
220. SPICER, supra note 50, at 349.
221. Id. at 5–6.
222. WHITE, supra note 114, at 212.
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communities—which also saw “nature as a set of commodities and resources”—
albeit with the dominant focus on community versus individual ownership. 224
Among Native communities in and around the basin there was much variation in
beliefs about human-nature relations.225 As a whole, however, they differed by
“their tendency to endow nature with a spiritual dimension largely lacking in white
thought. Plants and animals were no more a simple commodity than were
humans.”226
Important line drawing—paralleling the creation of Indian reservations—also
took place during this period. Evolving views on human-nature relations were partly
at play. As a threshold matter, the seven states with territory located inside the
Colorado River Basin were carved out, California being the first to attain statehood
in 1850, and Arizona and New Mexico being the last to do so in 1912. 227 So, too, did
public land policy pivot. While the latter half of the nineteenth century marked the
zenith of the disposal era—privatization of federal lands being the paradigm driving
the 1862 Homestead Act and its counterparts—retention of federal lands also
emerged as a counterbalancing priority.228 Witness the geneses of the Organic
Administration Act of 1897 underpinning the National Forest System, the
Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizing national monuments, and the 1916 Organic Act
establishing the National Park Service.229 Distinct values animated these novel laws
emphasizing public ownership: conservation in some instances, preservation in
others.230 As applied to the basin’s landscape (e.g., Grand Canyon National Park’s
1919 designation)231 and beyond, the laws revealed a nascent shift in American
thought about relations between human beings and other parts of nature. 232
Laws governing human relations with and over water also surfaced at this
time.233 Born in the mining camps of the California Gold Rush, the legal doctrine of

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 212–13.
227. For a map depicting these statehood dates, see The U.S. Today, with Dates of Statehood Wall
Map, MAPS.COM, https://www.maps.com/products/the-us-today-with-dates-of-statehood-wall-map910xml (last visited April 24, 2021).
228. See, e.g., Paul Hirt, Who Is the “Public” on the Colorado River Basin’s Public Lands?, in VISION
& PLACE, supra note 12, at 126.
229. See, e.g., Robert B. Keiter, John Wesley Powell and the National Park Idea, in VISION & PLACE,
supra note 12, at 109–10, 113.
230. Hirt, supra note 228, at 129; Keiter, supra note 229, at 113.
231. An Act to Establish the Grand Canyon National Park in the State of Arizona, 40 Stat. 1175,
1177 (Feb. 26, 1919).
232. This shift is most pronounced in relation to the national parks. As set forth in the 1916
Organic Act, their purpose is illustrative: “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects
and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” An Act to Establish a
National Park Service, and for Other Purposes, 39 Stat. 535, 535 (Aug. 25, 1916).
233. See, e.g., Matthew McKinney & John E. Thorson, Resolving Water Conflicts in the American
West, 17 WATER POL’Y 679, 687–91 (2015).
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prior appropriation affords one example. 234 It hinges the existence of water rights
on ongoing “beneficial use” of the water afforded by them—“use it or lose it”—and
calls for allocating water according to temporal priority when not all water rights
can be satisfied—“first in time, first in right.”235 Prior appropriation spread like
wildfire across the Colorado River Basin and broader West over the latter half of
the nineteenth century.236 While prior appropriation is state law, however, another
paradigm-shifting piece of federal legislation came into existence around the
twentieth century’s turn: the Reclamation Act of 1902. 237 It brought into being the
U.S. Reclamation Service (later renamed Bureau of Reclamation) and facilitated the
construction, operation, and maintenance of federal water projects throughout the
basin and region.238 The beneficiaries of prior appropriation and the Reclamation
Act were the same Euro-American settlers whose mass migration compelled the
U.S. “civilizing” program for Native communities.239 At the same time, tribes were
not wholly invisible to the law during this period—at least on paper.240 In 1908, the
U.S. Supreme Court handed down Winters v. United States, holding that the
creation of Indian reservations for agricultural purposes implicitly reserved tribal
water rights.241
Would the values embedded in Winters, or those espoused by the National
Park Service’s 1916 Organic Act, come to make a difference within the Law of the
River? Its nearly century-long evolution began not long after these milestones. 242
Over the past century, which communities have mattered in Colorado River
governance, and which communities have not? Looking at the big picture, how well
has Colorado River governance navigated the reality of the basin as a community of
communities? The answer undoubtedly lies in the eye of the beholder. And it’s to
this confluence of the basin’s communities and institutions that we now turn.
III. LAYERS OF INSTITUTIONS
Nothing about the story above should suggest the Colorado River Basin’s
cultural fabric has been static as the American period has continued to play out.
Change has been constant in both ancient and new communities within and

234. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). Prior appropriation was initially recognized as
formal law in this case.
235. See, e.g., JASON ANTHONY ROBISON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 286–
87, 354–59 (2020).
236. See ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 59–133 (1983) (elegantly
chronicling this pattern).
237. See DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848-1902
(1992), for a rich exploration of the Reclamation Act’s backstory.
238. See, e.g., The Bureau of Reclamation: A Very Brief History, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
https://www.usbr.gov/history/borhist.html (last updated Aug. 15, 2018).
239. See supra Part II.
240. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
241. Id.
242. See supra Part III.
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adjacent to the basin throughout the Law of the River’s evolution. This trajectory
has been richly tracked in other writings.243 An unmistakable aspect of it has been
explosive growth, as captured famously by the concept of the “Big Buildup.” 244
Cities in and around the basin “organized a concerted campaign” during the midtwentieth century for “the rapid, wholesale development of . . . energy and water,”
resulting in “one of the most prodigious peacetime exercises of industrial might in
the history of the world.” 245 In this fashion, the Big Buildup “made the modern
Southwest,” transforming it “from a backwater region of 8 million people at the end
of World War II into a powerhouse of 32 million” by the century’s end.246 Diversity
accompanied this growth.247 Not only with respect to the types of parties entitled
to use Colorado River system water, but even more significantly in public attitudes
about the types of uses to which this water ought to be put.248
So human communities in and around the Colorado River Basin have
increased in both scale and value pluralism since the Law of the River’s 1922
genesis—a pattern circling back to the big-picture question posed a moment ago.
How well has Colorado River governance navigated the reality of the basin as a
community of communities? Put differently, how visible is the multi-colored
character of the whole basin community in the institutions developed for Colorado
River governance? We pursue these questions in two threads.
A. Relational Foundation
Our initial thread is foundational in nature. It accounts for the roughly fortyyear period from 1922 to 1963 during which the Colorado River Compact, 249 U.S.Mexico Treaty,250 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,251 and U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Arizona v. California252 came about. Taken together, these four
instruments make up the Law of the River’s international and interstate water

243. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 12; FLECK, supra note 22; PHILIP. L. FRADKIN, A RIVER NO MORE: THE
COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST (1981); MARK W.T. HARVEY, A SYMBOL OF WILDERNESS: ECHO PARK AND THE
AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (1994); MICHAEL HILTZIK, COLOSSUS: HOOVER DAM AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CENTURY (2010); RUSSELL MARTIN, A STORY THAT STANDS LIKE A DAM: GLEN CANYON AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE WEST (1989); DAVID OWEN, WHERE THE WATER GOES: LIFE AND DEATH ALONG THE COLORADO
RIVER (2018); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986); APRIL
R. SUMMIT, AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER (2013); CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU:
CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (1999).
244. WILKINSON, supra note 243, at xii.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Robison et al., supra note 21, at 18–19 (discussing value pluralism in the era of
limits).
248. Id.
249. Compact, supra note 24.
250. Treaty, supra note 27.
251. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) [hereinafter Upper Basin
Compact].
252. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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allocation framework.253 Even more critical than their allocation function,
however—at least for present purposes—are the precedents they set for the
relationships that make up Colorado River governance. They shaped both human
relations and human-nature relations in and around the basin in ways reverberating
here and now.
1. Colorado River Commission
It is again the cornerstone of the nearly century-old maze of laws and policies
collectively known as the “Law of the River”: the Colorado River Compact.254 Yet the
compact’s legacy in the area of governance is somewhat confounding. While it
placed federal-state relations over the Colorado River system into a mold that has
persisted, the specific body that negotiated the compact, the Colorado River
Commission, disbanded once the ink on the signature line had dried. 255 There is no
basinwide commission for Colorado River governance—“[n]o compact provision
establishe[d] a commission or other permanent agency for administration of the
agreement.”256 But that is not to say the compact is irrelevant in this space.
It took the Colorado River Commission approximately ten months to negotiate
the compact—an undertaking spanning from January to November of 1922. 257 The
commission was composed of representatives from the federal government and
the seven states whose boundaries overlie the basin—again, Colorado, Wyoming,
Utah, and New Mexico on the one hand (colloquially, the “Upper Basin states”), and
Arizona, California, and Nevada on the other (colloquially, the “Lower Basin
states”).258 As this lineup shows, the federal sovereign and basin state sovereigns
had seats at the table and voices in shaping the Law of the River’s cornerstone. The
same is not true for other communities whose connections to the basin ran and still
run much deeper. Tribal representation on the commission? That question sadly
may have provoked laughter at the negotiations, as they occurred during the
allotment era of federal Indian policy and embodied its bullheaded focus on
“civilization and assimilation” of Native peoples.259 The Colorado River Commission

253. Jason Anthony Robison, The Colorado River Revisited, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 475, 480–81 (2017).
254. Compact, supra note 24.
255. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF
WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2d ed. 2009), for the seminal work on the Colorado River Compact’s legal
history; see also ERIC KUHN & JOHN FLECK, SCIENCE BE DAMMED: HOW IGNORING INCONVENIENT SCIENCE DRAINED
THE COLORADO RIVER (2019), for an complementary source; see also Minutes and Record of the First
Eighteen Sessions of the Colorado River Commission Negotiating the Colorado River Compact of 1922,
http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/LawOfTheRiver/MinutesColoradoRiverCompact.pdf
(last
visited April 24, 2021).
256. Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1966).
257. HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 138–214.
258. See Compact, supra note 24, at preamble, for the identities of the federal and state
commissioners.
259. COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 77 (internal quotations omitted).
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made “[n]o attempt . . . to discover how many Indians were in the basin or what
their water needs were.”260 While Winters had been on the books for fourteen
years, “[t]he commission simply assumed that the water rights of Indians were
negligible.”261 “Indians were a forgotten people in the Colorado Basin, as well as in
the country at large.”262 And so, too, was Mexico pushed to the margins. It formally
requested to be “represented” on the commission and “given consideration in the
studies and projects.”263 But that ask went nowhere; instead, the commission
relegated Mexico to observer status.264
The relationships animating the compact negotiations can be gleaned on the
document’s face—by what’s there and what’s not. There is a clear focus on informal
cooperation between the federal and state sovereigns on technical aspects of
Colorado River governance. Article V actually uses the term “cooperate” in this
vein.265 Neither it nor its dispute-resolution-focused counterpart, Article VI, suggest
anything resembling a formal governance entity, however. 266 Whatever the
Colorado River Commission was, it had evaporated.
Precisely what the compact does at the margins should also be brought to
light. The invisibility of the basin’s tribal sovereigns not only can be seen from the
negotiations. It’s unmistakable in Article VII’s text: “Nothing in this compact shall
be construed as affecting the obligations of the United States of America to Indian
tribes.”267 Despite Winters and the federal trustee’s obligations, this provision is the
compact’s sole mention of the Colorado River Basin’s thirty tribal sovereigns—a
one-sentence disclaimer. And the condescension and dismissiveness accompanying
the provision’s drafting cannot be ignored, both characteristics illuminated
brilliantly by the Colorado River Commission’s chairman, Herbert Hoover:
“You always find some congressmen . . . ,” he explained, “who will
bob up and say, ‘What is going to happen to the poor [I]ndian?’ We
thought we would settle it while we were at it.” And the way to settle

260. HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 211. According to Hundley, there were “nearly sixty thousand
Indians on about thirty reservations in the basin” at this time. Id. at 80.
261. Id. at 211 (internal quotations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court handed down Winters in
1908. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
262. HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 80.
263. Id. at 175.
264. Id. at 175–76.
265. Compact, supra note 22, at Art. V (calling for cooperation between the “chief official of each
signatory State charged with the administration of water rights,” the “Director of the United States
Reclamation Service,” and the “Director of the United States Geological Survey.”). Meyers, supra note
256, at 13 (“Article V requires certain state and federal officials to cooperate in gathering and
disseminating information regarding run-off and use of system water.”).
266. Compact, supra note 22, at Art. VI. Meyers, supra note 256, at 13 (“[A]rticle VI contemplates
the appointment of ad hoc commissioners to settle controversies arising between the signatory states.”).
267. Compact, supra note 22, at Art. VII.
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it, he suggested, was his “wild Indian article” . . . . The commissioners
unanimously approved his suggestion.268
Mexico fared slightly better in the compact’s text. It anticipated a future treaty
and prescribed how treaty flows would be supplied by the basin states. 269 Of
further note at the margins is the Colorado River system itself, as the compact not
only reflected contemporary views on human relationships with the river system,
but also set the stage for future conflicts involving competing views on that
subject. Should the river system be treated as a mere conduit for human water
consumption? Or might it be approached as a living river system? The compact
clearly pointed Colorado River governance in the former direction, with its core,
animating concern being “beneficial consumptive use” of Colorado River system
water.270
2. International Boundary and Water Commission
Colorado River governance at the international level looks quite different than
at the domestic basinwide level in the United States. While the Colorado River
Compact’s signing in 1922 marked the end of the line for the Colorado River
Commission, the U.S.-Mexico Treaty’s formation in 1944 brought into being a new
(or updated) body to navigate the nation-states’ relations over the Colorado
River.271 The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) constitutes a
formal entity for Colorado River governance. In this characteristic, the IBWC stands
apart from the informal, ad hoc federal-state arrangements called for by Articles V
and VI of the compact,272 not to mention the defunct commission.
It took several decades during the first half of the twentieth century for the
U.S.-Mexico Treaty—and thus the IBWC—to come into existence.273 When the
treaty ultimately appeared towards the end of World War II, the IBWC supplanted
its predecessor, the International Boundary Commission, and was entrusted with

268. HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 212.
269. Compact, supra note 22, at Art. III(c).
270. Beneficial consumptive use of Colorado River system water is what frames the compact’s
apportionment in Article III. Id. at Art. III(a)–(b). Further indicia of this orientation appear in Article II’s
definition of “domestic use” and Article IV’s water-use hierarchy. Id. at Arts. II(h), IV(a)–(b).
271. Treaty, supra note 25. The treaty also applies to the Rio Grande and Tijuana River.
272. Compact, supra note 22, at Art. V.
273. Succinct coverage of the treaty’s formation can be found in Norris Hundley, Jr., The West
Against Itself: The Colorado River—An Institutional History, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 9 (Gary
D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1986). More extensive studies include Charles J. Meyers & Richard
L. Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367 (1966), and NORRIS HUNDLEY,
JR., DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (1966).
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treaty administration.274 Consisting of a U.S. Section and a Mexican Section, 275 the
treaty spells out the IBWC’s composition, including a requirement that each Section
shall have an Engineering Commissioner as its head.276 Likewise, the treaty specifies
the IBWC’s powers and duties, which involve a host of technical matters (e.g.,
installation of gaging stations, recordkeeping and dissemination of treaty-flow
data),277 but also extend to critical non-technical subjects. Examples of the latter
sort include the IBWC’s authority over treaty enforcement and dispute
resolution.278 More significant than the details of these aspects of international
Colorado River governance is the core fact that the treaty creates and defines the
composition of a formal governance entity.279
Yet one aspect of the IBWC’s approach to treaty administration deserves
special attention: the minutes system.280 It has proven clutch over the roughly
seventy-five years of the treaty’s existence, with no fewer than 325 minutes
adopted as of this writing.281 Treaty minutes are implementation agreements—
agreements adopted by the IBWC to implement the treaty’s provisions without
amending its text.282 More specifically, the treaty calls for the IBWC to record its
decisions as minutes, and maps out a process through which minutes take effect. 283
The default rule is that silence by either government during a thirty-day period
following a minute’s pronouncement by the IBWC constitutes approval.284
Conversely, if either government expresses disapproval of a minute during the
thirty-day period, the treaty requires the governments to “take cognizance of the
matter” and work toward an agreement. 285 All told, this component of international

274. Treaty, supra note 25, at Art. 2. Specifically, the IBWC was entrusted with “[t]he application
of the present Treaty, the regulation and exercise of the rights and obligations which the two
Governments assume thereunder, and the settlement of all disputes to which its observance and
execution may give rise.” Id.
275. Welcome, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY & WATER COMMISSION, UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, UNITED
STATES SECTION, https://www.ibwc.gov/home.html (last visited April 24, 2021); Notas de Actualidad,
COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE LÍMITES Y AGUAS ENTRE MÉXICO Y ESTADOS UNIDOS,
https://cila.sre.gob.mx/cilanorte/ (last visited April 24, 2021).
276. Treaty, supra note 25, at Art. 2. “The Commissioner, two principal engineers, a legal adviser,
and a secretary . . . shall be entitled in the territory of the other country to the privileges and immunities
appertaining to diplomatic officers.” Id.
277. Id. at Arts. 12(d), 24(f).
278. Id. at Arts. 24(c)–(d).
279. The IBWC has not been immune from criticism as a governance entity. See generally Robert
J. McCarthy, Executive Authority, Adaptive Treaty Interpretation, and the International Boundary and
Water Commission, U.S.-Mexico, 14 U. DENVER WATER L. REV. 197 (2011).
280. Treaty, supra note 25, at Art. 25.
281. Minutes Between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC, INT’L BOUNDARY &
WATER COMMISSION, U.S. AND MEX., U.S. SECTION, https://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_Minutes/Minutes.html
(last visited April 24, 2021).
282. Robison, supra note 253, at 505.
283. Treaty, supra note 27, at Art. 25.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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Colorado River governance has enabled the treaty to be implemented adaptively in
the face of challenges that either weren’t anticipated or prioritized when the
instrument was adopted—delta restoration and climate change being prime
examples.286
Although the treaty’s approach to governance is much different than the
Colorado River Compact’s, there are a couple pieces of notable commonality. First,
just as Native communities had no voice in the compact’s formation, Indigenous
Peoples on either side of the international border do not appear to have had any
hand in the treaty’s formation.287 Its text is silent about Indigenous Peoples.288 Not
even an analogue to the compact’s perfunctory “Wild Indian article” (i.e., Article
VII) can be seen.289 Second, the treaty embodies the notion of the Colorado River
system as a conduit for human water consumption. There is no reference to the
Colorado River Delta’s ecology (or the like), the water-use hierarchy prioritizes
consumptive uses, and Mexico’s allocation is expressed as a quantified allocation
to be delivered annually by the United States.290 No sense of a living river system
emanates from the document.
3. Upper Colorado River Commission
Moving far upstream from the international border—to the vast high desert
country, majestic mountains, and sheer canyons above Lee Ferry—it becomes
apparent that the Colorado River Compact is not the only interstate agreement
superimposed on the Colorado River system. It has a counterpart with the Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact (Upper Basin Compact). 291 In its approach to
governance, this instrument resembles the U.S.-Mexico Treaty more closely than it
does the cornerstone, establishing a formal governance entity (“interstate
administrative agency”) in the Upper Basin called the Upper Colorado River
Commission (UCRC).292

286. See, e.g., INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, EXTENSION OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES AND ADOPTION
WATER SCARCITY CONTINGENCY PLAN IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN, MINUTE NO. 323 (Sept. 21,
2017), https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min323.pdf [hereinafter MINUTE 323]; INT’L BOUNDARY &
WATER COMM’N, INTERIM INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN THROUGH 2017
AND EXTENSION OF MINUTE 318 COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE CONTINUED EFFECTS OF THE APRIL 2010
EARTHQUAKE IN THE MEXICALI VALLEY, BAJA CALIFORNIA, MINUTE 319 (Nov. 20, 2012),
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute_319.pdf [hereinafter MINUTE 319]. Minutes 319 and 323
illustrate adaptive treaty implementation in these areas. Id.
287. See, e.g., HUNDLEY, supra note 255; Meyers & Noble, supra note 273. Neither Hundley nor
Meyers and Noble mention Indigenous Peoples in their lengthy studies of the treaty’s legal history. Id.
288. See Treaty, supra note 27.
289. Compact, supra note 24, at Art. VII; HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 212.
290. Treaty, supra note 27, at Arts. 3, 10. The hierarchy does address the non-consumptive use
of international waters for hydropower, navigation, and fishing and hunting. Id. at Art. 3.
291. See Upper Basin Compact, supra note 251.
292. Id. at Art. VIII.
OF A BINATIONAL

2021

COMMUNITY IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN

39

The Upper Basin Compact’s genesis—and thus that of the UCRC—was
heralded by much less fanfare (read: drama) than the Colorado River Compact’s.
Preceded by two years of data gathering and field meetings, the Upper Basin
Compact’s negotiation took place in Vernal, Utah—adjacent to Dinosaur National
Monument—over a three-week period in July 1948.293 The catalyst at this time was
a shared interest among Upper Basin leaders in securing water infrastructure for
which a compact had been deemed a prerequisite.294 Similar to the Colorado River
Compact, the Upper Basin Compact was shaped by representatives of the federal
sovereign, Upper Basin state sovereigns, and the State of Arizona—collectively, the
“Upper Colorado River Basin Compact Commission.”295 This body adjourned sine
die in Salt Lake City on August, 5, 1949, but not without creating a successor for
compact administration.296
The UCRC is a federal-state entity largely, though not wholly, in the mold of
the negotiating body that brought it about.297 Composed of one commissioner from
each Upper Basin state—as well as a federal commissioner “if designated by the
President”—the UCRC employs a secretary and any “engineering, legal, clerical and
other personnel as, in its judgment, may be necessary for the performance of its
functions.”298 To administer the compact’s apportionment,299 the UCRC is charged
with determining “the quantity of the consumptive use of water” from the Colorado
River system by each Upper Basin state.300 And the UCRC is vested with a host of
related powers: installing gaging stations, engaging in cooperative water-supply
studies, collecting and disseminating hydrological data, and making findings about
critical subjects such as “the quantity of water deliveries at Lee Ferry” and “the
necessity for and the extent of the curtailment of use” by the Upper Basin states to

293. E.g., HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 300–01; Norris Hundley, Jr., Clio Nods: Arizona v. California
and the Boulder Canyon Act – A Reassessment, 3 W. HIST. Q. 17, 28–29 (1972); Meyers, supra note 256,
at 27–31.
294. Hundley, supra note 293, at 28.
295. See Upper Basin Compact, supra note 251, at preamble. The identities of these
representatives are noted in the preamble of the Upper Basin Compact. Id. Arizona was represented in
the negotiations because its northeastern corner lies in the Upper Basin. The Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact Commission compiled an official record of its proceedings and related documents in three
volumes. Volumes 1 and 2 contain a record of the Commission’s eleven meetings, while Volume 3
contains the Engineering Advisory Committee’s Final Report and an Inflow-Outflow Manual. An overview
of the volumes and chronological list of the meetings can be found in the Explanatory Note at the
beginning of UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN COMPACT COMMISSION, OFFICIAL RECORD, VOL. I (1949) (on file with
author) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORD].
296. The adjournment date appears in the Explanatory Note at the beginning of OFFICIAL RECORD,
supra note 295.
297. Although it was represented at the Upper Basin Compact negotiations, Arizona does not
have a commissioner on the UCRC. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 251, at preamble, Art. VIII.
298. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 251, at Art. VIII(a), (c); About the UCRC, UPPER COLORADO
RIVER COMMISSION, http://www.ucrcommission.com/about-us/ (last visited April 24, 2021).
299. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 251, at Art. III.
300. Id. at Art. VI.
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ensure compliance with the Colorado River Compact. 301 Notably, although the
UCRC’s findings “shall constitute prima facie evidence of the facts found” in any
judicial or administrative proceeding, the Upper Basin Compact does not vest the
UCRC with compact-enforcement power.302
At the margins of the Upper Basin Compact—though less so than with the
Colorado River Compact—are Native communities whose ancestors inhabited and
visited the Colorado Plateau and diverse ranges of the Rocky Mountains for
centuries or millennia before Euro-American settlers began filling in Utah’s Wasatch
Front, Colorado’s Front Range, and other Upper Basin locales. Tribal sovereigns
have no seat at the UCRC’s table.303 It is exclusively a federal-state body.304 Nor did
tribal sovereigns have an opportunity to participate in negotiating the Upper Basin
Compact.305 It was born during the termination era of federal Indian policy—“the
most concerted drive against Indian property and Indian survival since the removals
following the act of 1830 and the liquidation of tribes and reservations following
1887.”306
Yet Native communities were on the commissioners’ minds to some extent at
the negotiations.307 And the Upper Basin Compact’s text does show some progress
compared to what was done in the Colorado River Compact. 308 An analogue to the
dismissive “wild Indian article” appears in the Upper Basin Compact: “Nothing in
this Compact shall be construed as . . . [a]ffecting the obligations of the United
States of America to Indian tribes.”309 But this broad disclaimer coexists with
provisions prohibiting Upper Basin states from “deny[ing] the right of the United
States of America . . . to acquire rights to the use of water,” and mandating that
“[t]he consumptive use of water by the United States of America or any of its . . .

301. Id. at Arts. IV, VIII(d).
302. Id. at Art. VIII(g); Meyers supra note 256, at 34–35.
303. See Upper Basin Compact, supra note 251.
304. Id. at Art. VIII(a).
305. COHEN’S, supra note 179.
306. Id. at § 1.06.
307. For specific excerpts within the negotiation minutes, see the “Indian rights, art. xix” entry on
page xi of the Subject Index at the beginning of OFFICIAL RECORD, supra note 295. One compelling excerpt
comes from the remarks of Mr. Paul B. Palmer—affiliated with the Bureau of Reclamation’s Hammond
Project—which were delivered to the commission at its third meeting on November 2, 1946, in
Farmington, New Mexico:
There are a lot of things I could tell you about why the Navajo Indian situation is a national
disgrace. It is also a disgrace to the State of New Mexico and to the State of Arizona in particular.
But something should be done by this body to recognize the rights of these people and to do
something about it. I am not telling you what to do but I think something should be done and
we should recognize that these people have some rights because they were here a long time
before we were here. Thank you. (Applause.)
Id. at 140.
308. See Upper Basin Compact, supra note 251.
309. Id. at Art. XIX(a).
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wards shall be charged as a use by the State in which the use is made.”310 No doubt
“wards” is a loaded term. Winters, however, at least implicitly shows up (contra the
Colorado River Compact).
As far as human-nature relations within Colorado River governance, the Upper
Basin Compact didn’t break new ground. The “Colorado River system as conduit”
perspective reigned at the time—or, put differently, the notion of a living river
system remained at the margins. It is impossible to miss the Upper Basin Compact’s
consumptive-use orientation in its apportionment, water-use hierarchy, and
definition provisions.311 What happened with the Bureau of Reclamation’s
proposed siting of dams in Dinosaur National Monument a few years after these
provisions had been penned, however, marked a cultural shift that still echoes
through Colorado River governance.312 It also made Arizona want its turn.
4. Lower Colorado River Watermaster
Arizona v. California federalized the Lower Colorado River in 1963.313 Filed
eleven years earlier to lay groundwork for the wildly coveted Central Arizona
Project, the case wasn’t Arizona’s first attempt to enlist the Supreme Court’s help
in resolving conflicts with a 1,000-pound-gorilla neighbor, California, over the
states’ shared border.314 On this occasion, however, the Court granted Arizona’s
request—a solicitation revealing dysfunction in Lower Basin relationships that
contrasted starkly with what the Upper Basin states had been able to accomplish a
few years before.315 And distinctions of this sort don’t end there.
Lower Colorado River governance can be summed up succinctly: the Secretary
of the Interior is the watermaster. For the first time in U.S. history, the Supreme

310. Id. at Arts. VII, IX(a).
311. See id. at Art. II(m) (defining “domestic use” as “use of water for household, stock, municipal,
mining, milling, industrial, and other like purposes”), Art. III(a) (apportioning “consumptive use of water”
among Upper Basin states and Arizona), Art. XV(a) (prioritizing water “use and consumption . . . for
agricultural and domestic purposes” above water “impounded and used for the generation of electrical
power.”).
312. See HARVEY, supra note 243, for a discussion of the epic fight over proposed siting of the Echo
Park and Split Mountain dams in Dinosaur National Monument.
313. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). In conjunction with the case’s fiftieth anniversary
in 2013, the University of Colorado law library created a collection of primary sources associated with
the case. Arizona v. California, WILLIAM A. WISE LAW LIBRARY, DIGITAL ARCHIVE,
https://lawcollections.colorado.edu/arizona-v-california/ (last visited April 24, 2021). The Arizona
Journal of Environmental Law & Policy also published a series of articles about the case and its legacy.
See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Arizona v. California: Its Meaning and Significance for the Colorado River
and Beyond after Fifty Years, 4 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 88 (2013). Additional historical scholarship is
widely available. See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 256, at 38–43, 43 n.184; HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 302–
06, 306 nn.50–51.
314. Arizona had filed three prior suits in the U.S. Supreme Court during the 1930s. Arizona v.
California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936); Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S.
423 (1931); see also HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 288–95.
315. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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Court held in Arizona v. California that Congress had established a statutory
apportionment for an interstate river, the Lower Colorado River (excluding its
tributaries), when enacting the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) in 1928. 316 “It
would have amazed the Congress of thirty-five years earlier to know what it was
supposed to have done.”317 But irrespective of whether the Court got Arizona v.
California wrong, its decree and the BCPA placed a dizzying array of hats atop the
Interior Secretary’s head. Most notably, it is the secretary who implements the
decree’s apportionment, annually assessing water-supply conditions along the
Lower Colorado River, and allocating water among parties in Arizona, California,
and Nevada.318 Not all water users enjoy secretarial water storage and deliveries,
however, but rather only those with whom the secretary has formed contracts (or
reserved rights holders).319 Formation of such contracts and hydropower
counterparts was a condition precedent for federal financing and construction of
the infrastructure authorized by the BCPA: Hoover Dam and the All-American
Canal.320 Piling on these infrastructural and contractual responsibilities, the
secretary is also the Lower Colorado River accountant, obligated by the Arizona v.
California decree to publish reports with data on water releases and consumption
under the apportionment and the U.S.-Mexico Treaty.321
This federalized governance structure is plainly different than the UCRC as
outlined in the Upper Basin Compact, as well as the disbanded Colorado River
Commission that drafted the Colorado River Compact. Yet there is important
overlap between these earlier instruments and the Arizona v. California decree. It
concerns how the Colorado River system is seen—again, as a conduit for human
water consumption. The decree’s apportionment is revealing, hinging the Secretary
of the Interior’s water-supply determination on the amount of Lower Colorado
River water available to satisfy quantified levels of “annual consumptive use” within

316. Id. at 560; see also Boulder Canyon Project Act, P.L. No. 642 (1928). The Court issued a 5-3
split opinion in the case. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 546. Justice Black authored the majority
opinion, while Justice Harlan and Justice Douglas wrote lengthy dissents. Id. The majority’s holdings
largely (though not wholly) reflected legal conclusions set forth in a 451-page report prepared by Special
Master Simon Rifkind. Arizona v. California, Simon H. Rifkind, Special Master, Report (Dec. 5, 1960),
http://hdl.handle.net/10974/312 [hereinafter Rifkind Report].
317. Hundley, supra note 273, at 32. For a thorough critique of the decision, see Hundley, supra
note 293.
318. A three-tier structure governs this process as outlined in Art. II(B)(1)-(3) of the Court’s
consolidated decree. Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150, 155–56 (2006). The secretary also has authority
under Art. II(B)(6) of the decree to reallocate on a one-year basis apportioned but unused water among
the Lower Basin states. Id. at 156.
319. This contract requirement appears in Art. II(B)(5) of the decree. Id. at 155. The proviso
addressing water releases for reserved rights holders can be found in Art. II(D). Id. at 157.
320. BCPA, supra note 316, at § 4(b).
321. This record-keeping obligation is set forth in Art. V of the decree. Arizona, 547 U.S. at 164–
65. The water accounting reports can be accessed at Boulder Canyon Operations Office — Programs and
Activities, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/wtracct.html (last visited
April 24, 2021).
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the Lower Basin states.322 So, too, do the decree’s water-use hierarchy and
definitions section lack any notion of the Lower Colorado River as a living river.323 It
appears inanimate on the page.
Arizona v. California, however, did stretch Colorado River governance in one
key way relevant to human-nature relations. Building on Winters a half-century
earlier, the Supreme Court broke new ground in Arizona v. California by extending
the reserved rights doctrine from Indian reservations to federal reservations.
Without offering an independent analysis, the Court adopted Special Master Simon
Rifkind’s ruling that “the principle underlying the reservation of water rights for
Indian Reservations was equally applicable to other federal establishments.” 324
Arizona v. California thus recognized federal reserved rights for three reservations
along the Lower Colorado River: Lake Mead National Recreation Area, Havasu Lake
National Wildlife Refuge, and Imperial National Wildlife Refuge. 325 To fulfill their
purposes, the Court’s decree spells out annual amounts of water that may be
diverted or consumed from the river.326
And that’s not all there is to say at the historical margins of Colorado River
governance. Arizona v. California took Winters in a new direction with respect to
Indian reserved rights, too. How much water should tribes be authorized to use
under them? More precisely, what method should be employed to quantify Indian
reserved rights implicitly created upon the establishment of Indian reservations for
agricultural purposes? Not only did the Supreme Court lay to rest any question
about Winters’ adherence within the Colorado River Basin when vetting those
questions, it also announced the practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) standard as a
quantification method.327 At stake were reserved rights claims asserted for five
Indian reservations along the Lower Colorado River: Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Fort
Yuma, Colorado River, and Fort Mojave.328 Both to elucidate Arizona v. California,
as well as to connect the case to the U.S. “civilizing” program described in the
previous Part,329 the Court’s penetrating description of the tribes’ reservations and
water’s essentiality to them should be quoted:

322. The phrase “annual consumptive use” appears throughout Art. II(B)(1)-(3). Arizona, 547 U.S.
at 155–56.
323. The decree’s water-use hierarchy in Art. II(A) lists irrigation and domestic uses as
consumptive uses and river regulation, navigation, flood control, and hydropower as non-consumptive
uses. Id. at 154–55. The decree’s definitions of “consumptive use” and “domestic use” in Art. I are also
notable. Id. at 153–54.
324. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963); Rifkind Report, supra note 316, at 291–300.
325. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601. The Court also recognized a federal reserved right for the Gila
National Forest, which lies within the Gila River Basin in southwestern New Mexico. Id.
326. These federal reserved rights appear in Art. II(D)(6)-(8) of the decree. Arizona, 547 U.S. at
158–59.
327. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600–01.
328. Id. at 595 n.97.
329. See supra Part II.C.
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It can be said without overstatement that when the Indians were put
on these reservations they were not considered to be located in the
most desirable area of the Nation. It is impossible to believe that when
Congress created the great Colorado River Indian Reservation and when
the Executive Department of this Nation created the other reservations
they were unaware that most of the lands were of the desert kind—
hot, scorching sands—and that water from the river would be essential
to the life of the Indian people and to the animals they hunted and the
crops they raised.330
Thus, alongside the federal reserved rights just mentioned, the Arizona v.
California decree sets forth Indian reserved rights for the five tribal sovereigns. 331
These rights are substantial in scope—at least on paper—authorizing annual
diversions of 719,248 acre-feet from the Lower Colorado River in the case of the
Colorado River Indian Tribes.332 In addition, although serving to quantify the
reserved rights, the PIA standard was explicitly not intended to be a straitjacket on
the types of uses to which water could be put under the rights. Rather, the PIA
standard “shall constitute the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water
rights but shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of them to irrigation or other
agricultural application.”333
B. Relational Adaptation
But not only did Arizona v. California and its predecessors lay a distributional
foundation in and around the Colorado River Basin—a foundation for how Colorado
River system water would be apportioned by the Law of the River’s allocation
framework.334 Arguably of even greater consequence is the fact that the
instruments laid a relational foundation for how the river system would be
governed. Which formal or informal bodies would be engaged? Who would have a
voice within those entities? How would they be composed—structures, processes,
etc.—to enable the basin’s community of communities to participate? What space,
if any, would there be for the notion of a living river system? In one form or another,
all these issues were broached, explicitly or implicitly, while the relational
foundation took shape.
Adaptation has been paramount ever since. Just as the Law of the River’s
allocation framework has been forced to adapt to climate change’s impacts on the
Colorado River Basin’s hydrology, so too has Colorado River governance witnessed

330. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 598–99.
331. The Indian reserved rights appear in Art. II(D)(1)-(5) of the decree. Arizona, 547 U.S. at 157–
58.
332. Id. at 158.
333. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
334. Robison, supra note 253, at 480–81.
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a variety of adaptations since Arizona v. California was handed down.335 Both the
Law of the River’s distributional foundation and relational foundation have proven
adaptive—at least up to a point.
Governance adaptations have surfaced in several forms involving humannature relations and human relations. One form consists of collaborative efforts to
address biodiversity loss and ecosystem protection and restoration. Another form
centers on tribal water rights—collaborative endeavors to better understand them
and to secure their legal recognition and quantification. And a final form has been
driven by climate change and collaborative undertakings to adapt the Law of the
River’s allocation framework to it. Taken as a whole, adaptations of these sorts
show how Colorado River governance is evolving, albeit gradually and
incrementally, along a path whose defining values include a game changer:
inclusivity. It has transformative power—the power to align Colorado River
governance institutions with the Colorado River Basin as a community of
communities. That’s exactly what the future should hold.
1. Biodiversity & Ecosystems
The Colorado River Delta is a good place to start for evidence of the
collaborative trend. Minutes 319 and 323 of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty are a proverbial
smoking gun.336 Adopted via the treaty’s minutes system in 2012 and 2017,
respectively, both documents are replete with innovative content. 337 Most
important for present purposes is one critical priority involving human-nature
relations that is impossible to overlook: the delta’s ecology.
Collaborative efforts aimed at protecting and restoring the Colorado River
Delta trace back at least two decades to Minute 306 and a preceding joint
declaration.338 “Collaboration is growing between [national] authorities,” described
Minute 306, “as well as between scientific, academic, and non-government
organizations in the two countries which have an interest in preserving the
Colorado River delta ecology.”339 In line with this pattern, the minute broke new
ground in Colorado River governance by institutionalizing cooperation over the

335. See generally id. (examining pattern of “adaptive framing” within allocation framework).
336. MINUTE 323, supra note 286; MINUTE 319, supra note 286.
337. See infra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of Minute 323’s novel, collaborative approach to
implementation of the international apportionment.
338. INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, MINUTE NO. 306: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED STATESMEXICO STUDIES FOR FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE RIPARIAN AND ESTUARINE ECOLOGY OF THE
LIMITROPHE SECTION OF THE COLORADO RIVER AND ITS ASSOCIATED DELTA (2000),
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf [hereinafter MINUTE 306]; JOINT DECLARATION BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (DOI) OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SECRETARIAT OF ENVIRONMENT,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND FISHERIES (SEMARNAP) OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES TO ENHANCE COOPERATION IN THE
COLORADO
RIVER
DELTA
(2000),
https://law2.arizona.edu/library/research/guides/portals/Original%20Appendices/08_2000JointDeclar
ation.pdf.
339. MINUTE 306, supra note 338, at 1.
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delta. Specifically, it established “a framework for cooperation by the United States
and Mexico through the development of joint studies that include possible
approaches to ensure use of water for ecological purposes in this reach and
formulation of recommendations for cooperative projects, based on the principle
of an equitable distribution of resources.”340
Minutes 319 and 323 are outgrowths of this cooperative framework. Minute
319 established an environmental flows pilot program for the Colorado River Delta
that called for the delivery of 158,088 acre-feet of water as base flow and pulse
flow.341 Participants in the program not only included the United States and Mexico,
but also a binational coalition of environmental organizations, all of which were
represented on an Environmental Flows Team that developed a delivery plan for
the flows.342 Five years later, Minute 323 carried the torch further, adopting a new
environmental flows program that reflects “continued interest” in the delta’s
ecology.343 Yet again the relationships bridging this program are key. The United
States, Mexico, and a binational coalition of environmental organizations teamed
up to contribute 210,000 acre-feet of water and $27 million dollars in one-third
increments, though even larger contributions had been recommended by a
Binational Environmental Work Group.344 Composed of representatives from the
United States, Mexico, and the binational coalition, that Work Group will
implement the program until Minute 323’s expiration on December 31, 2026. 345
Floating upstream from the delta, related collaboration in Colorado River
governance can be seen in the U.S. portion of the basin, growing partly from the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and partly from the Grand Canyon Protection Act. 346
Three multi-stakeholder programs have spawned from the former statute, all of
which aim to recover (or work toward the recovery of) endangered or threatened
fish species: (1) the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program

340. Id. at 2.
341. MINUTE 319, supra note 286, at 11–14. 52,696 acre-feet and 105,392 acre-feet were specified
for base flow and pulse flow, respectively. Id. at 14. The environmental results of the pilot program are
addressed in INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’M, MINUTE 319 COLORADO LIMITROPHE AND DELTA ENVIRONMENTAL
FLOWS
MONITORING
FINAL
REPORT
(2018),
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minute_319_Monitoring_Report_112818_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT]. Base flow volumes of 57,621 acre-feet ended up being delivered to three restoration areas
(Miguel Aleman, El Chausse, and Laguna Grande) and to the Colorado River channel in Mexico during
Minute 319’s term. Id. at 11. The pulse flow was delivered over an eight-week period from March 23,
2014 to May 18, 2014. Id.
342. MINUTE 319, supra note 286, at 12; FINAL REPORT, supra note 341, at 6.
343. MINUTE 323, supra note 286, at 15–18.
344. Id. at 16.
345. Id. at 16–17, 22.
346. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2019); Grand Canyon Protection Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 1802(a), 106 Stat. 4669 [hereinafter GCPA].
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(“Upper Basin Program”),347 (2) the San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation
Program (“San Juan Program”),348 and (3) the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species
Conservation Program (“Lower Colorado River Program”). 349 Extending from the
latter statute, in turn, is the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program
(GCDAMP).350
The dual orientation of these programs is, respectfully, a head trip. Consider
the Upper Basin Program’s purpose for illustration: “[T]o recover endangered fish
in the Upper Colorado River Basin while water development proceeds in
accordance with federal and state laws and interstate compacts.” 351 The San Juan
and Lower Colorado River programs are similarly driven by mixed recoverydevelopment mandates.352 Although anchored in a different statute, the GCDAMP
exists in a confined institutional space as well. Any recommendations for Glen
Canyon Dam’s operation offered to the Secretary of the Interior must heed two
congressional commands. The Secretary must operate the dam “in such a manner
as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which Grand
Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were
established.”353 Yet the Secretary must fulfill that mandate “in a manner fully
consistent with and subject to” the pre-existing swath of laws governing “allocation,
appropriation, development, and exportation of the waters of the Colorado River
Basin”—Colorado River Compact, U.S.-Mexico Treaty, Upper Basin Compact,
Arizona v. California decree, etc.354 What stories are we telling ourselves in this

347. General Information, UPPER COLORADO RIVER ENDANGERED FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM,
https://coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/general-information.html (last visited April 25,
2021).
348.
Welcome,
SAN JUAN RIVER BASIN RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM,
https://www.fws.gov/southwest/sjrip/index.cfm (last visited April 25, 2021).
349. General Program, LOWER COLORADO RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM,
https://www.lcrmscp.gov/general_program.html (last visited April 25, 2021).
350. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/index.html [hereinafter GCDAMP] (last visited April 25, 2021).
351. About the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program, UPPER COLORADO RIVER
ENDANGERED FISH PROGRAM,
https://coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/about.html
[hereinafter About] (last visited April 25, 2021).
352. See Welcome, supra note 348 (“The SJRIP was established to recover the Colorado
pikeminnow and the razorback sucker while allowing water development and management activities to
continue in the San Juan River Basin.”); General Program, supra note 349 (describing Lower Colorado
River Program as “work[ing] toward the recovery of species currently listed under the [ESA],” “reduc[ing]
the likelihood of additional species listings,” “accommodat[ing] current water diversions and power
production,” and “optimiz[ing] opportunities for future water and power development by providing ESA
compliance.”).
353. GCPA, supra note 346, at § 1802(a).
354. Id. § 1802(b).
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space? No doubt the prospect of irreconcilability is heavy.355 Are we avoiding that
truth?
Despite their dual orientation, one unmistakable thing about these programs
is their place within the collaborative trend in Colorado River governance. For
context, they came into being in 1988 (Upper Basin Program), 356 1992 (San Juan
Program),357 1997 (GCDAMP),358 and 2005 (Lower Colorado River Program).359 Their
structures vary in scope and composition but uniformly take multi-stakeholder
collaborative forms. The most extensive is the Lower Colorado River Program,
which encompasses in its Steering Committee fifty-seven entities, including “state
and Federal agencies, water and power users, municipalities, Native American
tribes, conservation organizations, and other interested parties.” 360 The other
programs are smaller in scale yet involve similar stakeholder representation. 361 In
total, a dozen tribal sovereigns collaborate in one or more of the programs. 362
Whether their mixed mandates are indeed capable of reconciliation—and what
specific actions should be taken to that end—are matters entrusted to the
representatives of those Native communities alongside their collaborators.
2. Tribal Water Rights
An adjacent area of collaborative Colorado River governance springs directly
from Arizona v. California. Recall how Winters established the existence of Indian
reserved rights, and how Arizona v. California affirmed that existence in the

355. The most thoughtful, exhaustive source on the efficacy of these programs is ADLER, supra
note 15. Also notable is Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation
of Social Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896 (2008).
356. About, supra note 351.
357. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW OF THE SAN JUAN RIVER BASIN RECOVERY
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM’S PROGRESS TOWARD RECOVERY (2018).
358. GCDAMP, supra note 350.
359.
History,
LOWER
COLORADO
RIVER
MULTI-SPECIES
CONSERVATION
PROGRAM,
https://www.lcrmscp.gov/history.html (last visited April 25, 2021).
360. General Information, supra note 347.
361. About, supra note 351; Program Partners, SAN JUAN RIVER BASIN RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRAM, https://www.fws.gov/southwest/sjrip/GB_PP.cfm (last visited April 25, 2021); Glen Canyon
Dam, Adaptive Management Program, Adaptive Management Work Group, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/amwg.html (last visited April 25, 2021) [hereinafter Work
Group].
362. No tribal sovereigns participate in the Upper Basin Program. General Information, supra note
347. The Jicarilla Apache Nation, Navajo Nation, Southern Ute Indian Tribe, and Ute Mountain Ute Indian
Tribe participate in the San Juan Program. Program Partners, supra note 361. The Hualapai Tribe, Hopi
Tribe, Navajo Nation, Pueblo of Zuni, Southern Paiute Consortium (Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians and
Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah), and San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe are members of the GCDAMP’s Adaptive
Management Work Group. Work Group, supra note 361; Southern Paiute Consortium, KAIBAB BAND OF
PAIUTES, https://www.kaibabpaiute-nsn.gov/SPC.html (last visited April 25, 2021). The Hualapai Tribe,
Colorado River Indian Tribes, and Chemehuevi Tribe are members of the Lower Colorado River Program’s
Steering Committee. Steering Committee, LOWER COLORADO RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM,
https://www.lcrmscp.gov/steer_committee/governance.html (last visited April 25, 2021).
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Colorado River Basin, as well as announced the PIA quantification standard. 363 As
mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court applied these holdings along the Lower
Colorado River to recognize and to quantify the reserved rights of five tribes with
reservations adjacent to the mainstem. 364 But what about the twenty-five basin
tribes whose reserved rights weren’t adjudicated in Arizona v. California? How
should their water rights be addressed, and what should be understood about them
(as well as the adjudicated rights) at this time, particularly given the basinwide
supply-demand imbalance? Two lines of collaboration stem from these questions.
Tribal water rights settlements are an initial line. Arizona v. California
illustrates adjudication as an adversarial path for addressing Indian reserved rights.
Colorado River Basin tribes (and others) who walk it may “win the battle but lose
the war” as it were. They may succeed in gaining recognition and quantification of
their reserved rights in a judicial decree—securing “paper water”—but nonetheless
be stranded without funding and infrastructure to translate the “paper water” into
“wet water” within their communities, not to mention being encumbered by hefty
legal bills and potential carnage to their relationships with other litigants.365 While
it is not utopic, negotiation exists as an alternative, cooperative path for avoiding
these drawbacks.366 It’s been the preferred path for basin tribes in Arizona v.
California’s wake,367 and the same goes for their trustee—the federal
government—particularly since 1990.368
A total of thirty-six tribal water rights settlements have been formed in the
United States—a trend whose genesis can be traced to the Colorado River Basin
with the Ak-Chin Indian Water Rights Settlement Act in 1978.369 Fourteen additional
settlements have been forged by basin tribes since then, 370 and two pending

363. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
600–01 (1963).
364. Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150, 157–58 (2006).
365. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS 2 (2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44148 [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
366. For a thoughtful study of negotiated settlements as an alternative to adjudications, see
DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA (2002).
367. To be clear, adjudications may prompt negotiated settlements. CRS REPORT, supra note 365,
at 3.
368. Id. at 1–3. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the
Federal Government in Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223
(Mar. 12, 1990) (“It is the policy of this Administration . . . that disputes regarding Indian water rights
should
be
resolved
through
negotiated
settlements
rather
than
litigation.”),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/1990-0312_Criteria%20%26%20Procedures%20IWR_C%26P.pdf.
369. CRS REPORT, supra note 365, at 6–8.
370. These settlements include the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act (1982); Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act (1988); Fort McDowell Indian
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settlements involving basin tribes are currently in Congress. 371 How these
settlements are composed varies by instrument. They differ in terms of the
amounts of water use authorized; types of water sources from which tribal water
rights will be fulfilled (e.g., surface water versus groundwater); types of water uses
in which tribes can engage (e.g., domestic, irrigation, instream flows); permissibility
of off-reservation water marketing; and funding sources and cost-share
requirements.372 What these features look like depends upon context—or, put
differently, relationships. And that circles back to the core point. Negotiated
settlements touch on interests, often essential values and aspirations, held by a
host of parties: basin tribes; diverse, sometimes conflicting federal agencies; basinstate and local water resource agencies; non-Indian water users; environmental
organizations, etc.373 Despite these parties’ diverse interests—and how they shape
particular negotiated settlements—the takeaway is simply that the settlements
trend since the late 1970s shows a willingness to seek common ground through
cooperation. That’s a different angle on dispute resolution than Arizona v.
California. And it is a defining thread in the history of Colorado River governance.
A parallel line of developments has accompanied the settlements trend, too.
The heightened imbalance in basinwide water supplies and demands over the past
two decades has correlated with a heightened interest in the status of tribal water
rights across the community of communities. How many basin tribes’ water rights
have not yet been recognized and quantified through negotiated settlements or
adjudications? To what extent are basin tribes whose water rights have been
recognized and quantified currently utilizing those rights? What are basin tribes’
plans for future water development? These questions speak to a fitting metaphor:
tribal water rights as a post-Arizona v. California “cloud” hovering over the Colorado
River Basin.374 It arguably looms larger than ever because of the supply-demand
imbalance.
Yet again, though, collaboration is being used for adaptation—specifically, for
gaining a better understanding of basin tribes’ water rights as informed by the
questions above.

Community Water Rights Settlement Act (1990); Jicarilla Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act
(1992); San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act (1992); Ute Indian Rights Settlement Act
(1992); Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act (1994); Shivwits Band of the Paiute
Indian Tribe of Utah Water Rights Settlement Act (2000); Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act
(2003); Arizona Water Settlements Act (2004); Northwestern New Mexico Rural Water Projects Act
(2009); White Mountain Apache Tribe Water Rights Quantification Act (2010); Bill Williams River Water
Rights Settlement Act (2014). Id. at 6–8.
371. These settlements are the Navajo Utah Water Rights Settlement Act and the Hualapai Tribe
Water Rights Settlement Act. Id. at 18–19.
372. Id. at 6–8, 11–14, 16.
373. BONNIE G. COLBY, JOHN E. THORSON & SARAH BRITTON, NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING
PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST 31–38 (2005).
374. See generally Amy Cordalis & Daniel Cordalis, Indian Water Rights: How Arizona v. California
Left an Unwanted Cloud over the Colorado River Basin, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 333 (2014).
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Partly fitting this bill is the Bureau of Reclamation’s Colorado River Basin
Water Supply and Demand Study (Basin Study) completed in 2012. 375 Projecting a
potential basinwide supply-demand imbalance of 3.2 million acre-feet (maf)
annually by 2060,376 the study was collaborative in several respects, including its
crowdsourcing of options for addressing the imbalance. 377 Content on tribal water
rights appeared in the study, including (1) a determination that “quantified tribal
diversion rights comprise about 2.9 maf in the Basin,” and (2) an acknowledgment
that a dozen tribes have unquantified rights and claims for which future demand
“will be a factor impacting Basin-wide water availability.”378 Of greatest relevance
here, however, is the fact that the study was a mixed bag from the standpoint of
relationships—federal-tribal relations in particular:
At the outset of the Study, the [tribes of the Ten Tribes Partnership]
were not represented on the steering committee established for the
Study; membership was limited to representatives of the Bureau and
the Basin States. Nor did the Ten Tribes feel that they had much of a
role in it because they were relegated to participation on sub-teams
that were used to develop technical data for the Study. Because it

375. COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/index.html (last updated Dec. 11,
2018).
376. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, STUDY REPORT
SR-34
to
-35
(2012),
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Study%20Report/CRBS_Study_Report
_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter STUDY REPORT].
377. This crowdsourcing is apparent in BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY
AND DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT F—DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES (2012),
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20F%20%20Development%20of%20Options%20and%20Stategies/TRF_Development_of_Ops&Strats_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT F]; BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT G—SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION
OF
OPTIONS
AND
STRATEGIES
(2012),
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20G%20%20System%20Reliability%20Analysis%20and%20Evaluation%20of%20Options%20and%20Stategies/T
R-G_System_Reliability_Analysis_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT G].
378. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL
REPORT
C—WATER
DEMAND
ASSESSMENT
C-38
(2012),
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20C%20%20Water%20Demand%20Assessment/TR-C-Water_Demand_Assessmemt_FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter
TECHNICAL REPORT C]. The Basin Study identified the following tribes as holding unquantified rights and
claims: Navajo Nation, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Havasupai Tribe, Hopi Tribe, Hualapai Tribe, Kaibab Band
of Paiute Indians, Pascua Yaqui Tribe, San Carlos Apache Tribe, San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe, Tohono
O’odham Nation, Tonto Apache Tribe, and Yavapai-Apache Nation. See also BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT C—WATER DEMAND ASSESSMENT,
APPENDIX
C9,
TRIBAL
WATER
DEMAND
SCENARIO
QUANTIFICATION
(2012),
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20C%20%20Water%20Demand%20Assessment/TR-C_Appendix9_FINAL.pdf.
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appears that the study was to be a decision document which could
significantly adversely impact tribal water rights and the tribal usage of
water in the future[,] exclusion from the steering committee became a
matter of great concern of the Partnership. This shortcoming and other
concerns were raised with the Bureau of Reclamation reminding the
Bureau of the United States’ trust responsibility to them in the
protection of their water and of the tribes’ sovereign status in control
of their water.379
In short, the study got off to a rocky start. To its credit, the Bureau responded
by engaging in outreach with basin tribes, which yielded the tribal water rights
content above.380 What was clear from the landmark project, though, was the need
for further collaboration.381
Enter the Colorado River Basin Ten Tribes Partnership Tribal Water Study
(Tribal Water Study).382 Completed six years after the Basin Study, in 2018, the
Tribal Water Study’s most salient feature for present purposes yet again concerns
relationships—namely, the study’s joint preparation by the Bureau of Reclamation
and the Ten Tribes Partnership. As described by Reclamation Commission Brenda
Burman in her foreword:
Recognizing the importance of furthering the understanding of tribal
water (both currently and in the decades ahead), the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Ten Tribes Partnership collaborated in this Study
to document Partnership Tribes’ water use and potential future water
development to better facilitate planning and decision-making
throughout the Basin. . . . The partnerships forged and strengthened

379. Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power
of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. 20 (July 16,
2013) (testimony of T. Darryl Vigil, Chairman), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG113shrg86774/pdf/CHRG-113shrg86774.pdf [hereinafter Vigil Testimony]. The Ten Tribes Partnership
consists of the Cocopah Indian Tribe, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, Colorado River Indian Tribes, Fort Mojave
Indian Tribe, Fort Yuma Quechan Indian Tribe, Jicarilla Apache Nation, Navajo Nation, Southern Ute
Indian Tribe, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe.
Tribes of the Colorado River Basin, TEN TRIBES PARTNERSHIP, https://tentribespartnership.org/tribes-of-thecolorado-river-basin/ (last visited April 25, 2021). Formed in 1992, the Ten Tribes Partnership’s goal is
“to increase the influence of tribes in Colorado River management and provide support for the
protection and use of tribal water resources.” Keepers of the River, TEN TRIBES PARTNERSHIP,
https://tentribespartnership.org/ (last visited April 25, 2021).
380. Vigil Testimony, supra note 379, at 20–21.
381. COLORADO RIVER BASIN TRIBES PARTNERSHIP & U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, AGREEMENT REGARDING
IMPORTANCE OF THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN TRIBAL WATER STUDY AS IDENTIFIED IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER
SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY (2013), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/agreement.pdf
[hereinafter TRIBAL WATER STUDY AGREEMENT].
382. TRIBAL WATER STUDY, supra note 19.
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during this Study will prove to be critical as we collaboratively address
the significant challenges ahead.383
This sentiment echoed an accompanying foreword by the Ten Tribes
Partnership:
We hope this Report informs, resolves some uncertainly about how
tribes perceive the future for their water uses, and establishes a
baseline for discussions and development of relationships among
tribes, states, the federal government, water managers, and water
users throughout the Basin.
No doubt the study did that baseline job. Like the Basin Study, the Tribal
Water Study is extensive, but one key figure connecting the documents deserves a
sober look: “Partnership Tribes have reserved water rights, including unresolved
claims, to divert nearly 2.8 million acre-feet per year (AFY) of water from the
Colorado River and its tributaries.”384 To reiterate, accounting for twenty-eight
basin tribes (versus just the Partnership Tribes), the Basin Study calculated
“quantified tribal diversion rights comprise about 2.9 maf in the Basin,” and also
identified a dozen tribes with “unquantified rights and claims.”385 That’s huge—a
cloud indeed. And, to be clear, the Tribal Water Study painted a clear picture of
what the future holds. Basin tribes intend to have outstanding reserved rights
claims resolved.386 They plan to secure water infrastructure projects promised to
them, to maximize on-reservation use of water, and to pursue off-reservation
transfers.387 Further, as an overarching priority, they aim to ensure “[t]he federal
government firmly asserts and exercises its trust responsibility to protect the
[tribes’] reserved water rights in all its management actions related to the Colorado
River.”388 Negotiation and implementation of the new management framework are
precisely such actions.
3. Allocation Framework
Before turning to the new management framework in earnest, one final
strand of collaborative Colorado River governance must be brought to light. It, too,
involves deep concerns about equity and climate change, albeit from a slightly
different angle than the collaborations over tribal water rights. A seemingly basic
question drives this final strand: How should the Law of the River’s allocation
framework adapt to climate change? The past two decades have seen a wide range

383. Id. at i.
384. Id. at 5.11-1.
385. TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 378, at C-38, C-40.
386. TRIBAL WATER STUDY, supra note 19, at appx. 1B-1.
387. Id.
388. Id.
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of answers to this question, internationally and domestically, all of which reveal
incremental (versus transformative) adaptation. While the substance of these novel
measures is important, even more so are their collaborative origins.
Understanding things at the international level requires circling back to
Minutes 319 and 323. Not to touch on Colorado River Delta restoration this goaround,389 but rather to consider an equally timely, compelling topic:
implementation of the international apportionment in the face of climate change.
The U.S.-Mexico Treaty itself deserves brief mention in this vein. It includes an
“escape clause” in Article 10(b) ostensibly allowing the United States to reduce
annual treaty flow deliveries to Mexico in the case of “extraordinary drought” or
“serious accident to the irrigation system in the United States.”390 Unfortunately,
however, problems with the clause’s text make it difficult if not impossible to apply
on the ground.391 “All told, it seems extremely unlikely that the United States can,
as a practical matter, ever expect to rely on article 10 to reduce deliveries to
Mexico.”392 A natural question thus arises: how exactly should the treaty be
implemented given climate change’s impacts on the basin’s hydrology?
Minutes 319 and 323 brought about some creative, collaborative solutions—
innovations that will stay in effect until December 31, 2026 under the latter
minute.393
Shortage sharing is one angle. With its adoption in 2012, Minute 319 put into
place a shortage-sharing regime for treaty flows, hinging annual deliveries on Lake
Mead’s elevation—specifically, on elevation tiers with graduated delivery
reductions that tracked domestic counterparts established in 2007 by the Colorado
River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for
Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Interim Guidelines).394 Five years later, in 2017, Minute
323 picked up this thread. Recognizing “it is in their mutual interests to continue to
proactively address the potential for unprecedented reductions on the Colorado
River,” the United States and Mexico not only agreed to an analogue to Minute
319’s shortage-sharing regime, but also mapped out a binational water scarcity
contingency plan.395 It was framed around updated elevation tiers for Lake Mead
mirroring those of a domestic Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan in the works

389. Delta restoration is discussed supra Part III.B.1.
390. Treaty, supra note 27, at Art. 10(b).
391. Robison, supra note 253, at 503–05.
392. Meyers & Noble, supra note 273, at 413.
393. MINUTE 323, supra note 286, at 22. Although our focus here is on Minutes 319 and 323, they
came on the heels of important predecessor Minutes also illustrative of the collaborative trend. See,
e.g., 7D REVIEW, supra note 29, at 7–9 (identifying cooperative elements of Minutes 316, 317, and 318).
394. MINUTE 319, supra note 286, at 6–7; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, COLORADO
RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE
MEAD (2007), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf [hereinafter
INTERIM GUIDELINES].
395. MINUTE 323, supra note 286, at 3–8.
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at the time of Minute 323’s adoption.396 The binational plan would take effect once
the domestic plan had.397
Another area of innovation involves what looks like international water
banking, though those terms were purposefully not used in Minutes 319 or 323. 398
The basic idea in this space is to enable Mexico to store unused treaty flows in Lake
Mead—U.S. infrastructure—for delivery at a later date. Minute 319 provided for
this arrangement in two circumstances: (1) where Mexico was unable to use treaty
flows due to infrastructure repairs from a 2010 earthquake in Mexicali, and (2)
where Mexico chose to rely on water yielded from conservation projects (e.g., canal
lining) or augmentation projects (e.g., desalination plants) in lieu of treaty flows. 399
As with the shortage-sharing regime, Minute 323 carried this cooperation forward.
Unified under a concept dubbed “Mexico’s Water Reserve,” Minute 323 authorizes
Mexico to store unused treaty flows in Lake Mead in both circumstances just noted,
and also establishes a replenishable “Revolving Account for Mexican waters in
storage in the United States.”400
This collaboration over the international apportionment hasn’t occurred in a
vacuum, but rather in conversation with domestic developments. Climate change
has spurred the invention and implementation of a host of measures within the U.S.
portion of the basin during the past two decades. For sake of brevity, two
instruments make the shortlist here: the 2007 Interim Guidelines and the 2019
Drought Contingency Plans.401
Climate change hit reservoirs and relationships hard when the megadrought
set on in the Colorado River Basin in 2000.402 A few years into the ordeal, “tensions
among the Basin States brought the basin closer to multi-state and inter-basin
litigation than perhaps any time since the adoption of the [Colorado River

396. Id. at 6–8.
397. Id. at 7.
398. Robison, supra note 253, at 507.
399. MINUTE 319, supra note 286, at 4, 7–10.
400. MINUTE 323, supra note 286, at 8–9. Treaty flows stored in the first circumstance are called
“Emergency Storage,” while treaty flows stored in the second circumstance are called “Intentionally
Created Mexican Allocation” (ICMA). Id. at 8.
401. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394. Several documents constitute the Upper Basin and Lower
Basin drought contingency plans. Colorado River Basin Drought Contingency Plans, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/finaldocs.html (last visited April 25, 2021). The collaborative
trend in Colorado River governance can also be gleaned from various complementary domestic
measures commenced in 2014: a Pilot System Conservation Program, a Memorandum of Understanding
for Pilot Drought Response Actions, and a host of conservation agreements, including several involving
basin tribes. 7D REVIEW, supra note 29, at 9, 37 tbl. 4.
402. 7D REVIEW, supra note 29, at 2 (“During the years 2000 through 2004, the Colorado River
Basin . . . experienced the lowest five-year average annual hydrology in the observed record, reducing
combined storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead from 55.7 million acre-feet (maf) (approximately 94
percent of capacity) to 29.7 maf (approximately 52 percent of capacity).”). See also id. at 6 (“From
October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2007, storage in Colorado River reservoirs fell from 55.8 maf
(approximately 94 percent of capacity) to 32.1 maf (approximately 54 percent of capacity), and was as
low as 29.7 maf (approximately 52 percent of capacity) in 2004.”).
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Compact]” in 1922.403 How should the flow obligations central to the compact’s
apportionment be implemented—particularly the obligation to contribute treaty
flows to Mexico—in this heated environment?404 The Upper Basin and Lower Basin
states did not see eye to eye. 405 Thankfully, though, they chose not to stage a
twenty-first-century reenactment of Arizona v. California, instead seeking
resolution of their differences by participating in a process initiated by Secretary of
the Interior Gale Norton under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 406
That process was not a panacea—including with respect to its treatment of basin
tribes’ and their water rights—but nonetheless showed earnest efforts by the
Bureau of Reclamation to afford opportunities for participation across the basin’s
community of communities.407 Two years later, in 2007, the process bore fruit.408
The Interim Guidelines contain a host of collaborative pieces. As is the case at
the international level, our focus is on the broad categories of shortage sharing and
water banking, though dispute resolution is also discussed in relation to a
complementary agreement.
With respect to shortage sharing, what the Interim Guidelines essentially did
is find mutually acceptable ways to implement the apportionments of the Colorado
River Compact and the Arizona v. California decree on an interim basis in response
to climate change.409 Reservoir operating regimes were the tool employed for this
purpose.410
Relevant to the Colorado River Compact’s apportionment, the Interim
Guidelines adopted a coordinated operating regime for Lake Powell and Lake Mead
that serves to implement the flow obligations just described as having pushed the
basin states toward an Arizona v. California repeat upon the megadrought’s
onset.411 In lieu of U.S. Supreme Court litigation aimed at interpreting those flow
obligations (and related compact terms), the coordinated operating regime
prescribes annual releases from Lake Powell and Lake Mead tailored to the
reservoirs’ respective elevations.412 The collaborative nature of the Interim
Guidelines’ formation finds expression in the professed goal for the coordinated
operating regime: “to avoid curtailment of uses in the Upper Basin, minimize

403. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 11.
404. See Compact, supra note 24, at Arts. III(c)–(d).
405. See, e.g., Robison, supra note 253, at 517–19.
406. Robison, supra note 253, at 519.
407. Concerns about the treatment of basin tribes and their water rights are acknowledged in 7D
REVIEW, supra note 29, at 12, 14.
408. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394.
409. These apportionments appear in Article III of the Compact and Article II(B) of the Decree.
Compact, supra note 24, at Art. III; Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150, 155–56 (2006).
410. Compact, supra note 24.
411. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 49–53.
412. Id.

2021

COMMUNITY IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN

57

shortages in the Lower Basin[,] and not adversely affect the yield for development
available in the Upper Basin.”413
As for the Arizona v. California decree, the Interim Guidelines provided muchneeded specificity about how its Lower Colorado River apportionment would be
implemented in the event of a shortage declaration by the Secretary of the Interior
(again, the federal watermaster).414 Hitched to Lake Mead’s elevation—i.e.,
elevation tiers with graduated delivery reductions—it was this domestic reservoir
operating regime that shaped the international counterparts in Minutes 319 and
323 mentioned above.415 Notably, however, California was not called upon to do
any sharing under the regime—something time would remedy.416
In addition to these shortage-sharing measures, the Interim Guidelines also
turned Lake Mead into an interstate water bank, though that terminology was not
used in the Record of Decision.417 Rather, the mechanism being referenced is the
Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS) program.418 It was designed to promote
conservation and flexibility in the use of Lower Colorado River water, to bolster
storage in Lake Mead and Lake Powell, and to avoid or minimize the impacts of a
secretarial shortage declaration.419 Parties in the Lower Basin states entitled to use
Lower Colorado River water (“contractors”) are able to generate ICS through water
conservation (“Extraordinary Conservation ICS” or “Tributary Conservation ICS”),
capital contributions to water system efficiency projects (“System Efficiency ICS”),
and imports of non-Colorado River system water into the mainstem (“Imported
ICS”).420 Once a contractor has created ICS in one of these forms, the contractor can
later request the Secretary of the Interior to deliver the ICS, so long as certain
conditions are met—e.g., the Secretary has determined an “ICS Surplus Condition”
exists within the meaning of the Interim Guidelines. 421 From the perspective of
collaboration, it is critical to note that the ICS program rests on a forbearance
agreement entered into by Lower Basin contractors.422 But for this forbearance
agreement, the ICS program could not have been stood up, as the Secretary’s

413. Id. at 49.
414. See supra Part III.A.4; INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 36–37.
415. See supra Part III.A.4; MINUTE 323, supra note 286, at 3–6; MINUTE 319, supra note 286, at 6–
7.
416. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 36–37.
417. Id. at 38–43.
418. The ICS program was preceded by an interstate water banking program adopted by federal
regulations in 1999 focusing on offstream storage of Lower Colorado River water—i.e., storage in
groundwater aquifers or reservoirs off the mainstem. 43 C.F.R. Pt. 414 (2007). In addition to the ICS
program, the Interim Guidelines also established a Developed Shortage Supply (DSS) program that has
not been utilized up to this point, as a secretarial shortage declaration has not yet been made. INTERIM
GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 44–46.
419. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 27.
420. Id. at 38–39.
421. Id. at 42–43.
422. Id. at 24–25.
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deliveries of surplus water would be bound by percentage-based allocations
prescribed by the Arizona v. California decree.423
Beyond the four corners of the Interim Guidelines, a complementary
agreement joined by the basin states (Basin States’ Agreement) should also be
highlighted vis-à-vis the collaborative trend.424 The agreement addresses dispute
resolution—a subject whose importance cannot be overstated given the basinwide
relationship stressor that is climate change. 425 The consensus reached by the basin
states in the document squarely rebukes Arizona v. California:
The Parties recognize that judicial or administrative proceedings are not
preferred alternatives to the resolution of claims or controversies
concerning the law of the river. In furtherance of this Agreement, the
Parties desire to avoid judicial or administrative proceedings, and agree
to pursue a consultative approach to the resolution of any claim or
controversy.426
Consultation is required before any judicial or administrative proceeding can be
initiated over the Colorado River Compact’s flow obligations or related parts of the
Law of the River.427
In terms of timeline, a couple things about the Interim Guidelines and the
Basin States’ Agreement are crucial to flag. First, both are temporary
instruments.428 December 31, 2025 is the Interim Guidelines’ general expiration
date.429 That’s when the shortage sharing schemes (i.e., reservoir operating
regimes) are slated to expire, as well as most parts of the ICS program. 430 The
dispute resolution provision (i.e., mandatory consultation requirement) of the Basin
States’ Agreement will survive an additional five years.431 Second, the Interim
Guidelines included an important measure that would be triggered leading up to
the interim period’s close: “Beginning no later than December 31, 2020, the
Secretary [of the Interior] shall initiate a formal review for purposes of evaluating
the effectiveness of these Guidelines.”432 The colloquial term for this formal review
is the “7.D. Review,” and much more is said about it below.433

423. Id. at 27 (Article II(B)(2) of the decree contains the percentage-based allocations); Arizona v.
California, 547 U.S. 150, 155 (2006).
424. Agreement Concerning Colorado River Management and Operations (Apr. 23, 2007),
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/FEIS/AppJ.pdf
[hereinafter
BASIN STATES’
AGREEMENT]. This agreement appears as attachment A of the linked document.
425. Id. at 10.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 13; INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 57–58.
429. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 57–58.
430. Id.
431. BASIN STATES’ AGREEMENT, supra note 424, at 10, 13.
432. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 394, at 56.
433. 7D REVIEW, supra note 29.
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Plugging the Drought Contingency Plans into this storyline, 2012 and 2013
witnessed the lowest two-year runoff period on record in the Colorado River Basin,
a turning point in the megadrought that prompted the basin states and Bureau of
Reclamation to begin work on these plans.434 The process spanned several years.435
Initially scheduled for completion in December 2018, the basin states ultimately
submitted the plans to Congress for approval in March 2019,436 with passage of the
Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act following one month
later.437 A massive collaborative effort was required to get there. As Reclamation
Commissioner Brenda Burman testified before Congress: “Interior is proud to have
worked collaboratively with the States, tribes, non-governmental organizations and
other Basin stakeholders on the DCPs. We look forward to continuing our work with
the States, tribes, NGOs, key water districts, and Mexico on implementation of the
DCPs once they become effective.”438 And, indeed, basin tribes had been
instrumental in making the plans a reality. Perhaps most notable is engagement by
the Colorado River Indian Tribes and the Gila River Indian Community in the Lower
Basin on the Arizona Drought Contingency Plan Steering Committee—though the
tribes had not been invited to participate at the start of the process. 439 At the end
of the day, with a signing ceremony atop Hoover Dam on May 20, 2019, the Drought
Contingency Plans went into effect, marking “an historic accomplishment” in the
basin.440

434. Id. at 7–8.
435. See id. at 8–9.
436. Drought Contingency Plans Basin States Transmittal Letter and Attachments from the Basin
States
to
Congress
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/docs/DroughtContigencyPlansBasinStates-TransmittalLetter-508-DOI.pdf.
After the December 2018 deadline went unmet, the Department of the Interior published in the Federal
Register a notice and request for input from the basin states’ governors, alluding to the prospect of
unilateral federal actions to ensure water security given the megadrought. Responding to Historic
Drought and Ongoing Dry Conditions in the Colorado River Basin: Request for Input, 84 Fed. Reg. 2244,
2245 (Feb. 6, 2019). The Department of the Interior rescinded this notice and request for input once the
basin states had submitted the Drought Contingency Plans to Congress. Department of the Interior
Statement: March 19, 2019. Transmittal of Drought Contingency Plans by the Seven Colorado River Basin
States and Key Water Districts to Congress for Implementation, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (Mar.
19, 2019), https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/docs/BORTransmittal-Statement-508-DOI.pdf.
437. Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 116-14, 133 Stat.
850 (2019).
438. Brenda Burman, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, Statement at the Energy and Natural
Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Water and Power, U.S. Senate on Efforts in the Colorado River
Basin
on
the
Drought
Contingency
Plans
(Mar.
27,
2019),
https://www.energy.senate.gov/services/files/3EF1EAC6-51A0-44DC-8DF3-6B17A40B5A12
[hereinafter Burman Testimony].
439. MIKHAIL SUNDUST ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV., THE ARIZONA DROUGHT CONTINGENCY PLAN: A TRIBAL
PERSPECTIVE,
7–10
(Oct.
2019),
https://aipi.asu.edu/sites/default/files/the_arizona_dcp__a_tribal_perspective.pdf.
440. Press Release, Bureau of Reclamation, Interior and States Sign Historic Drought Agreements
to
Protect
Colorado
River
(May
20,
2019),
https://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=66103.
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Simply put, the Drought Contingency Plans are concerned with reservoir
protection—i.e., reducing “the likelihood of reaching critical elevation levels in Lake
Powell and Lake Mead . . . .”441 To this end, the plans reflect a common
understanding that “additional actions beyond those contemplated in the 2007
Interim Guidelines” are necessary.442
The Upper Basin Drought Contingency Plan aims to maintain Lake Powell’s
storage to ensure compliance with the Colorado River Compact’s flow obligations,
and to sustain hydropower generation and associated revenues at Glen Canyon
Dam.443 Directed toward these goals, the plan includes (1) a Drought Response
Operations Agreement generally focused on coordinating operations at Colorado
River Storage Project Act reservoirs to keep Lake Powell at a target elevation, and
(2) a Demand Management Storage Agreement generally addressing the potential
establishment of an Upper Basin Demand Management Program. 444
As for the Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan, it’s oriented similarly with
respect to maintaining Lake Mead’s storage to avoid secretarial shortage
declarations along the Lower Colorado River—as well as hydropower generation
and revenues at Hoover Dam—and also outlining how shortages will be shared
among the Lower Basin states.445 The Interim Guidelines’ shortage sharing regime
is built out through a scheme of “DCP Contributions” and more extensive elevation
tiers that contemplate California shouldering some of the shortage burden (contra
the guidelines).446 It is this updated regime that corresponds with Minute 323’s
binational water scarcity contingency plan discussed earlier. 447 Lastly, the Lower
Basin Drought Contingency Plan modifies the ICS program—including further

441. AGREEMENT CONCERNING COLORADO RIVER DROUGHT CONTINGENCY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (May 20, 2019), https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/docs/final/Companion-AgreementFinal.pdf [hereinafter COMPANION AGREEMENT].
442. Id. See also Burman Testimony, supra note 438, at 2 (“Since 2007, the drought has persisted
and more action . . . is needed to protect these reservoirs that are essential to our environment and
economy.”). The source cited immediately before the parenthetical is where the quote is drawn from.
443. See, e.g., Burman Testimony, supra note 438, at 3.
444. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AGREEMENT FOR DROUGHT RESPONSE OPERATIONS AT THE INITIAL UNITS OF THE
COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT ACT (2019), https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/docs/final/Attachment-A1Drought-Response%20Operations-Agreement-Final.pdf [hereinafter DROUGHT RESPONSE OPERATIONS
AGREEMENT]; BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AGREEMENT REGARDING STORAGE AT COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT ACT
RESERVOIRS
UNDER
AN
UPPER
BASIN
DEMAND
MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM
(2019),
https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/docs/final/Attachment-A2-Drought-Managment-Storage-AgreementFinal.pdf [hereinafter DEMAND MANAGEMENT STORAGE AGREEMENT]. These documents are accompanied by
COMPANION AGREEMENT, supra note 441.
445. The plan includes BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, LOWER BASIN DROUGHT CONTINGENCY PLAN AGREEMENT
(2019), https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/docs/final/Attachment-B-LB-DCP-Agreement-Final.pdf [hereinafter
LOWER BASIN DCP]; BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, EXHIBIT 1 TO THE LOWER BASIN DROUGHT CONTINGENCY PLAN
AGREEMENT
(2019),
https://www.usbr.gov/dcp/docs/final/Attachment-B-Exhibit-1-LB-DroughtOperations.pdf [hereinafter EXHIBIT 1]. Again, these documents are accompanied by COMPANION
AGREEMENT, supra note 441.
446. EXHIBIT 1, supra note 445, at 2–5.
447. MINUTE 323, supra note 286, at 6–8.
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incentivizing participation—so as to bolster Lake Mead’s status as an interstate
water bank.448
While far more could be said about both Drought Contingency Plans’ content,
the main point to convey again concerns relationships. Imagine how much time and
effort it took to iron out the details above. Consider, too, how much more of the
same it will take for the plans’ implementation. Just like the Interim Guidelines on
which they rest, the plans are truly massive collaborative projects. And a final
connecting thread drives this point home just a bit more. Recall the Basin States’
Agreement accompanying the Interim Guidelines. 449 Its dispute-resolution
provision disavows “judicial or administrative proceedings” as “preferred
alternatives to the resolution of claims or controversies or controversies concerning
the law of the river.”450 A consultative approach is called for instead—that is,
consultation is mandated as a prerequisite to initiating any such proceedings. 451
Connecting this provision to the Drought Contingency Plans, the exact same
approach to dispute resolution appears in those documents. 452
Looking ahead, the Interim Guidelines’ general expiration date—again,
December 31, 2025—also applies to the Drought Contingency Plans. 453
Implementation of the plans over the next several years are scheduled to “occur
while Basin State representatives . . . Tribes, NGOs, and the public, begin efforts to
develop agreements on longer-term operations that would be adopted beyond
2026.”454 The plans are thus a “bridge” to the new management framework. 455
Taking place in parallel has been the 7.D. Review. The Bureau of Reclamation
undertook it throughout 2020, and one prevalent thread involves the topic
animating this whole discussion: “increasing inclusivity of diverse stakeholders and
partners” in Colorado River governance.456 “Since the adoption of the Guidelines,”

448. EXHIBIT 1, supra note 445, at 9–12.
449. BASIN STATES’ AGREEMENT, supra note 424.
450. Id. at 10.
451. Id.
452. COMPANION AGREEMENT, supra note 441, at 4–5; DROUGHT RESPONSE OPERATIONS AGREEMENT,
supra note 444, at 11–12; DEMAND MANAGEMENT STORAGE AGREEMENT, supra note 444, at 10; LOWER BASIN
DCP, supra note 445, at 7.
453. The general expiration date is incorporated into COMPANION AGREEMENT, supra note 441, at 2,
8; DROUGHT RESPONSE OPERATIONS AGREEMENT, supra note 444, at 10; DEMAND MANAGEMENT STORAGE
AGREEMENT, supra note 444, at 7; see EXHIBIT 1, supra note 445, at 1. If an Upper Basin Demand
Management Program is established, certain provisions bearing on conserved water stored in and
released from Colorado River Storage Project Act units will persist until 2057. DEMAND MANAGEMENT
STORAGE AGREEMENT, supra note 444, at 5–6. The Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan Agreement is
scheduled to terminate “on the later of (i) December 31, 2026; or (ii) the date on which all ICS Accounts
and DCP ICS Accounts are reduced to zero . . . .” LOWER BASIN DCP, supra note 445, at 2. While the general
expiration date applies to this plan’s shortage-sharing regime, nuanced expiration dates apply to the ICS
provisions. EXHIBIT 1, supra note 445, at 13.
454. Burman Testimony, supra note 438.
455. Id.
456. 7D REVIEW, supra note 29, at 10.
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described the Bureau, “the ongoing drought has driven Basin partners to cultivate
cooperative relationships for addressing Basin-wide challenges through consensus
and collaboration.”457 And past is prologue. “This expanded inclusivity will continue
to forge and strengthen partnerships that will be critical as we address the
significant challenges ahead.”458 It is this continued expansion that we now
advocate for.
IV. NEXT-GENERATION GOVERNANCE
We can do even better in the Colorado River Basin. While the past several
decades have witnessed an array of collaborative governance approaches, existing
institutions need to continue evolving to better align with the full sweep of the
basin’s community of communities. A key aspect of this pattern involves treating
the thirty tribal sovereigns as just that—sovereigns—alongside the federal
government and the basin states, not as a special type of stakeholder. In this spirit,
the material below is woven around a vital, invigorating goal: imagination. Our aim
is to envision how next-generation Colorado River governance institutions can be
composed to reflect more fully the basin’s character as a community of
communities—particularly, though not solely, the new management framework
taking shape over the next several years. To clarify, we use the phrase “new
management framework” as a reference to the collective body of domestic and
international instruments negotiated between now and 2026 stemming from the
general expiration of the Interim Guidelines, Drought Contingency Plans, and
Minute 323.
We draw heavily on cutting-edge work by the Water & Tribes Initiative (WTI)
in this exercise.459 In February 2019, WTI initiated a conversation at a basinwide
workshop about designing a collaborative process to facilitate meaningful
participation by tribes and other communities in developing the new management
framework.460 WTI then completed more than 100 confidential interviews with
tribal and other leaders in and around the basin to solicit input on process

457. Id. at 14.
458. Id.
459. The Water & Tribes Initiative is an ad hoc partnership catalyzed in 2017 to pursue two
complimentary objectives: (1) enhance the capacity of tribes to advance their needs and interests with
respect to water management in the Colorado River Basin, and (2) advance sustainable water
management through collaborative problem-solving. Water & Tribes Initiative, UNIV. OF MONT., CTR. FOR
NAT. RES. & ENVTL. POLICY, https://naturalresourcespolicy.org/projects/water-tribes-colorado-riverbasin/default.php (last visited April 25, 2021). WTI is guided by a broad-based Leadership Team, does
not speak for any tribe or other entity, and pursues its objectives through facilitation, policy research,
and education. Id.
460. WATER & TRIBES INITIATIVE, TOWARD A SENSE OF THE BASIN: DESIGNING A COLLABORATIVE PROCESS TO
DEVELOP THE NEXT SET OF GUIDELINES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM 2 (2020),
http://naturalresourcespolicy.org/docs/colorado-river-basin/basin-report-2020.pdf [hereinafter SENSE
OF THE BASIN].
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options.461 These interviewees are anonymously referred to as “basin leaders”
below. WTI’s interview findings were initially presented at the Colorado River Water
Users Association annual meeting in December 2019—where Reclamation
Commissioner Brenda Burman encouraged attendees to reflect on past processes,
to highlight lessons learned, and to explore options for the future—and the findings
were discussed at greater length at a basinwide workshop convened by WTI in
February 2020.462 Ultimately, WTI summarized the results of this work in a report
released in June 2020, Toward a Sense of the Basin,463 which both responded to
Commissioner Burman’s request and serves as this Part’s foundation.464
To be clear, however, the intent in the pages that follow is not only to report
what more than 100 basin leaders have said about next-generation Colorado River
governance. We also offer our own conclusions and prescriptions to guide the new
management framework’s development over the next few years. In addition,
building on feedback from many basin leaders during WTI’s interviews, we cast our
eyes further into the future, suggesting how these short-term negotiations should
be understood and harnessed as a path toward more inclusive, adaptive, and
resilient approaches to Colorado River governance beyond 2026.
A. Vision
Form should follow function. That proposition is our entry point into nextgeneration governance institutions for the Colorado River system. They should
strive to embody the collective vision of the whole community of communities.
Whether designed for short- or long-term purposes, Colorado River governance
entities and processes should be guided by and responsive to the values and
aspirations of the basin community in its entirety. Anything less is exclusionary,
provincial, undemocratic, and suspect in light of the basin’s history.
Yet there is a major problem. No recognized forum exists to bring together
the basin’s community of communities for dialogue of this sort, and thus there have
been few, if any, attempts to forge a consensus-based vision. WTI has sought to
bridge this gap.
As a threshold matter, WTI’s interviews with basin leaders throughout 2019
began by asking about their respective visions for the Colorado River system looking
out twenty-five, fifty, or even a hundred years.465 Responses generally fell into two
camps, “policy-oriented” visions and “process-oriented” visions,466 as synthesized
below.
From a policy perspective, the most common vision articulated is that next-

461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 14.
465. Id. at 16.
466. Id. at 18.
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generation governance institutions should foster sustainable, resilient use of the
Colorado River system for human beings and the rest of nature.467 Some basin
leaders even referred to the new management framework as “sustainability”
guidelines.468 This vision is a call to move away from antiquated institutions that
treat the river system as mere plumbing for human beings, and toward
contemporary institutions that manage the river system holistically—as an
interconnected ecosystem encompassing human beings and the rest of nature.
As for basin leaders’ perspectives on process, four key points were
emphasized.469 First, collaboration should be used as a process of first resort in
Colorado River governance, in lieu of litigation or other adversarial options. 470
Second, governance institutions should evolve from ad hoc collaboration to more
intentional, ongoing systems of collaborative problem-solving and decisionmaking.471 Third, existing institutions should move toward a more adaptive
management framework that supports modifying the river system’s operation in
sync with changing hydrological conditions.472 And fourth, Colorado River
governance should continue progressing in the direction of a unified system of
water management across the basin—i.e., throughout the Upper Basin and Lower
Basin and within the United States and Mexico.473
Taken together, some basin leaders viewed this combination of policy- and
process-oriented visions as marking a paradigm shift too cumbersome and
unworkable to guide the new management framework’s development. 474
Conversely, other basin leaders suggested it is important to seek consensus on an
overarching vision for the Colorado River system, and then to realize that vision
incrementally through a variety of public processes, including but not limited to
those associated with the new management framework. 475 In line with the latter
view, the basin community should adopt a worldview of “pragmatic idealism,” as
described by one basin leader,476 an unabashedly bold vision coupled with a
gradual, incremental approach.
Complementing its interviews with basin leaders, WTI delved more deeply
into visions for the Colorado River system by examining those expressed by Native
communities.477 In a policy brief released in October 2020, A Common Vision for the

467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 16–17.
470. Id. at 16.
471. Id. at 17.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. WATER & TRIBES INITIATIVE, POLICY BRIEF #3, A COMMON VISION FOR THE COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM:
TOWARD
A
FRAMEWORK
FOR
SUSTAINABILITY
(2020),
http://naturalresourcespolicy.org/docs/policybrief3finalweb.pdf [hereinafter POLICY BRIEF #3].
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Colorado River System, WTI synthesized vision statements prepared by four tribal
groups.478 They included (1) the Ten Tribes Partnership vision statement; (2) the
tribal vision for protecting the Colorado River prepared and ratified by the Cocopah,
Chemehuevi, Fort Mojave, Hualapai, and Colorado River Indian Tribes in 2015, and
endorsed by the Quechan Tribe in 2019; (3) the Bluff Principles generated through
a series of conversations among Hopi and other tribal leaders in Moab and Bluff,
Utah in 2016; and (4) the Tribal Water Study jointly completed by the Ten Tribes
Partnership and the Bureau of Reclamation in 2018. 479
Relying on these Native voices, and blending them with what basin leaders
had shared during interviews and at related gatherings, WTI identified a number of
common values and themes, incorporating them into the following “Resolution for
Sustainability”:
Whereas water is life; it is a precious, life-giving resource;
Whereas water is sacred; it is valued for spiritual, cultural, and
ecological purposes as well as for sustaining human populations and
economies;
Whereas water is foundational to the identities of tribes in the Basin
and provides an intrinsic connection to their wellbeing and homelands;
Whereas water in the Colorado River system is essential to urban and
rural communities; municipal, agricultural, industrial, recreational, and
other uses; and to more than 40 million people in two countries, seven
states, and [30] sovereign Indian nations; and
Whereas natural and cultural resource conservation are connected.
Now, therefore, be it resolved that the next framework to govern
the Colorado River system should:
•

Promote and support the sustainable, resilient use of the River
system for people and the rest of nature;

•

Ensure the spiritual, cultural, and ecological integrity of the
River system while providing water for human use and
consumption;

478. Id.
479. Id. at 1–4. See also TRIBAL WATER STUDY, supra note 19.
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•

Equitably allocate water by considering the contemporary
diversity of needs, interests, and priorities; historical use
patterns; and the realities of drought and climate change;

•

Promote and support reliable access to clean water for all
residents of the Colorado River system;

•

Leave the earth and its water systems better than we found
them;

•

Honor, respect, and realize the federal government’s trust
responsibility toward the Basin’s tribes in a manner that
acknowledges their sovereignty and human right to selfdetermination;

•

Engage in collaboration as the action of first resort to develop
policy and solve problems; and

•

Integrate traditional indigenous knowledge with western
science to better understand the River system and the
consequences of alternative management scenarios.480

This resolution is a great place to begin—a starting point for next-generation
Colorado River governance institutions. While it may not exhaustively reflect the
values and aspirations of the entire Colorado River Basin community, it does so for
a broad segment of that community, articulating a vision for the river system that
embraces human beings and the rest of nature, instrumental and intrinsic values,
land and water—in short, a holistic vision for a living river system. As tribal and
other leaders imagine a new management framework over the next several years,
we encourage them to think deliberately about this sustainability resolution, and to
embrace the wisdom of “pragmatic idealism.” In the spirit of collaboration, these
leaders should create opportunities for representatives from diverse communities
in and around the basin to discuss the resolution, including how its vision might be
refined to account more fully for the values and aspirations of the whole community
of communities.
B. Navigation
Of course, the vision needs to be realized, too. And the basin community—
leaders and otherwise—must be mindful of opportunities and challenges
associated with navigating the vision from the realm of values and aspirations to
the realm of action. Such navigation involves many questions. Which elements of

480. POLICY BRIEF #3, supra note 477, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
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the vision should shape the new management framework for the Colorado River
system—the framework itself as well as negotiation processes—and which
elements should be addressed elsewhere? Similarly, which elements should be
acted on sooner rather than later, and which elements should be approached with
a long-sighted view? Further, how should cultural and ecological values be
integrated into modeling and decision-making processes used to develop the new
management framework? And, in the final analysis, how should the basin
community address trade-offs to find an optimal balance between consumptive
uses (e.g., drinking water, agriculture, industry, etc.) and non-consumptive uses
(e.g., instream flows for fish and wildlife, sustaining plants for traditional and
subsistence purposes, ceremonial and spiritual uses, etc.)? Vision-driven navigation
of this sort is the essence of collaborative decision-making—working together to
achieve shared goals—and should be regarded as the foundation of nextgeneration Colorado River governance.
This perspective does not come out of the blue. Rather, it has roots in
opportunities and challenges shared by basin leaders during WTI’s interviews
throughout 2019—again, as summarized in Toward a Sense of the Basin.481
Opportunities abound for next-generation Colorado River governance right
now. Time is of the essence. Carpe diem. Recall the confluence described above—
the synced expiration of the Interim Guidelines, Drought Contingency Plans, and
Minute 323 at the end of 2025 and 2026.482 This confluence creates a blank slate of
sorts to bring fresh, creative ideas to bear on governance institutions. Many basin
leaders explained that, while it is important to build on lessons learned and existing
institutions, the confluence presents a unique opportunity to consider alternative
arrangements for managing the river system. It is an exceptional time to encourage
experiments and pilot projects aimed at achieving sustainable and resilient water
use. Basin leaders pointed to a host of measures involving variations on (1)
augmenting supply, (2) reducing demand, (3) modifying operations, and (4)
facilitating governance and implementation of operating guidelines and water
management strategies.483 Several basin leaders also noted that the new

481. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460.
482. See supra Part III.B.3.
483. The Bureau of Reclamation’s Basin Study addressed numerous measures in these areas.
TECHNICAL REPORT F, supra note 377; TECHNICAL REPORT G, supra note 377. Building on these measures,
basin leaders suggested a variety of tools should be more fully developed and employed, at least
experimentally: (1) augmenting supply—water recycling/reuse, aquifer recharge/underground storage,
desalination, and stormwater collection; (2) reducing demand—new system conservation programs, ICS
creation at Lake Powell, drought management at Colorado River Storage Project units, classification of
water conservation as a “beneficial use” in basin states, conservation easements for unused tribal water,
and compensation for water non-use, including to tribes; (3) modifying operations—incentivizing and
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management framework provides a chance to institutionalize ongoing systems of
engagement and decision-making.484 “It is time to acknowledge and accept all the
uncertainties facing the basin and that we are going to live in a state of perpetual
negotiation to manage the river,” explained one leader. 485 In line with this
viewpoint, the confluence marks a special moment for building innovative systems
of collaborative, adaptive governance and moving away from more centralized,
stationary approaches to decision-making.486
What exactly should be done with the new management framework in this
moment? It’s no surprise most basin leaders agree the framework should include
operational elements similar to those in the Interim Guidelines, Drought
Contingency Plans, and Minute 323, including shortage-sharing regimes and
coordinated reservoir operations.487 Many tribal and other leaders, however, also

liberalizing water trading and sharing in relation to developed and undeveloped tribal water rights,
interstate and inter-basin transfers, and agriculture-to-urban transfers; and (4) facilitating governance
and implementation—managing growth and linking land use and water planning. SENSE OF THE BASIN,
supra note 460, at 20. Many basin leaders commented that the future of Colorado River system
management is less about acquiring and developing water rights (except for tribes) and more about
sharing available water resources through trading and other exchange mechanisms. Id. at 22 n.4. This
perspective is evident in several tools just identified within the reducing demand and modifying
operations categories.
484. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 20.
485. Id.
486. Many basin leaders expressed interest in building on the basin’s collaborative culture and
moving slowly—but intentionally—from ad hoc collaborative processes to ongoing collaborative
systems of decision-making. Id. at 22 n.5. The rationale for this transformation revolves around three
observations: (1) the basin community is in an era where decisions must be made in the face of
uncertainty, and thus there is an ongoing need to learn what is working or not working and to adapt
management; (2) it should be possible to build flexibility into decisional documents (e.g., records of
decision entered pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act) to allow decision-makers to engage
in adaptive management without multi-year negotiations and/or congressional consent; and (3) there
are significant transaction costs to starting-up basinwide collaborative processes every three to five
years. Id. In sum, basin leaders are aware of the need to work together, and thus the idea is to establish
a more permanent system of collaborative governance to do so efficiently and effectively. Some leaders
take this process issue one step further, suggesting the basin community should move (albeit slowly)
toward a unified system of management and governance, drawing on increased coordination between
the United States and Mexico under Minute 323 and between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin under
the Drought Contingency Plans. Id. The idea here is to strive for incremental progress toward sustainable
water use, to realize that climate change and other external forces are accelerating the timeline for
institutional change, and therefore to adjust the basic architecture for governance. By contrast, other
leaders prefer an “if it ain’t broke, don't fix it” approach. Id. In other words, the existing ad hoc system
of collaborative problem-solving is perceived as working, so let it be and make marginal improvements
where it is quick and easy to do so. Id. Some leaders also suggested that the basin states may resist this
evolution in governance given (1) the Lower Basin states’ (uneasy) partnership with the Bureau of
Reclamation along the Lower Colorado River, and (2) the Upper Basin states’ more autonomous system
facilitated by the UCRC. Id. Another key tension seems to be the degree to which tribes should be treated
as co-equal sovereigns alongside the federal and state governments. Id.
487. Id. at 20. These aspects of the Interim Guidelines, Drought Contingency Plans, and Minute
323 are discussed supra Part III.B.3.

2021

COMMUNITY IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN

69

suggested it’s time to move beyond managing the river system as plumbing for
cities and farms, and toward a more robust scheme that better accommodates
multiple needs and interests, including tribal sacred and cultural values, ecological
and recreational values, and the integration of land and water management. 488
Consistent with WTI’s sustainability resolution, the intent here is to articulate a
holistic vision for a living river system, and then to make incremental progress
toward realizing that vision—again, “pragmatic idealism.”489 During such visiondriven navigation, the basin’s community of communities needs to carefully
consider trade-offs between water-supply goals and ecosystem-protection and
restoration objectives, and to move from a system focused on water use to
watershed management.490
As for specific issues that should be addressed during the new management
framework’s development, basin leaders pointed to three Gordian knots of

488. Many basin leaders acknowledged negotiations over the new management framework will
most likely start with existing agreements—particularly, the Drought Contingency Plans—and suggested
a logical path forward is to identify gaps in those plans and ways in which they could be improved. By
contrast, several leaders suggested that with the synced expiration of the Interim Guidelines, Drought
Contingency Plans, and Minute 323, nothing should be placed off the table at the negotiations (at least
at the start), and participants should carefully evaluate tradeoffs and return on investment associated
with vetting particular issues and solutions. Many leaders endorsed the idea that the negotiations should
strike a balance between addressing the most urgent needs and interests (e.g., refining the coordinated
operating regime for Lake Powell and Lake Mead) and underlying, unresolved problems (e.g., the
structural deficit in the Lower Basin and the Upper Basin states’ flow obligations under the Colorado
River Compact). The intent in this vein is to consider broader issues as well as to generate an operational
plan. The basic rationale is that things have changed in some fundamental ways since the Interim
Guidelines were adopted. The basin’s community of communities needs to better accommodate the
interests of Mexico, tribes, recreationalists, and environmentalists, as well as to acknowledge the reality
of climate change. The immediate goal should be to find the sweet spot between the perfect and the
practical—again, to craft an inclusive long-term vision and then to take incremental steps towards
realizing it.
489. Basin leaders framed this subject in different ways. Here is a representative sample of
specific aspects of it: (1) seek agreement on standards or principles for shortage sharing and provide
equity in processes and policies for shortage sharing between the United States and Mexico, tribal
sovereigns vis-à-vis state and federal sovereigns, the Upper Basin and Lower Basin, agricultural and
municipal water users, consumptive and non-consumptive water users, etc.; (2) integrate a shortagesharing regime(s) with the Glen Canyon Dam Long-Term Experimental and Management Plan, Lower
Colorado River Program, Upper Basin Program, San Juan Program, salinity control program, and
operating guidelines for all dams and reservoirs in the system; (3) address ecological conditions in the
Colorado River Delta as well as issues in and around the Salton Sea; (4) address fish, wildlife, and
recreational issues alongside hydropower issues and provide recreational/environmental flows; and (5)
produce a comprehensive environmental impact statement and long-term basinwide plan rather than
addressing issues in a siloed or fragmented way.
490. Along these lines, some basin leaders commented on the need to clarify legal foundations
for ecological protection and restoration in the Colorado River Basin, as well as specific goals and targets
for different stretches of the river system (e.g., the Grand Canyon and Colorado River Delta). Without
such information water-supply decisions will continue driving the system by default. A few leaders
suggested John Wesley Powell’s watershed-commonwealths proposal should inform a long-term vision
for a sustainable, resilient river system. Powell’s proposal is discussed supra Part I.
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Colorado River governance.491
The Lower Basin’s “structural deficit” is the first Gordian knot. It generally
refers to the imbalance between water supplies and demands in the Lower Basin. 492
Numerous basin leaders raised concerns about it.493 Most leaders seem to view this
imbalance as resulting from multiple years of below-average supplies and excess
depletions, and to favor Lower Basin policymakers developing a long‐term plan with
a realistic water budget aimed at (1) increasing supplies (e.g., augmentation from
desalination or other sources); (2) reducing losses (including ways to account for
reservoir evaporation and other unavoidable losses); and (3) reducing consumption
(e.g., strategies for reducing water demands for agricultural, industrial, and
municipal uses through conservation and voluntary purchases or retirement of
water rights).494 Many basin leaders cautioned that the structural deficit will be
increasingly difficult to address if water demands increase in the Upper Basin while
climate change continues to diminish water supplies.495
The second Gordian knot involves the Upper Basin states’ flow obligations to
the Lower Basin states and Mexico under the Colorado River Compact. 496 Nearly
every basin leader commented that the new management framework should
address this issue. Many leaders see it as closely tied to the Lower Basin’s structural
deficit.497 The general question seems to be whether existing expectations
associated with the flow obligations are equitable in light of climate change and
potential future development of tribal and/or state water rights in the Upper
Basin.498 Some leaders believe the Upper Basin states need to come to terms with
the fact that they will not be able to consume more than 4.5 maf annually from the
river system.499 This issue thus implicates potential development and
implementation of a demand management program under the Upper Basin

491. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 21.
492. More detailed treatment of the structural deficit can be found in Robison, supra note 253,
at 536–42.
493. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 21.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 18.
496. Compact, supra note 24, at Art. III(c)–(d). One leader explained that the “minimum objective
release” from Lake Powell is 8.23 maf annually, accounting for 7.5 maf as an annual average release
under Article III(d) plus 750,000 acre-feet as an equal share of Mexico’s treaty water under Article III(c).
Another leader explained that the 8.23 maf “minimum objective release” from Lake Powell was a
function of the Long-Range Operating Criteria’s 602(a) storage provision, which is currently superseded
by the 2007 Interim Guidelines’ elevation tier-based coordinated operating regime for Lake Powell and
Lake Mead.
497. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 21.
498. Do climate change’s impacts rise to the level of “extraordinary drought” within the meaning
of Article 10(b) of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty? Treaty, supra note 27, at Art. 10(b). Several basin leaders
suggested this issue should be addressed and resolved during negotiations over the new management
framework.
499. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 21.
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Drought Contingency Plan.500
The third issue that rose to the level of a Gordian knot vis-à-vis the new
management framework is the recognition, quantification, and utilization of tribal
water rights. The Colorado River Basin’s tribal sovereigns have quantified rights to
divert a large portion of the basin’s flows. Alongside the figures noted above from
the Basin Study and Tribal Water Study,501 the most recent counterpart from the
Bureau of Reclamation comes from the 7.D. Review. 502 “In addition to currently
unquantified rights, Reclamation recognizes that tribes hold quantified rights to a
significant amount of water from the Colorado River and its tributaries
(approximately 3.4 maf of annual diversion rights) . . . .”503 That 3.4 maf figure
equates to approximately 23 percent of average annual natural flows at Lees
Ferry.504 Many tribes are not fully using their quantified water rights, however, due
to lack of infrastructure, lack of funding, or antiquated and inefficient water
systems.505 In addition, a dozen tribes have unquantified water rights.506 Yet
basinwide demands already exceed supplies.507 While tribes expect to fully use
their water rights to satisfy social, economic, and environmental interests, nonIndian parties are concerned about the integration of tribal water rights with
existing and future water uses. Recall the cloud metaphor.508 Although there has
been progress in recent decades to address tribal water rights without displacing
non-Indian water uses, this issue remains a major concern.
The process of developing a new management framework for the Colorado
River system thus provides an ideal opportunity for tribes to work with the federal
government, basin states, and other stakeholders to address a number of critical
questions about tribal water rights:

500. DEMAND MANAGEMENT STORAGE AGREEMENT, supra note 444.
501. TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 378, at C-38 (identifying 2.9 maf of quantified annual diversion
rights plus a dozen tribes with unquantified rights and claims); TRIBAL WATER STUDY, supra note 19, at
5.11-1 (“Partnership Tribes have reserved water rights, including unresolved claims, to divert nearly 2.8
million acre-feet per year . . . from the Colorado River and its tributaries.”).
502. 7D REVIEW, supra note 29.
503. Id. at 14. See also WATER & TRIBES INITIATIVE, POLICY BRIEF #4, THE STATUS OF TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS
IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN 1 (2021) (“There are 30 federal recognized tribes in the Colorado River Basin.
Twenty two of these tribes have recognized rights to use 3.2 million-acre feet (maf) of Colorado River
system water annually, or approximately 22 to 26 percent of the Basin’s average annual water supply.”),
http://www.naturalresourcespolicy.org/publications/policy-brief-4-final-4.9.21-.pdf [hereinafter POLICY
BRIEF #4].
504. Natural flows at Lees Ferry averaged 14.76 maf annually from 1906 to 2018. HOMA SALEHABADI
ET AL., CENTER FOR COLORADO RIVER STUDIES, UTAH STATE UNIV., THE FUTURE HYDROLOGY OF THE COLORADO RIVER
BASIN 1–2 (2020), https://qcnr.usu.edu/coloradoriver/files/WhitePaper4.pdf.
505. This underutilization pattern can be seen in TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 378, at C-41 fig.
C-18.
506. POLICY BRIEF #4, supra note 503, at 1, 7 tbl. 3.
507. STUDY REPORT, supra note 376, at SR-34 fig. 12.
508. Cordalis & Cordalis, supra note 374.
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•

How can the new management framework encourage the development
and use of tribal water rights in a way that is consistent with the principle
of tribal self-determination? In other words, what types of provisions
should be included in the framework that provide flexibility and
opportunities for tribes to use their water rights as they see fit—e.g., to
provide access to clean water in Native communities, 509 to sustain
cultural and ecological values, and/or to transfer water rights or share
them with other water users?

•

How can the future development of unused tribal water rights be
reconciled with the overall goal of rectifying the basinwide supplydemand imbalance?

•

What does the status of tribal water rights in the basin suggest in terms
of modeling and scenario planning for the development of the new
management framework? What type of information would help tribal
and other leaders shape policy options aimed at accommodating tribal
water rights and existing non-Indian water uses?

Many basin leaders suggested it is time to explicitly acknowledge the role of
tribal sovereigns and their water rights in resolving the basinwide supply-demand
imbalance—an approach partly illustrated by the role played by tribes in developing
the Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan.510 For many basin leaders—particularly,
tribal leaders—the role of tribes in the future should be based upon the
fundamental principle of self-determination.511 Tribes should be allowed to develop
and use their water rights as they see fit for economic, public health, ecological, or
ceremonial reasons. If tribes are interested, the new management framework
potentially could establish mechanisms enabling short‐term water transfers during
shortages, as well as long‐term water transfers to better align basinwide supplies
and demands. Any such options would move the basin’s community of communities
toward a key tenet of next-generation Colorado River governance: respect for tribal
sovereignty and self-determination.

509. For an excellent source on this subject, see WATER & TRIBES INITIATIVE, UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO CLEAN
WATER FOR TRIBES IN THE
COLORADO RIVER BASIN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(2021),
http://www.naturalresourcespolicy.org/projects/water-tribes-colorado-river-basin/3.20-wti-reportexecutive-summary-final.pdf [hereinafter UNIVERSAL ACCESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
510. SUNDUST et al., supra note 439, at 7–10.
511. Self-determination is the defining principle of federal Indian policy at this time. COHEN’S,
supra note 179, at 97–113. Further, as set forth in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, self-determination is a human right: “Indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.” G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 3, United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
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C. Institutions
Given the general consensus around a sustainability vision for the Colorado
River system, along with the shortlist of pressing policy issues currently facing the
basin, what types of institutions are needed to realize the vision and to navigate the
policy issues? Put differently, how do we build on advancements in collaborative
governance during recent decades to design next-generation institutions that
reflect even more fully the whole character of the basin’s community of
communities? Questions of this sort about institutional design are critical. We roll
out a sequence of ideas in the pages below.
1. Guiding Principles
WTI’s interviews with basin leaders in 2019—as summarized in Toward a
Sense of the Basin512—again mark our entry point. Drawing on their experiences
with recent processes in the Colorado River Basin, as well as lessons learned from
planning and decision-making efforts in other transboundary basins, leaders
offered eight key principles aimed not only at guiding the new management
framework’s development, but also shaping more durable institutions for Colorado
River governance over the long haul. These principles are as follows:
•

Use NEPA as the foundation for the new management framework’s
development, particularly provisions on public participation and
alternatives analysis.513

•

Encourage and support informal collaborative processes to supplement
the formal NEPA process in order to build awareness, understanding, and
consensus across the basin’s community of communities.514

•

Recognize the Secretary of the Interior and/or Reclamation
Commissioner will have final decision-making authority in consultation
with the basin states.515

•

Provide opportunities for tribes to meaningfully engage in the new
management framework’s development as sovereigns, rather than as a
special type of stakeholder.516

•

Structure negotiations over the new management framework to be open,

512. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460.
513. Id. at 26.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 26, 29.
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transparent, and inclusive, and to provide opportunities for meaningful
participation by any parties interested in or affected by the process.517
•

Use the best available scientific and technical information, including
Indigenous knowledge, to develop the new management framework. 518

•

Seek consensus as much as possible, particularly among basin sovereigns
(i.e., federal government, seven basin states, and thirty federally
recognized tribes).519

•

Allow for learning and adaptive management, as we will never have
complete knowledge and information, and always manage the river
system in the face of change and uncertainty.520
2. Decision-makers

As these guiding principles reveal, a threshold question in designing any
transboundary water institution—including negotiation processes—is, “Who is
going to make what decision?” In relation to the new management framework,

517. Id. at 26.
518. In addition to modeling alternative scenarios, many basin leaders explained an informed
process is one that fosters mutual learning, common understanding, and consideration of a variety of
options. In line with this view, all sovereigns, water users, and stakeholders should have equal
opportunities to share views and information. Some leaders suggested the process should provide
sufficient time and space for creative, outside-the-box thinking to generate innovative ideas, options,
and solutions, including those that might technically fall beyond constraints rooted in existing
interpretations of the Law of the River. As one leader expressed, “the crisis of the moment is solved by
whatever good ideas are laying around; so, an important part of preparing for and engaging in the next
basin-wide negotiation process is to litter the field with good ideas so there are lots of resources
available when the decision-making process catches up.” An informed process should also enable
participants to develop a range of alternatives to address the purpose and need, realizing no one of them
will be perfect. Rather, elements from several alternatives generated by different groups almost
certainly will be cobbled together into an agreed-upon package. The Interim Guidelines themselves were
based on an alternative that adopted large portions of a basin states’ proposal, but also incorporated
concepts from others. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, COLORADO RIVER
INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD
6-3 to 6-5 (2007), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/FEIS/Chp6.pdf [hereinafter
INTERIM GUIDELINES FEIS].
519. As explained by one group of basin leaders, the goal is to “build a broad coalition of states,
water users, tribes, stakeholders, and others that support the preferred alternative or recommendation
in the Record of Decision.” SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 28.
520. Id. Many basin leaders favored development of a twenty-five-year plan rather than a series
of three- to five-year plans given the transaction costs of starting and stopping every few years. From a
longer-term perspective, the new management framework should create an ongoing process to monitor
the Colorado River system, to learn, and to adjust or adapt management strategies. Similar to the
Drought Contingency Plans, this process should include explicit triggers to initiate alternative
management strategies (e.g., reservoir elevations). Id.
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basin leaders’ answers to that question include a mix of contextual parameters and
sovereign and non-sovereign actors.521
The foreseeable scenario is identified by the principles. NEPA will structure
the formal process for negotiating the new management framework,522 and the
Secretary of the Interior and/or Reclamation Commissioner will have final decisionmaking authority.523
In addition to this dominant federal role, however, most basin leaders opined
that the basin states should play a significant role in the new management
framework’s development. A host of reasons were given: (1) the Colorado River
Compact apportions water between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin while
recognizing state control over water administration within state boundaries;524 (2)
tribal water use is charged against basin states’ apportionments under the Upper
Basin Compact and Arizona v. California decree;525 (3) basin states most likely will
assume responsibility to build coalitions among diverse constituents within their
boundaries; (4) states have constitutional authority to form interstate compacts
and agreements;526 and (5) the federal government generally defers to state water
law outside specific contexts (e.g., reserved rights).527 In light of these parameters,
some basin leaders suggested the new management framework might be
developed through something akin to the negotiation process for the Drought
Contingency Plans, where states initially negotiated agreements that were
subsequently enacted as federal law and implemented by a federal agency. 528
In the final analysis, the process of developing the new management
framework most likely will be a hybrid model, where the basin states negotiate an

521. Id. at 29–33.
522. Id. at 26. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements for
“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)
(2020). The new management framework’s development and implementation qualify as such an action.
523. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 26. Many basin leaders explained that the Bureau of
Reclamation may play a host of roles in the negotiations beyond initiating and convening the formal
NEPA process, including providing technical expertise, serving as facilitator or meditator, and advising
on international negotiations with Mexico.
524. See, e.g., Compact, supra note 24, at Art. IV(c).
525. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 251, at Art. VII; Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150, 159
(2006).
526. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, para. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”).
527. The Colorado River Basin Project Act further addresses federal-state relations by declaring:
It is the policy of the Congress that the Secretary of the Interior . . . shall
continue to develop, after consultation with affected States and appropriate
Federal agencies, a regional water plan, consistent with the provisions of this Act
and with future authorizations, to serve as the framework under which projects
in the Colorado River Basin may be coordinated and constructed.
43 U.S.C. § 1501(b) (2020).
528. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 26.
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agreement that is considered as one alternative in the NEPA process. The Interim
Guidelines’ formation illustrates such an approach.529 Whether Congress ultimately
would need to review the outcome of the NEPA process is an open question that
seemingly revolves around which particular funding requests and policy measures
are incorporated into the new management framework.
Looking beyond the dominant roles played by the federal and state sovereigns
in developing the new management framework, many basin leaders favored the
“community of decision-makers” being broader and more inclusive.530 As noted
above in the guiding principles, many leaders suggested that the thirty basin tribes,
as sovereigns alongside the federal government and basin states, should have a seat
at the decision-making table.531 This expanded inclusivity in the “community of
decision-makers” would not only level the playing field to an extent among basin
sovereigns, but also treat tribes as partners with the federal government and basin
states rather than as non-sovereign stakeholders per past processes.
To operationalize this idea, several basin leaders suggested creating a
Sovereign Review Team comprising representatives from the federal government,
basin states, and basin tribes.532 This approach was used successfully in the
Columbia River Basin—which encompasses portions of Idaho, Montana, Oregon,
Washington, and Wyoming—to prepare for renegotiation of the Columbia River
Treaty between the United States and Canada.533 The basic premise of this
arrangement is that federal, state, and tribal governments share a unique character
in being sovereign—a character distinct from myriad non-sovereign stakeholders
with interests in the Colorado River system. The sovereign status of these entities
elevates them into the “community of decision-makers” if you will. In addition,
some basin leaders analogized the Sovereign Review Team’s structure to the
structure of negotiations for tribal water rights settlements as described above,
where federal, state, and tribal representatives collaborate to resolve Indian
reserved rights claims.534 Several basin leaders even suggested the Sovereign
Review Team should also include Mexico as a neighboring federal sovereign,
although doing so would not obviate the need for international negotiations under
the auspices of the IBWC.
As an incremental step in expanding inclusivity within the “community of
decision-makers,” several basin leaders envisioned the Sovereign Review Team
operating as an advisory group in the new management framework’s development.

529. See INTERIM GUIDELINES FEIS, supra note 518, at 2–8 to 2–12.
530. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 26–27.
531. Id. at 26.
532. Id. at 29–30.
533. See, e.g., U.S. ENTITY, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY 2014/2024 REVIEW RECENT STUDY RESULTS (2012),
https://www.bpa.gov/news/pubs/FactSheets/fs-201206-Columbia-River-Treaty-Review-Recent-StudyResults.pdf.
534. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 29. Tribal water rights settlements are discussed supra
Part III.B.2.
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In that capacity, it would (1) serve as the primary forum for receiving input and
advice from various stakeholders, experts, and the public; (2) foster a common
understanding and develop alternatives for the new management framework; (3)
seek agreement on a preferred alternative; and (4) advise the Secretary of the
Interior and/or Reclamation Commissioner as the final decision-makers in the NEPA
process. An alternative option would be for the Sovereign Review Team to function
as an advisory group that is supplementary to the federal government and basin
states as principal decision-makers. In contrast to these options, several basin
leaders suggested the Sovereign Review Team would be even more effective if the
Secretary of the Interior established it not just as an advisory body, but instead as
a formal entity within the decision-making process.
Some basin leaders agreed with the Sovereign Review Team concept in
principle, but ultimately dismissed it as unworkable.535 The primary concern
revolved around efficiency: how to effectively represent the basin’s sovereigns
while still keeping the “community of decision-makers” small enough to get work
done.536 Several tribal and other leaders offered a range of creative solutions in
response.537 One way to operationalize the Sovereign Review Team would be to ask
the federal government to designate one or two representatives; to ask each basin
state to appoint one representative; and to ask basin tribes to select a limited

535. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 10. The Sovereign Review Team concept received mixed
reviews at WTI’s basinwide workshop in February 2020. On the one hand, many participants agreed it
could provide a meaningful role for basin tribes, integrate more perspectives into planning and decisionmaking processes, and facilitate broad-based learning and education. Some participants suggested a
Sovereign Review Team should facilitate transactional opportunities in addition to sharing information,
building relationships, and refining the governance structure. Several participants also emphasized that
a Sovereign Review Team makes sense as a supplement to other processes, but not as a replacement
for formal consultation with basin tribes. Creating a Sovereign Review Team, according to many
participants, would be a major step forward in Colorado River governance. On the other hand, many
participants raised the issue described in the text concerning how all thirty basin tribes could be
represented on the Sovereign Review Team, particularly in light of the variation in interests, capacities,
and cultures. The priorities for some tribes may be to develop and use their water rights for economic
purposes, while other tribes may be interested in developing and using their water rights for a mix of
economic, environmental, and cultural objectives. Moreover, some tribes have unresolved water rights
claims, while other tribes hold quantified rights. Participants also expressed concern about how a
Sovereign Review Team could be structured to ensure its work would be given serious consideration by
the ultimate decision-makers—i.e., the Secretary of the Interior and/or Reclamation Commissioner—as
the Sovereign Review Team itself is not envisioned as a formal decision-making body. Some participants
likewise raised questions about whether the Sovereign Review Team would be subject to the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, while other participants asked related questions about who would convene,
staff, and fund a Sovereign Review Team, as well as how consensus might be reached among such a
large, diverse group of participants. Other participants noted that basin states would need to work
closely with basin tribes whose reservations lie within the states’ boundaries to forestall potential
attempts to use the Sovereign Review Team as an appeals process. And finally, some participants
wondered whether a Sovereign Review Team would distract tribes from formal decision-making
processes. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 29–30.
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number of representatives given that direct participation by thirty tribes would be
cumbersome. Along these lines, it is important to emphasize each basin tribe is
unique, and it may be difficult (if not impossible) to reach tribal consensus on all
matters. Two potential options for tribal representation on the Sovereign Review
Team are (1) selecting one tribal representative per basin state (i.e., seven in total),
or (2) selecting one or two tribal representatives for the Colorado River mainstem
tribes, Central Arizona Project tribes, and Upper Basin tribes as groups. Both
options would keep the “community of decision-makers” relatively small yet
inclusive. Notably, tribal representatives would not speak for basin tribes that are
not at the table per se, instead assuming responsibility for regularly communicating
with those tribes, sharing information and ideas emerging in the Sovereign Review
Team, and seeking input and advice.
Other basin leaders expressed concern about how the Sovereign Review
Team, as envisioned here, would not represent non-sovereign stakeholders (e.g.,
irrigators, municipal water users, environmental organizations, etc.). 538 These
communities would continue to participate in collaborative processes much as they
have in the past, including the NEPA process, state-led efforts, and other informal
arrangements. To facilitate more inclusive engagement of non-sovereign
stakeholders, however, the Sovereign Review Team could create working groups,
delegate assignments, and ask working groups to generate reports and
recommendations. The Sovereign Review Team could also convene public
workshops to increase awareness and understanding and to seek broad-based
input and advice. From this perspective, the Sovereign Review Team would be a
significant step forward in creating next-generation governance institutions that
better reflect the Colorado River Basin’s community of communities.
Taking the long view, some basin leaders suggested a Sovereign Review Team
might shape Colorado River governance well beyond the new management
framework’s development.539 Perhaps over time the Sovereign Review Team would
evolve into a standing body to facilitate adaptive management and collaborative
decision-making. The catalyst for this line of thought is that a basinwide commission
does not currently exist, and that right now might be an opportune moment to
begin conceiving such an entity, given the complex problems facing the basin’s
community of communities and the collaborative culture that has emerged among
them in recent decades.540 In other words, the Sovereign Review Team should be

538. Id. at 10.
539. Id. at 30.
540. Basin leaders offered arguments for and against a basinwide commission. Arguments in favor
included (1) establishing clear, consistent, transparent processes for making decisions and resolving
disputes, and therefore avoiding the need to reinvent processes time and again; (2) dedicating staff

2021

COMMUNITY IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN

79

understood as a potential incremental adjustment to the “community of decisionmakers” that could evolve over time into a transformative institution for nextgeneration Colorado River governance.
3. Role of Tribes
Yet the Sovereign Review Team idea certainly does not end our discussion of
tribal engagement in Colorado River governance. It is a compelling topic for so many
reasons. In addition to their sovereign nature, the basin’s thirty federally recognized
tribes hold substantial, senior rights to Colorado River system water, as identified
above—“approximately 3.4 maf of annual diversion rights” according to the 7.D.
Review, roughly equivalent to 23% of average annual natural flows at Lees Ferry. 541
This share will increase as additional rights are recognized and quantified. 542 And
basin tribes with quantified rights likewise plan to develop them. 543 The proverbial
cloud is indeed a Gordian knot.
But you might not know it. History generally shows basin tribes at the margins
of Colorado River governance. Their total exclusion from the Colorado River
Compact’s formation is one historic episode worth reiterating. 544 Only in recent
decades have they had opportunities to participate directly in policy discussions
shaping the river system’s management. Even with the collaborative turn, however,
much progress remains to be made. Basin tribes have expressed concern about how
they and their water rights were treated in the NEPA process culminating in the
Interim Guidelines.545 A few years later, the Basin Study likewise got off to a rocky
start, with tribes not being represented on the study’s exclusive federal-state
steering committee and instead being relegated to technical sub-teams.546 The
Bureau of Reclamation made earnest efforts to remedy the situation—after being
reminded of the federal government’s trust responsibility toward tribes—but even
so the Basin Study’s coverage of tribal water rights fell short and necessitated the

whose responsibility would be to consider the entire basin rather than just a portion of it; and (3) moving
from an ad hoc system of collaboration to a more deliberate, inclusive system of planning and decisionmaking. Id. at 37 n.4. Arguments in opposition included (1) redefining the basin states’ role; (2)
transaction costs associated with creating a commission; and (3) fear of the unknown. Id. A good starting
point for literature on this topic is David H. Getches, Colorado River Governance: Sharing Federal
Authority as an Incentive to Create a New Institution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 573 (1997).
541. 7D REVIEW, supra note 29, at 14; SALEHABADI ET AL., supra note 504, at 1 (describing natural
flows at Lees Ferry averaged 14.76 maf annually from 1906 to 2018). See also POLICY BRIEF #4, supra note
503, at 1 (noting twenty-two basin tribes collectively hold “recognized rights to use 3.2 million-acre feet
(maf) of Colorado River system water annually, or approximately 22 to 26 percent of the Basin’s average
annual water supply.”)
542. See POLICY BRIEF #4, supra note 503, at 1, 7 tbl. 3 (identifying a dozen basin tribes with
unrecognized rights).
543. See, e.g., TECHNICAL REPORT C, supra note 378, at C-41 to C-43.
544. HUNDLEY, supra note 255, at 80, 211.
545. 7D REVIEW, supra note 29, at 12.
546. See Vigil Testimony, supra note 379.
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Tribal Water Study.547 That latter study marked a step in the right direction with
respect to relationship building and other benefits of collaboration. And the same
can be said about basin tribes’ participation over the past decade in policy
discussions at the Colorado River Water Users Association’s annual conference.548
The benefits of tribal inclusion at policy tables are readily apparent. 549 Recall
as just one example the recent engagement of the Colorado River Indian Tribes and
the Gila River Indian Community on the Steering Committee for the Arizona
Drought Contingency Plan.550 “Arizona water users were able to reach a deal on the
DCP, in part, because Arizona tribes participated in and led negotiations on
conservation efforts and water exchanges”—specifically, the Colorado River Indian
Tribes’ offer to store 50,000 acre-feet annually in Lake Mead over a three-year
period beginning in 2020, and the Gila River Indian Community’s leasing of 33,185
acre-feet annually to the Central Arizona Groundwater Replenishment District over
a twenty-five-year period commencing in 2018.551 “Tribes in Arizona, including the
Gila River Indian Community and the Colorado River Indian Tribes, played a
significant role in the new Drought Contingency Plan implementation,” described
Arizona Representative Raúl M. Grijalva.552 “Without tribal participation, the DCP
would not be possible . . . .”553
According to basin leaders, along with representations made by
commentators at recent conferences and policy discussions, there is a general
consensus that basin tribes should be more meaningfully involved in policy
discussions and negotiations about the Colorado River system’s future, including
development of the new management framework. 554 While leaders arrive at this
consensus view for diverse reasons, nearly all are interested in the critical question

547. TRIBAL WATER STUDY AGREEMENT, supra note 381.
548. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 38. Tribes have participated in planning this conference
since 2009, when George Arthur of the Navajo Nation served as vice-president and then president of the
Colorado River Water Users Association. Id. at 42 n.2.
549. In addition to their engagement in the Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan, Lower Basin
tribes—Colorado River Indian Tribes, Gila River Indian Community, and Tohono O’odham Nation—have
participated in a Pilot System Conservation Program since 2015. Pilot System Conservation Program
(Pilot
Program),
BUREAU
OF
RECLAMATION
(2019)
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/PilotSysConsProg/pilotsystem.html. This participation has
bolstered Lake Mead’s storage so as to stave off a shortage declaration along the Lower Colorado River.
Id.
550. SUNDUST ET AL., supra note 439, at 7–10.
551. Id. at 7.
552. Id. at 3.
553. Id.
554. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 39.
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of “how” to make this happen.555 Basin leaders seem to agree that (1) the new
management framework must address tribal rights and interests in a meaningful
way, and (2) the federal government and basin states need to do a better job of
reaching out to basin tribes, enhancing tribal capacity to participate vigorously in
these types of processes, and listening to basin tribes in an effort to accommodate
their respective needs, interests, and priorities.556
At the same time, basin tribes need to take advantage of opportunities to
participate, to clarify their objectives for managing the river system, and to
communicate what they bring to the table in terms of history, knowledge, water
rights, and potential solutions. Tribes should be more proactive and less reactive,
more assertive and less deferential to federal and state officials, and prepared to
engage robustly in the new management framework’s development.
Basin leaders pointed to a range of options for how tribes could participate in
decision-making processes surrounding the new management framework. The
following options are certainly not mutually exclusive.557 First, tribes could engage
in government-to-government consultations with the federal government and hold
it accountable (1) to fulfill its trustee role with respect to tribal water resources, and
(2) to champion any positions on which there is federal-tribal consensus.558 To this
end, some leaders suggested jump-starting the 7/10 process previously initiated by
the Ten Tribes Partnership and the Secretary of the Interior. 559 Second, tribes could
work with officials from the state(s) in which their reservations are located (1) to
ensure tribal needs, interests, and priorities are integrated into the negotiating
strategy of the state(s) for the new management framework, and (2) to hold the
state(s) accountable to champion any positions on which there is state-tribal
consensus.560 Third, tribes could participate in something like a Sovereign Review
Team—as mapped out above—and again hold federal and state officials
accountable to champion any positions on which the sovereigns reach

555. Three major reasons are prevalent among the non-tribal basin leaders: (1) respect for equity,
social justice, and/or tribal sovereignty in relation to the negotiation process and basin tribes’ abilities
to develop and use their water rights; (2) interest in mitigating uncertainty over the impacts of tribal
water development on non-tribal water users; and (3) commitment to engaging basin tribes in
collaborative problem-solving aimed at meeting the needs and interests of both tribes and other water
users reliant on the Colorado River system. Tribes, of course, believe they need to be at the table because
of their aboriginal connections to the river system, their expertise and knowledge derived from these
longstanding connections, and as a recognition of their sovereign status and the significance of the water
rights they hold. Id. at 42 n.6.
556. Id. at 39.
557. Id. at 40.
558. Id.
559. Id. at 6. According to some basin leaders, representatives of the seven basin states and the
Ten Tribes Partnership began discussions in the early 1990s to address problems facing the Colorado
River Basin. Known as the “7/10 process,” these officials explored ways of improving water-use
efficiency, water management, and voluntary water transfers in order to extend supplies and reduce the
risk of shortages. The 7/10 process has not been active for quite some time. Id. at 40, 42 n.9.
560. Id. at 40.
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consensus.561 Fourth, tribes could co-create and participate in a distinctly tribes-led
forum: Tribal Leaders Forum.562 It would serve to facilitate and organize
involvement by all interested tribes, as well as to enable information exchange,
dialogue aimed at finding common ground, and development of options and
recommendations for the new management framework. 563 Finally, tribes could
participate in issue-specific, place-based, and other collaborative processes that
may emerge, as discussed further below.564
To operationalize any of these options for tribal participation, basin tribes will
need or want assurances that their participation will constitute more than a
symbolic gesture—“that it will actually make a difference in the process.” 565 At the
same time, tribes will need to “step forward proactively to demonstrate good faith
and a commitment to work together,” underpinned by an “understanding that their
interests and views will be considered to the same extent as those of other
sovereigns,” and they will have opportunities to influence outcomes. 566 There is
also the capacity issue. Effective tribal participation hinges on it, including adequate
“time, staffing, knowledge … and funding to hire consultants.”567 In the final
analysis, it is important to keep in mind that each basin tribe is unique and will
determine how, if at all, they wish to engage based upon their interests and

561. Id.
562. Id.
563. During the basinwide workshop convened by WTI in February 2020, participants generally
agreed some sort of forum for tribes to build capacity and to facilitate engagement in basinwide policy
discussions is an essential step forward. To be most effective, a Tribal Leaders Forum would need to be
driven by tribes, with all thirty tribes invited to participate—notwithstanding variation in their interests,
knowledge, resources, capacity, and experience. The Tribal Leaders Forum would need to be well-funded
and staffed, and it would need access to a robust suite of scientific and technical information. When
viewed in connection with the Sovereign Review Team proposal, some participants suggested the Tribal
Leaders Forum could select representatives to participate on the Sovereign Review Team, and otherwise
convey tribal input and advice to the Sovereign Review Team, as well as providing a mechanism to ensure
all tribal needs and interests are adequately represented in the Sovereign Review Team. According to
some participants, the Tribal Leaders Forum is one place where tribes that have been more active in
basinwide decision-making processes—e.g., Colorado River Indian Tribes and Gila River Indian
Community—could share experiences with other tribes to enhance capacity. Some participants
wondered whether the Ten Tribes Partnership and the Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona could help launch
and facilitate the Tribal Leaders Forum, while other participants suggested it should be convened and
facilitated by the Bureau of Reclamation to maximize its legitimacy and credibility, or perhaps by WTI
given its demonstrated commitment and capacity. Although not denominated as such, the Tribal Leaders
Forum idea is discussed briefly as Option #5 in id. at 40.
564. Id.
565. Id. at 41.
566. Id.
567. Id. Some basin leaders suggested that one way to demonstrate a commitment to tribes as
partners in the new management framework’s development would be to provide funding so tribes can
contract for outside expertise and assistance, including but not limited to hydrologists, economists,
lawyers, planners, and engineers. Some leaders noted that, as a matter of social justice, there should be
some level of funding for tribes in light of the billions of dollars historically spent on projects that have
diverted water away from Indian reservations. Id. at 43 n.11.
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capacity.568
Although there is no singular “tribal ask” given the unique needs, interests,
and culture of each basin tribe, it is possible to identify general themes in response
to the question of “what do tribes want?” out of negotiations over the new
management framework.569
First, as made abundantly clear by basin leaders, tribes want to have a
formative role in the framework’s development. They want to be treated as
sovereigns alongside their counterparts: the federal government and basin states.
Relationship building is key here. Basin tribes want the federal government to
engage in more meaningful, more impactful government-to-government
consultation in fulfillment of its trustee role.570
Second, big surprise: basin tribes want to use their water rights. And they need
funding for construction and management of infrastructure. A host of corollary
“asks” fall under this umbrella: (1) completing settlements of unrecognized and
unquantified tribal water rights; (2) fully developing quantified but unused or
under-used tribal water rights;571 (3) addressing impacts of future development of
tribal water rights on other water users; (4) providing accessible drinking water and
sanitation to every person in the basin;572 (5) recognizing storage of tribal water as
a beneficial use; (6) allowing dedication of unused tribal water to Intentionally
Created Surplus or other water conservation measures; (7) resolving issues
associated with accounting for tribal water rights under basin states’
apportionments; and (8) developing depletion schedules for basin tribes similar to
those completed for the Upper Basin and Lower Basin states in the Interim
Guidelines.573
Third, another general theme growing out of the question of “what do tribes
want?” from negotiations over the new management framework concerns selfdetermination. Tribes want to exercise that promise as it has framed federal Indian
policy for the past half century.574 Along with empowering tribes to promote

568. Id. at 41.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 40.
571. Some basin leaders commented that tribes may be able to support the idea of treating all
quantified rights—whether they are currently used or unused—as “used” by definition and thus
available for marketing and sharing. One variation on this theme is to develop a method for measuring
unused tribal water and then providing tribes with some type of “conservation credit” for not diverting
that water. Id. at 43 n.13.
572. UNIVERSAL ACCESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 509. An estimated 30 percent of people on
the Navajo Reservation lack access to running water and must haul water. DIG DEEP & U.S. WATER ALL.,
CLOSING THE WATER ACCESS GAP IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN 38 (2019) (citing NAVAJO NATION
DEP’T OF WATER RES., DRAFT WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY FOR THE NAVAJO NATION 2 (2011)).
573. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 41. The Upper Basin and Lower Basin states’ depletion
schedules are set forth in Appendices C and D, respectively, of INTERIM GUIDELINES FEIS, supra note 518.
This suggestion could build off growth scenarios developed for the Ten Tribes Partnership tribes in
chapter 5 of TRIBAL WATER STUDY, supra note 19.
574. COHEN’S, supra note 179, at 97–113.
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economic development, to build governmental infrastructure, to manage natural
and cultural resources, to meet health care and educational needs, and to perform
other essential functions, the principle of self-determination should be extended
unequivocally to tribal water rights. In short, basin tribes should have autonomy.
They should determine whether they wish to use their water rights for social,
economic, cultural, or environmental purposes on their reservations, as well as
whether they wish to transfer, market, or otherwise share their water rights off
those reservations.
4. Stakeholder Engagement & Public Participation
Moving beyond the community of decision-makers, next-generation
governance institutions in the Colorado River Basin should provide ample
opportunities for participation, learning, dialogue, and problem-solving by the
whole community of communities, consistent with the guiding principles above.
Nearly every basin leader suggested that “the process” for developing the new
management framework “should not and will not revolve around a single table.” 575
Rather, “the process” should include multiple opportunities for participation by
parties whose interests are affected by the framework, as well as by entities
engaged in implementing it.576 “In short, ‘the’ collaborative process should take the
form of a network of networks.”577
Beyond the NEPA framework mentioned above, including its provisions for
public participation, a network of networks should encompass varied formal and
informal processes for stakeholder engagement.578 The basic idea here is to create
multiple, overlapping opportunities for meaningful participation, to “facilitate the
flow of ideas and information across networks via shuttle diplomacy and other
methods,” and to seek consensus among the broadest possible coalition of
parties.579 These objectives can be attained by initially “keeping tables small enough
to negotiate agreements,” and subsequently integrating those agreements into a
consolidated package of proposals for the new management framework.580
A network of networks should start by building on existing processes and
forums—e.g., the well-established forum for basin state principals, the Colorado
River Sustainability Campaign in the conservation area, etc. 581 There may also be
opportunities to create new working groups around specific issues or places.582 One

575. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 31.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. The Organization, COLO. RIVER SUSTAINABILITY CAMPAIGN, https://www.rivercampaign.org/ (last
visited Apr. 10, 2021).
582. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 31.
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way to imagine how a network of networks might be composed is to envision a
nested system.583 Moving from basinwide to localized scales, the network of
networks could encompass a range of options:584
•

International dialogue between the United States and Mexico, convened
under the auspices of the IBWC, to negotiate a successor to Minute 323.

•

Interstate dialogue, convened by basin-state principals, to enable states
to exchange information and seek agreements on the new management
framework.

•

Tribal Leaders Forum to provide a unique, distinct space for all thirty tribal
sovereigns in the basin to exchange information, to clarify needs and
interests, and to reach consensus positions on the new management
framework.

•

Upper Basin and Lower Basin forums to build awareness, understanding,
and agreement among states, tribes, and stakeholders within each subbasin (e.g., the Upper Colorado River Basin Water Forum convened by
Colorado Mesa University).585

•

State-level forums to facilitate communication, understanding, and
agreement on needs and interests within individual states, including
those of tribes, water users, and conservation groups (e.g., Arizona
Reconsultation Committee).586

•

Issue-specific working groups to facilitate communication,
understanding, and agreement on particular issues (e.g., reservoir
operations, water banking and marketing, environmental concerns, tribal
water rights, governance, etc.).

•

Place-based working groups to focus on multiple issues in particular
places within or adjacent to the basin (e.g., Colorado River Delta, Salton
Sea, Grand Canyon, etc.).

•

Citizen diplomacy to encourage unaffiliated citizens, conservation groups,
universities, “and other interested parties to initiate, convene, and

583. Id.
584. Id. at 31–32.
585. Upper
Colorado
River
Basin
Water
Forum,
COLO.
MESA
https://www.coloradomesa.edu/water-center/forum/index.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
586. Arizona
Reconsultation
Committee,
ARIZONA
DEP’T
OF
WATER
https://new.azwater.gov/arc (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
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coordinate forums to explore issues of mutual interest, [to] offer
solutions and recommendations to solve problems, and [to] facilitate
shuttle diplomacy.”587
This network of networks offers rich opportunities for the basin’s community
of communities to participate in collaborative decision-making over the new
management framework.588 Some opportunities are more formal, others more
informal.589 Some are designed to facilitate information exchange and foster
education and learning, while others are designed to provide advice to decisionmakers. Still other forums are focused on building agreements, resolving conflicts,
and making decisions. Some of the opportunities can and should occur before the
formal NEPA process begins, while others can and should occur parallel to, and
thereby supplement and complement, the formal NEPA process. 590
Consistent with the network of networks concept, another option for
collaborative problem-solving related to the new management framework would
be to create a multi-stakeholder forum similar to the Bureau of Reclamation’s
Moving Forward Effort.591 It was designed as a multi-stakeholder collaborative
forum for building on next steps from the Basin Study.592 Undertaking Phase 1 of its
activities from 2013 and 2015, the forum included representatives from the federal
government, basin states, tribes, conservation organizations, and agricultural and
municipal water users.593 This multi-stakeholder collaborative structure could
supplement several options encompassed within the network of networks. 594
While the network of networks focuses predominantly on opportunities for
stakeholder participation in the new management framework’s development (i.e.,
participation by sovereigns and organized interest groups), it is equally important
to consider opportunities for public participation (i.e., participation by more or less
unaffiliated citizens in and around the Colorado River Basin).595 A couple points are
relevant in this space.
As a threshold matter, basin leaders agreed there is a huge need to inform
and educate the general public about where their water comes from, as well as

587. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 32.
588. Id. at 31.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 26.
591. Moving
Forward
Effort,
BUREAU
OF
RECLAMATION,
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/MovingForward/ (last updated Dec. 10, 2018).
592. Id.
593. Moving
Forward
Effort,
Phase
1,
BUREAU
OF
RECLAMATION,
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/MovingForward/Phase1.html (last updated Dec.
10, 2018).
594. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 30.
595. Id. at 32. To be clear, the citizen-diplomacy component of the network of networks would
enable participation by unaffiliated citizens.
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issues, options, and trade-offs facing the basin community.596 Some leaders
suggested there would be value in a targeted “public information and education
campaign that is broad, inclusive, and innovative.”597
In addition, as far as soliciting input and advice from the public, the formal
NEPA process should dovetail with supplementary methods of public participation,
including options available to the public before the formal NEPA process begins. 598
The toolboxes of the International Association for Public Participation 599 and the
National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation600 are excellent sources for
innovative methods that have emerged in recent decades to meaningfully engage
members of the public in collaborative decision-making. These methods could be
integrated into several options encompassed within the network of networks,
including Upper Basin and Lower Basin forums, state-level forums, issue-specific
working groups, place-based working groups, and citizen diplomacy.
5. Knowledge & Information
In relation to the new management framework’s development and far
beyond, a final yet essential ingredient for next-generation Colorado River
governance institutions involves knowledge and information. While it may seem
trite, it’s important to begin our foray into this topic by recognizing the general
consensus among basin leaders that governance must be based on the best
available scientific and technical information. 601
Building on this premise, basin leaders were quick to point out a critical
interface.602 While there is no shortage of scientific and technical information about
the Colorado River system, there is a need to ensure the relevance of that
information to decision-making processes.603 “What questions need what kind of
information?”604 How is information integrated into governance? 605 Some leaders
suggested that one way to better integrate science into decision-making processes
would be to rely on real-time/actual hydrologic data, rather than forecasting and

596. Id.
597. Id. The “For the Love of Colorado” water education campaign might serve as a model. Joe
Rubino, New Campaign Implores Water Conservation, ‘For the Love of Colorado,’ DENVER POST (June 20,
2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/06/20/campaign-water-conservation-love-colorado/.
598. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 32.
599. Welcome,
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
FOR
PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION,
https://www.iap2.org/mpage/Home (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
600. Welcome, NATIONAL COALITION FOR DIALOGUE AND DELIBERATION, https://ncdd.org (last visited
Apr. 25, 2021).
601. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 27.
602. Id. at 44.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Id. For more on this topic, particularly the historical pattern of ignoring science in Colorado
River governance, see generally KUHN & FLECK, supra note 255.
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modeling, to develop annual operating plans.606 Other leaders “suggested that
forecasting and modeling are essential” for establishing benchmarks and triggers,
as well as for clarifying options and tradeoffs.607 Perhaps there is intersectionality
versus dissonance here: forecasting and modeling tools should be enhanced to
generate more real-time information for planning.608 All told, there is general
consensus among leaders that it is imperative to align expectations and water
management with the basin’s hydrology.609
In addition to using the best available scientific and technical information, as
well as focusing that information on decision-making processes, another
indisputable fact is that Colorado River governance inevitably must occur in a
context of uncertainty (e.g., climate change, water development, etc.). 610 Once
again, there is general consensus among basin leaders that decision-makers and
stakeholders should acknowledge this dynamic and strive to make informed
decisions based upon what is known, with the expectation of learning and adapting
over time.611 Interestingly, some leaders explained how “current and emerging
science is expanding the range of uncertainty, making it even more difficult to
[reach] consensus on scientific and technical information.” 612 One response to the
challenge of navigating uncertainty has been a significant investment in scenario
planning, including projecting water availability in different climate-change and
water-development scenarios.613
Another important set of issues involving scientific and technical information
concerns the need to better understand the Colorado River system’s vulnerability
to low‐probability, high‐impact events beyond the scope of normal expectations
and current management plans (e.g., megadroughts or extreme floods).614 Most
risks of this sort revolve around extreme hydrological conditions that may stress
existing institutions—those addressing water allocation, reservoir operations,
biodiversity loss, ecosystem protection and restoration, etc.—and otherwise

606. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 44.
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Id. at 45.
613. Id. at 44. The Basin Study and Tribal Water Study both exemplify such work. STUDY REPORT,
supra note 376, at SR-12 to SR-36; TRIBAL WATER STUDY, supra note 19, at 5.11-4 to 5.11-6; WANG ET AL.,
CTR. FOR COLO. RIVER STUD., UTAH STATE UNIV., MANAGING THE COLORADO RIVER FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE (2020),
https://qcnr.usu.edu/coloradoriver/files/CCRS_White_Paper_3.pdf; Colorado River Conversations
Project, CTR. FOR CLIMATE ADAPTATION SCI. & SOL., UNIV. OF ARIZ., https://ccass.arizona.edu/colorado-riverconversations-project (last visited April 25, 2021); See also SALEHABADI ET AL., supra note 504.
614. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 45. For more on the role of risk in Colorado River
management, see generally Thinking About Risk on the Colorado River, COLO. RIVER RSCH. GRP. (2019),
https://www.coloradoriverresearchgroup.org/uploads/4/2/3/6/42362959/crrg_thinking_about_risk.p
df.
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compromise the socio-ecological system’s stability.615 Several basin leaders
explained that the likelihood of such events occurring is increasing.616 Thus, the new
management framework must “consider a range of potential futures” that may
stress the river system and utilize “the best available information to frame
alternative scenarios and management strategies.”617
Several additional issues related to knowledge and information should be
considered in the development of next-generation Colorado River governance
institutions—the new management framework and otherwise.618 These issues
include the following:
•

Clarifying, understanding, and translating tribal spiritual and cultural
values related to the river system into terms that are comprehensible and
useful to water managers.

•

Integrating western science, traditional knowledge, and cultural values
into planning and decision-making processes involving the river system.

•

Articulating clear, specific ecological goals for different segments of the
river system (e.g., Grand Canyon, Colorado River Delta, etc.).

•

Assessing and reconciling trade-offs between water-supply and ecological
goals.

•

Coordinating the wealth of information and expertise related to the river
system (e.g., Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Geological Survey, state water
resource agencies, university-based centers and experts, environmental
organizations, etc.).

•

Building capacity and sharing knowledge and information across the
basin’s community of communities.

•

Communicating scientific and technical information to decision-makers
and stakeholders.

•

Resolving disagreements among scientists from different disciplines or
fields.

•

Enhancing scientific and technical capacity to facilitate adaptive

615. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 45.
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. Id. at 44.
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management.619
In response to this list, basin leaders offered several prescriptions generally
involving building existing knowledge, 620 enhancing tribal capacity,621 devising
strategies for integrating western science and traditional tribal values and
knowledge,622 and creating a system for ongoing learning and adaptive
management.623 These prescriptions were synthesized into a strawman proposal
presented at WTI’s basinwide workshop in February 2020 that called for something
novel. The Secretary of the Interior should create, or should encourage the creation
of, a Colorado River Science and Culture Open Forum (“Open Forum”). It would
provide a venue for (1) exploring scientific and technical issues facing the basin; (2)
enhancing public awareness of those issues; (3) moving beyond a science agenda
focused largely on water-supply concerns to a more holistic understanding of the
river system based upon western science and traditional tribal values and
knowledge; (4) integrating findings and conclusions of the Open Forum into
decision-making processes related to the new management framework; and (5)
surfacing the broadest possible range of policy alternatives for the new
management framework’s design, including “third rail” options unlikely to surface
through more conventional processes.624
The Open Forum proposal received a mixed review.625 As an overarching

619. Id. at 44–46. Some basin leaders suggested this issue is less about enhancing scientific and
technical capacity per se, and more about integrating it into planning and decision-making systems that
govern the river system. Id. at 46. Part of the challenge is to develop a flexible management framework
with the expectation that its implementation will vary in sync with the basin’s hydrology (e.g., reservoir
operations). Id.
620. Examples include supplementing data from the Basin Study and Tribal Water Study with
information generated by entities such as the Center for Colorado River Studies at Utah State University,
the Western Water Assessment at the University of Colorado, the University of Arizona’s Center for
Climate Adaptation Science & Solutions, and the Colorado River Research Group. Id. at 47.
621. Several basin leaders suggested the Bureau of Reclamation should provide tribes with the
same type and level of technical support in relation to the new management framework’s development
as the agency did for the basin states with the Interim Guidelines’ development. Id. This approach would
follow on the heels of the technical support provided by the Bureau for the Tribal Water Study. Id.
622. An important aspect of this prescription involves translating tribal spiritual and cultural
values into terms that can be used by water managers. Id. at 48. To accomplish this translation, some
basin leaders suggested experimenting with innovative methods of engagement, such as “ethical space.”
Id. The intent here is to respect and accommodate differences between traditional tribal values and
knowledge and western culture/science. Id. Many leaders commented that this task will be an important
aspect of designing any collaborative process going forward, and that it involves values and vision as
much as scientific and technical information. Id. The goal, according to some leaders, is to move beyond
a science agenda dictated largely by federal and state officials to a more holistic understanding of the
river system based on western science and traditional tribal values and knowledge. Id.
623. Some basin leaders favored creating a formal system or entity to facilitate ongoing learning
and adaptive management. Id. They identified as potential models the U.S. Geological Survey’s Grand
Canyon Monitoring and Research Center and the Public Policy Institute of California. Id.
624. Id. at 62–63.
625. Id. at 12–13.
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matter, workshop participants observed that values and policy preferences drive
data generation and modeling.626 This interface led some participants to pose the
question of “how should we decide what we need to know, and how should we go
about gathering that information?” 627 Participants suggested that examining
assumptions about what type of data are needed would not only foster a broader
conversation, but also influence decision-making over the new management
framework.628 For example, what would happen if we were to assume all tribal
water rights will be quantified and fully developed across the Colorado River Basin?
Or what would happen if we were to prescribe ecological goals for different
segments of the river system? Should we be modeling for short-term water supply,
long-term sustainability, or both?
Along these lines, some workshop participants observed that the new
management framework should both consider and reflect a broader, more inclusive
set of values and interests than water managers historically have taken into
account—a viewpoint consistent with the sustainability resolution above. 629 In
particular, some participants explained that the Colorado River Compact talks about
“no impairment,” and that this provision historically has focused solely on water
supply.630 In developing the new management framework, these participants
advocated for a more liberal construction, extending the provision to issues such as
universal access to clean water and protection of ecological values across the
basin.631
To achieve these objectives, workshop participants generally agreed it is
essential to better integrate traditional tribal values and knowledge into the new
management framework, with such integration occurring as early as possible in the
negotiations.632 Underlying this recommendation is not only a desire to broaden
the new management framework’s purpose, scope, and aspirations, but also a
recognition of the importance of respecting different types of knowledge
(traditional knowledge and western science) and different values (tribal cultural,
environmental, and spiritual values as well as the value of water supply). All parties
should have access to the same body of information, realizing that this access will
not necessarily correlate with uniform agreement on the interpretation and
meaning of that information.
Some workshop participants observed that integrating traditional tribal
values and knowledge into the new management framework is easier said than

626. Id. at 12.
627. Id.
628. Id.
629. POLICY BRIEF #3, supra note 477, at 5.
630. Compact, supra note 24, at Art. VIII (“Present perfected rights to the beneficial use of waters
of the Colorado River System are unimpaired by this compact.”).
631. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 12.
632. Id.
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done.633 A couple concerns are notable. First, what is the best way to gather
information about traditional tribal values and knowledge, and how can it be done
with respect for information tribes may not wish to share for cultural and other
reasons? One path forward, according to some participants, would be to convene
listening sessions with tribal and other leaders, reflecting WTI’s process of
conducting interviews and convening workshops to prepare Toward a Sense of the
Basin.634 Second, how can tribal cultural and spiritual values be translated into
terms (or parameters) suitable for modelling work, keeping in mind that relativism
should exist between the value added by western science and traditional tribal
values and knowledge?635 In short, how can information of this sort be made
actionable? Although the Bureau of Reclamation has expressed willingness to
explore how to package this information for translation into the Colorado River
Simulation System,636 some participants suggested a new model and/or decisionmaking framework may be needed that better accommodates a broader range of
values and aspirations.
Circling back to the Open Forum proposal, some workshop participants
wondered whether creating this entity would be the best way to achieve the
objectives above.637 They suggested new platforms are not needed to do this type
of work, and the entity would distract from other planning and problem-solving
forums.638 Conversely, other participants indicated there is a need for more
independent scientific and technical review of alternative proposals for the new
management framework, and this type of review should be informed not only by
western science, but also by traditional tribal values and knowledge. 639 Some
participants, however, raised concerns about how the Open Forum’s work would
be considered and/or integrated into the decision-making process.640 Perhaps the
best option to address this challenge, according to some participants, would be for
the Secretary of the Interior to authorize the Open Forum’s creation, thereby

633. Id.
634. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460.
635. For an excellent introduction to bridging cultural differences, see generally PETER S. ADLER &
JULIANA E. BIRKHOFF, THE NATIONAL POLICY CONSENSUS CENTER, BUILDING TRUST: WHEN KNOWLEDGE FROM “HERE”
MEETS
KNOWLEDGE
FROM
“AWAY”
(2002),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/building_trust_adler_birkhoff.pdf. For a review of
innovative methods to blend different ways of knowing and learning, see ALBERTA ENERGY REGULATOR,
VOICES
OF
UNDERSTANDING:
LOOKING
THROUGH
THE
WINDOW
(2017),
https://static.aer.ca/prd/documents/about-us/VoiceOfUnderstanding_Report.pdf; Willie Ermine, The
Ethical Space of Engagement, 6 INDIGENOUS L. J. 193 (2007).
636. For a basic description of this modeling system, see General Modeling Information, BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/riverops/model-info-APR2018.html (last visited
Mar. 27, 2021).
637. SENSE OF THE BASIN, supra note 460, at 13.
638. Id.
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establishing its visibility, legitimacy, and credibility.641
Finally, many workshop participants highlighted the need to ensure adequate
funding and staffing for the Open Forum, as well as access to relevant
information.642 Basin tribes (and other parties) most likely would need time, money,
expertise, and other resources to build capacity for effective participation in the
forum. It would also require expertise to translate and communicate technical
information across the basin’s community of communities.
And that brings us back to what animates this lengthy discussion of the new
management framework and next-generation Colorado River governance writ
large. . . .
V. CONCLUSION
Community. That concept is what this Article’s been about. It’s what Colorado
River governance should be about—the new management framework and beyond.
And it’s much more than a concept. Bet your life on it.
John Wesley Powell’s proposed watershed commonwealths fell short of
community—at least from a twenty-first-century vantage.643 Powell saw
connections—perhaps his mind’s strongest tendency—but his vision was tethered
to historical context,644 as all of ours are. So while he floated a river system flush
with life—animate—initially in 1869 and again in 1871 and 1872,645 only one species
was alive in his advocacy about Western water.646 And while that advocacy echoed
the Arid Region’s Spanish and Mexican past—embracing communitarian water
governance—Powell’s commonwealths weren’t for those peoples. 647 Nor were
they for Native communities who intrigued Powell for so much of his life 648—
communities whose connections to the river system have been described with the
perfect word: umbilical.649

641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Powell, supra note 1, at 114.
644. Louis Warren & Rachel St. John, Strange Resurrection, in VISION & PLACE, supra note 12, at
24–25 (“Powell was . . . of course, a man of his time and place, constrained by the biases and beliefs of
a culture that assumed natural resources could best be used to promote agrarian development, that
presumed the dominion of white men over Native people and the natural world alike, and that imbibed
a blind faith in progress that would lead mostly to intense disappointment.”).
645. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, EXPLORATION OF THE COLORADO RIVER OF THE WEST AND ITS TRIBUTARIES (1875).
646. Two publications are foremost in this advocacy: Powell, supra note 11; JOHN WESLEY POWELL,
REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES (1878).
647. Powell, supra note 1, at 112.
648. “Powell was instrumental in establishing the Smithsonian Institution’s Bureau of Ethnology—
later renamed the Bureau of American Ethnology—including serving as it first director (1879-1902).”
VISION & PLACE, supra note 12, at xx.
649. As described by Zuni tribal member Jim Enote: “The Zuni River and Little Colorado River are
like umbilical cords, connecting us back to the place where we emerged.” The Voices of Grand Canyon,
supra note 54.
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Have you ever felt invisible? Maybe some readers do now. If so, you’re not
alone. Take a look at this piece of Patty Limerick’s famous writing about Western
history:
The cast of characters who inherit the West’s complex past is as diverse
as ever. As Western dilemmas recur, we wish we knew more not only
about the place but also about each other. It is a disturbing element of
continuity in Western history that we have not ceased to be strangers.
. . . One would be happy to consign this pattern of thought to the old
frontier West, but the quarantine would not hold. When AngloAmericans look across the Mexican border or into an Indian
Reservation, they are more likely to see stereotypes than recognizable
individuals or particular groups; the same distortion of vision no doubt
works the other way too. . . . Indians, Hispanics, Asians, blacks, Anglos,
businesspeople, workers, politicians, bureaucrats, natives, and
newcomers, we share the same region and its history, but we wait to
be introduced.650
Any hand this Article may have in making such introductions would be cause
for celebration. The Colorado River Basin is a community of communities. It cannot
and should not be a community of strangers. That’s not community at all. By the
same token, Colorado River governance cannot and should not occur among
strangers. That’s not governance at all. “What really is the key to success are
relationships. You can’t really work closely with folks and on very complex
contentious issues if you don’t know about each other and respect each other. I
know it sounds simple. Of course, it’s not, in fact.”651 That wisdom comes from Terry
Fulp, former Lower Colorado Regional Director for the Bureau of Reclamation, 652
and possibly a kindred spirit to Patty Limerick. The next several years present an
opportunity for relationship building that is exceptional in our lifetimes. Who knows
when such a moment will come again. It’s time to get to know each other. It’s time
to give and earn respect. And in these “simple” ways, it’s time to do what John
Wesley Powell envisioned for his watershed commonwealths, but in twenty-firstcentury form: create institutions shaped by our connections.
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651. Gary Pitzer, A Colorado River Leader Who Brokered Key Pacts to Aid West’s Vital Water Artery
Assesses His Legacy and the River’s Future, WESTERN WATER (Nov. 6, 2020),
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